Spinoza and Religion

A study of Spinoza's metaphysics and of
his particular utterances in regard to
religion, with a view to determining the
significance of his thought for religion and
incidentally his personal attitude toward it.

By

Elmer Ellsworth Powell, A. M., Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy in Miami University

Chicago
The Open Court Publishing Company

London

Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Ltd.
1906

COPYRIGHT 1906

. B7

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO
CHICAGO

105736

TO MY WIFE

PREFACE.

A German translator and expounder of Spinoza's
works declares that in the whole history of human
thought there is not to be found a system more dif
ficult to understand and to explain. After studying
the system in its details, I am disposed to accept this
assertion as probably true. I have blinked no dif
ficulties, however; but have felt it my duty to study
each one until I have succeeded either in harmoniz
ing it with the system as a whole, or in clearly
showing it to be a logical inconsistency. Spinoza's
logical inconsistencies are of two kinds: (1) fallacies
of reasoning, and (2) the acceptance of contradictory
propositions which are correctly deduced, although
from different and incompatible presuppositions.

My excuse for adding another book to the already
formidable pile of literature on Spinoza is the fact
that his relation to religion has not yet been made
the subject of specific, comprehensive, and candid
treatment; and that consequently there prevail not
only among intelligent people in general, but even
among students of philosophy, the vaguest possible
notions in regard to this matter. Anyone who may
feel disposed to think that I am performing a work
of supererogation, is asked to suspend his judgment
until he has read Chapter II. of my " Introduction. "

In order to go to the bottom of the question and
attempt to settle it, it has been necessary to pass be
yond Spinoza's specific utterances in regard to re-

Vlll

PREFACE

ligion, and to subject his metaphysics to careful
analysis. Those who are not used to abstract think
ing (if any such should do me the honor of reading
my book), will doubtless find my exposition of
Spinoza's metaphysics in some parts difficult, per
haps dull; although I have spared myself no pains,
in order to attain the utmost clearness.

In conducting my investigations and in presenting
the results, I have endeavored to maintain a strictly
impersonal attitude, aiming solely to determine (1)
what Spinoza taught and (2) how his doctrine is
related to the religious consciousness. Accordingly,
I must disappoint those who seek in the present
work either a polemic against Spinoza or an apology
for him. I will not deny, however, that my book
is after all a polemic, a polemic against a mistaken
interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy and person
ality.

While, as the basis of my judgments, I have
taken, of course, Spinoza's own writings (in the
original Latin where extant, and in the Dutch trans
lation where the Latin is lost), I have derived valu
able hints from several of his expounders. My
obligations are acknowledged in the foot-notes to
the text. The " Biographical Sketch" is the part
for which I claim the least merit; for, considering
it as of minor importance for the question at issue,
I have been willing to accept, in regard to the orig
inal sources, the critical labor of others, save when
facts significant for our estimate of Spinoza's per
sonality were involved. In this part I am most in
debted to Dr. Freudenthal of Breslau, who has done
so much in recent years to enrich our scanty knowl
edge of Spinoza's life; although I have sometimes

PREFACE ix

been led to express quite other judgments on the
facts. In a general way, I owe most to my former
instructor in philosophy, Professor Benno Erdmann ,
although he should not be held responsible for the
point of view here represented.

Spinoza's works I have cited according to Van
Vloten and Land's edition: "Benedict! de Spinoza
Opera," The Hague, 1895.

E. E. POWELL.

March, 1906.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

Page

Chapter I. Biographical Sketch 1

1. Historical Antecedents 1

2. Environment in which Spinoza's Lot was

Cast 3

3. Spinoza's Early Years 6

4. Rupture with the Synagogue 12

5. Sojourn in Rijnsburg 23

6. Sojourn at Voorburg 26

7. At The Hague 33

8. His Personality 42

Chapter II. Diversity of Opinion in Regard to

Spinoza's Relation to Religion 45

1. Various Expressions on the Subject 45

2. Causes and Significance of the Diversity of

Opinion 51

Chapter III. Spinoza's Doctrine of Knowledge 66

1. Certain Peculiarities of Spinoza's Psychol

ogy 66

2. The Imagination 75

3. The Reason 80

4. Logical Presuppositions 86

PART I.
SPINOZA'S CONCEPTION OF GOD.

Chapter I. His Definition of Substance (God)

and His Problem . , 97

xii SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Page

Chapter II. The Formal Attributes of Substance 101

1. Self-Existence and Eternity of Substance. . 102

2. Infinitude of Substance 103

3. Solitariness of Substance 107

4. Immutability of Substance 107

5. Perfection of Substance 109

6. Substance as Cause 110

Chapter III. Spinoza's Doctrine of Real Attri
butes 112

1. Relation of Attributes to Substance 112

2. Significance of the Infinite Number of Un

known Attributes 125

Chapter IV. Substance and Modes: God and

the World 130

Chapter V. Content of the Attribute of Exten
sion 161

Chapter VI. Content of the Attribute of

Thought 163

1. Intellectus Inflnitus 163

2. Idea Dei 182

3. Absoluta Cogitatio 190

Chapter VII. How Spinoza's Conception of the
Absolute is Related to the Religious
Consciousness 221

1. Analysis of the Religious Consciousness. . . 221

2. The Religious Consciousness and Spinoza's

Conception of God 239

PART II.

PARTICULAR DOCTRINES AND EXPRESSIONS

SUPPOSED TO IMPLY RELIGIOUS

VIEWS AND INTEREST.

Chapter I. The Intellectual Love of God . . 249

CONTENTS Xiii

Page

Chapter II. Immortality 266

Chapter III. Church and State 281

Chapter IV. His Treatment of Individual Re
ligious Conceptions 289

1. Miracles 289

2. Revelation 289

3. Jesus Christ 308

4. Sin 316

5. Repentance 319

6. Salvation 320

7. Providence . 321

8. Prayer 322

Chapter V. Supposed Professions of Religious

Interest 326

Conclusion . 339

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.1

1. Historical Antecedents.

Baruch (Latin, Benedictus) Spinoza was born of
Jewish parents at Amsterdam on the 24th of No
vember, 1632. His father at least was directly from
Portugal, perhaps originally from Spain. During
the generations immediately preceding Baruch 's
time, his race and family passed through experiences
which were not without significance for his own
life and which therefore deserve brief mention.

In the fifteenth century the "Holy Office" (the
Inquisition), which had been established in Arragon
by Gregory IX. as early as 1232 with a view to ex
tirpating the Albigensian heresy, had fallen almost
into disuse. In Castile, Leon, and Portugal it had,
in fact, never taken permanent root; but with the
union of Castile with Arragon toward the end of

1 The principal sources of our knowledge of Spinoza's
life are given in Freudenthal's "Die Lebensgeschichte
Spinoza's" (1899), which contains the early biogra
phies by Colerus (Kohler), Lucas, etc., together with
many important documents not published before. The
most recent and complete biography is the first volume
of Freudenthal's "Spinoza: sein Leben und seine Lehre"
(1904). With this compare, "Spinoza en zijn Kring,"
by the Dutch author, K. O. Meinsma (1896). Those to
whom these are not accessible will find a somewhat com-
pleter biography than is here given in Martineau's "Study
of Spinoza" (3d ed. 1895), and in Pollock's, "Spinoza:
His Life and Philosophy" (2d ed. 1899). Martineau's in
particular would now require to be altered in some
details.

2 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

that century by the marriage of Ferdinand and
Isabella, there opened a new era for the Inquisition
in the whole of the Peninsula. Its chief object now
was to punish baptized Jews who secretly relapsed to
their old religion. The Catholic zeal of the other
wise gentle Queen and the financial distress of the
King, whose treasury would be filled from the
confiscated goods of wealthy Jews, disposed the
sovereigns to hear with favor the Dominican advo
cates of a more reckless and cruel type of persecu
tion than had hitherto prevailed. Early in 1481,
therefore, a reorganized form of the Inquisition
began its work, and before the end of that year,
according to Mariana, a Jesuit historian, more than
two thousand perished by the flames in the arch
bishopric of Seville and the bishopric of Cadiz alone.
In 1492 the movement took on a new phase. The
Jews of all Spain were notified by royal decree that
those still loyal to their faith would after a short
term be required to leave the Kingdom. They
were to be allowed to take with them most of their
goods, except gold and silver. "When the days of
grace expired and they were called upon to choose
between baptism and banishment, they set out in
swarms toward those lands that seemed the least
inhospitable. It is estimated that 90,000 passed from
Castile alone into Portugal, the King of this
country having promised them temporary protec
tion for a money consideration. But here also they
were soon confronted with the old alternative, con
version or exile.

Many of the Spanish Jews possessed less heroism
or less depth of religious conviction than did these
emigrants, and consented to Christian baptism and

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 3

to the practice of what they considered idolatry, as
the price of remaining in Spain. But their apostasy
purchased them little peace; for their conversion
was regarded as a mere outward pretense, and
they were shadowed by informants, on whose
testimony many were from time to time condemned
to the flames. In both Kingdoms, however, not a
few families succeeded in living the double life for
several generations.

To these so-called "New Christians" in their dis
tressful condition came the report, about a century
after the exodus from Spain above-mentioned, that
the northern provinces of Holland had decided every
citizen "should remain free in his religion." Con
sequently in 1593 a small group of Portuguese (or
Portuguese and Spanish) Jews shook the dust off
their feet and embarked at Oporto for Holland. It
has been conjectured that Spinoza's father was one
of this company. We know now that he was not,
but that he came with a subsequent company of
the same kind. His home had been at Figueira near
Coimbra, Portugal; but we have reason to believe
that the family came originally from Spain. This
supposition is not inconsistent with the assumption
that for an indefinite time preceding their emigra
tion to Holland their home had been in Portugal.
Indeed this seems to be the only theory that har
monizes all the facts.

2. The Environment in which Spinoza's lot was cast.

In the seventeenth century Holland, where Spin
oza was born and passed the whole of his life, was
in many respects the most favored country in
Europe. Not least among the facts that justify this

4 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

assertion is the well-known one that it was more
completely than any other country the home of re
ligious toleration. The long but victorious struggle
with intolerant Spain, the acquisition of colonies
beyond the seas, extensive commercial relations
with different countries, and the presence of people
of various religious tenets, had led to the recogni
tion of the rights of the individual conscience. Its
rulers clearly saw the justice and wisdom of grant
ing complete religious liberty; and, left to them
selves, they probably would not have been guilty of
acts of persecution. As a matter of fact, however,
the influential clergy of the Reformed Church, sup
ported by ignorance and bigotry among the people,
sometimes forced the hand of the government to
acts of intolerance. But at no time and in no in
stance did persecution take the form of active in
quisition into private opinions. Everyone was per
mitted to think what he pleased, provided he did not
aggressively and contumaciously seek to propagate
offensive views. For actively disseminating what
seemed to be harmful heresies or atheism, imprison
ment and banishment were in a few cases the pen
alties inflicted. In so far as the spasmodic intoler
ance expressed itself in civil proceedings, it gener
ally took the form (1) of restricting to members of
the Reformed Church the right of regular public
worship, others being permitted to meet only in
private houses; (2) of depriving sectarians of the
right to hold civil offices; (3) of prohibiting, confis
cating, and burning heretical writings. But in spite
of these limitations on liberty of thought and speech,
dissenters and free-thinkers found themselves com
paratively secure in Holland. All could publish

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 5

books and pamphlets with the strong probability
that these would not be suppressed. By re-printing
condemned books in a new place and under a new
name, even radical free-thinkers succeeded in keep
ing their ideas before the public.

Another advantage enjoyed by Holland in the
seventeenth century was the great wealth gained
through its colonies and commerce. At the same
time, perhaps in part as a consequence of material
prosperity, it became the home of literature and
art, and disputed with France the leadership of
Europe in these matters. It was the age of Grotius
in general learning, of Huygens in natural science,
of Rembrandt in art. How important for Spinoza's
development all this must have been, need not be
remarked.

In regard to the Jewish colony in Amsterdam, it
ought to be noted that in Spinoza's time it no longer
had an exclusively Spanish-Portuguese character,
since it had received accessions from time to time
from every part of Europe, and had thus become
quite heterogeneous. Even the Spanish-Portuguese
element must have embraced very different types of
character. Among its members were families which
had refused in 1492 to accept Christianity and had
consequently left Spain for Portugal. These no
doubt represented the sturdier moral fibre of the
colony; but even these, though braving no incon
siderable hardships for conscience' sake, had ulti
mately come short of the spirit of martyrdom; for,
discouraged by their disappointing reception in
Portugal, they had finally accepted there the bap
tism they had refused in Spain. In short, they had
long been accustomed to live a double life. As com-

Q SPINOZA AND RELIGION

pared with these, those families that came directly
from Spain to Amsterdam, and probably most of the
Portuguese Jews also, must have possessed either less
depth of conviction or less moral stamina ; for, when
threatened, they had immediately submitted to bap
tism. A preponderance of practical interests had
always, it seems, determined them, whenever a pro
fession of their faith would cause them serious loss,
to accommodate themselves to their surroundings by
a life of prudent hypocrisy. While we have not the
heart to blame them, we can but recognize that they
were far from being thorough-going idealists whose
subjective interest in moral consistency would cause
them to break their heads against the solid walls
of external fact.

In its religious aspects the influence of this en
vironment on Spinoza seems to have been rather to
excite antipathies than to induce conformation, and
may be recognized to some extent no doubt in his
subsequent radical repudiation of ceremonialism and
his contempt for religious fanaticism. But he was
not entirely immune from unwholesome effects of
other features of his environment. The community
and the home in which he grew up received by tra
dition the habits of thought and feeling acquired
by the fathers under the shivering dread of persecu
tion. This circumstance both explains and palliates
Spinoza's excessive timidity and his over-valuation
of prudence.

3. Spinoza's Early Years.

Michael de Spinoza (or d'Espinoza), the father
of our philosopher, was a respectable and intelligent
tradesman. The local records show that not less

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 7

than four times he held the chief office either in one
of the three congregations existing before 1639 or
in the united congregation after that date, and that
he was once administrator of the loan-agency con
nected with the Synagogue. Of Hannah Deborah,
Benedict's mother, whose family name has not been
discovered, we know only that she was Michael's
second wife and that she died before her son had
completed his sixth year. During these early years,
Benedict's chief companions were probably his half-
sister Kebecca and his own sister Miriam, both
several years his senior. In his ninth year he was
presented with a stepmother, of whose character we
are ignorant.

With the school which Spinoza attended we are
better acquainted than with the conditions of his
home life. Extant documents recently published tell
us the names of his probable instructors, the subjects
they taught, and even the salaries they received.
The school had seven grades. In the first, the pupils
learned the Hebrew alphabet, spelling, and the
reading signs; in the second, they practiced the
sections of the Pentateuch appointed for the Sabbath
service, giving special attention to the conventional
pauses, rhythm, and intonation; in the third, they
translated portions of the Pentateuch into Spanish;
in the fourth, passages from the Prophets; in the
fifth, they studied the commentaries of the great
Talmudist Raschi ; in the sixth and seventh, the Tal
mud itself.1

Among the teachers under whose formative in
fluence Spinoza began his mental development, we
should mention Menasseh ben Isreal and Saul Levi

1 Freudenthal's "Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's," p. 113.

8 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Morteira. It was Menasseh ben Isreal (1604-1657)
who must have introduced him to the study of the
Talmud. This amiable personality was a scholar —
he is credited among other things with a knowledge
of ten languages — but not a thinker. He clung
firmly not only to the traditional Judaism as rep
resented by the Rabbinical system, but also to the
Cabala; and, like his less educated colleagues, re
garded every word in the Talmud and the Zohar as
divinely inspired.1

Saul Levi Morteira, Spinoza's chief instructor in
the Talmud, was a man of somewhat different type.
He was born at Venice in 1596, and studied with an
eminent physician of the place, who later became
private physician to Maria dei Medici in France.
Morteira, who accompanied his master, was thus
given a taste of court life. When he came to Am
sterdam at the age of twenty, it was probably his
prestige, his knowledge of the world and his courtly
manners, that secured him the invitation to remain
there and to undertake the Synagogue service. His
selection as chief instructor in the Talmud when the
Synagogue school was organized in 1639, indicates
that during the twenty-three years subsequent to
his arrival he had known how to retain the first-won
respect of the community, and to gain a reputation
for Rabbinical learning in addition. But he seems
to have enjoyed no fame for erudition outside of
Amsterdam. His sermons, the only printed produc-

1 "Cabala" is the name of the system of theosophy
which is alleged to have been transmitted by the mouths
of the Patriarchs and Prophets from the time of the
first man. "Zohar" is the name of the compilation of
these traditions alleged to have been made by Simon
ben Yochi (70-110 A. D.), but assigned by disinterested
scholars to the thirteenth century.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 9

tions of his literary activity, are said to have a
philosophical complexion, but no depth of thought.

A glance at the course of instruction given in the
school suffices to discover that the Talmud was the
only subject that was calculated in any degree to
interest and stimulate a young mind of logical bent.
In order to estimate the influence of this study, it
is necessary to recall its exact character. The Tal
mud comprises two parts : the Mishnah, the body of
oral, i. e., post-Mosaic legal (in great part ceremo
nial) traditions; and the Gemarah, learned commen
taries on the Mishnah. It exists in two recensions,
the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud,
both completed before the end of the fifth century
A. D. Of these a competent authority observes : ' ' The
doctors of both recensions, although they primarily
discuss the correctness of the text and the meaning
of the Mishnah and what should be the right legal
decision, do not confine themselves to this. They
introduce, as occasion serves, not merely the whole
of the oral tradition handed down to their time, and
the necessary interpretations of the various laws
to be found in the Pentateuch and other sacred
writings, but exhibit also, though only in a frag
mentary manner, an almost complete cycle of the
profane sciences as current orally and known to
them by books composed by Jews and Gentiles."1
It is well to note that the Talmud contained not only
religious matter, but also obsolete ideas in every
field of knowledge.

The method of imparting instruction in the Tal
mud is said to have been an alternation of questions
and answers, of difficulties and solutions. This

1 Solomon M. Schiller Szinessy, Encyc. Brit.

10 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

single redeeming feature of the School was well
calculated to develop logical acuteness. Spinoza's
interest in these exercises is attested by the tradi
tion that at the age of fifteen he was much praised
by Morteira for his uncommon penetration.

It has been supposed with some plausibility that
after finishing the School he decided, for the sake
of gratifying his taste for learning, to become a
Rabbi. If this be true, he must have spent the next
few years chiefly in more thorough study of the
Bible and Talmud, and also in diligently reading the
great Jewish writers on the philosophy of religion,
especially Maimonides and Ibn ben Ezra, of whom
his writings betray a considerable knowledge.

Outside the School and his theological environ
ment, there were other intellectual influences to
which he was more or less responsive, especially
from his fifteenth year on. By this time, as we have
already remarked, the Jewish colony had grown to
considerable dimensions, and had acquired a cosmo
politan character. The security and freedom en
joyed at Amsterdam had attracted Jews from dif
ferent parts, especially from Catholic Christendom
and from the German states, which were at that
time devastated by the Thirty Years' War. One
consequence of this circumstance was that the col
ony became a polyglot community. Owing to com
mercial pursuits and to the migratory habits occa
sioned by varying persecutions, the Jews in general
were the best linguists of the time. Those dwelling
at Amsterdam had peculiar opportunities and in
centives for acquiring languages. It has been noted
that Manasseh ben Isreal was acquainted with ten.
Most of his colleagues doubtless knew something

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH H

of five or six. All educated persons were supposed
to have learned several. Of the dead languages,
Latin was especially cultivated. It was very natural
therefore that Spinoza, a capable and aspiring
youth, should devote some attention to several lan
guages and should undertake a thorough mastery of
Latin. In Greek he never became proficient. His
studies in Latin were begun under a German
teacher, whose name has not come down to us, and
were continued and completed under a certain Fran
cis van den Ende, a physician and scholar, who was
interested in the natural sciences and had a reputa
tion both for skill as a teacher and for free-thinking.
In how far the report that he was a free-thinker was
justified, we are unable to determine. That he was
an efficient teacher, we may infer from the fact that
under him Spinoza soon learned to write a Latin
style which, though not faultless, was concise and
clear, quite adequate to the expression of his
thought. It was the language in which he afterward
did all his thinking and composed all his works.

There exists a story that, while Spinoza was re
ceiving instruction from Van den Ende, he fell in
love with his master's daughter Clara Maria, and
that in his wooing he was defeated by a rival who
won the girl's affection with the potent charms of a
pearl necklace. Data are now at hand which show
that Clara was then a child of only eleven or twelve
years. If Spinoza ever wooed her, it must have been
later; but of this there is also no tangible evidence.
The whole story has the appearance of one of those
old wives' fables which the historian may ignore.1

1 But compare Freudenthal I, pp. 41-42; Meinsma, p.
141; Martineau, p. 25; Pollock, p. 13.

12 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

With the acquisition of Latin, at this time the
universal language of scholars, a new world was
opened to Spinoza; and he must have entered it
without delay. His studies in mathematics, physics,
mechanics, astronomy, chemistry, and medicine,
probably date from this period. In philosophy he
must now have become acquainted with Aristotle,
the Stoics, the Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance,
Francis Bacon, Hobbes, and Descartes, with all of
whom his writings show more or less familiarity.
To Descartes in particular, who ultimately had more
influence upon his thinking than did all others, he
certainly devoted at this time very careful study.

This is all we know of Spinoza up to his twenty-
fourth year. It should be noted that, so far as is
known, he had not yet manifested any special re
ligious interest. Morteira is said to have praised
him for his mental acuteness, but no one is known
to have remarked upon his piety. The assumption
that, in his youth, he was of a religious disposition
seems to rest on nothing better than the two senti
mental grounds: (1) that he, like religious re
formers, was persecuted, and (2) that he was a Jew,
the Jews being supposed by some to be endowed by
nature with an inalienable "religiousness."

4. Rupture icitli the Synagogue.

In the meantime young Spinoza had begun to
excite the suspicion of the Elders of the Synagogue.
It is said he expressed too freely opinions of his
own, and was not sufficiently strict in his observance
of all the ceremonies. It began to look as though he

BIOGRAPHICAL, SKETCH 13

would get into trouble, unless he were more guarded
in his conversation and conduct ; for we have now to
note with disappointment that the hunted victims
of religious intolerance had not themselves learned
toleration. Spinoza's position seemed all the more
precarious, as the Jewish church had severely dealt
with one heretic already. Uriel da Costa, for this
was his name, was born of "New Christian" parents,
and had been brought up as a Catholic in Spain.
Breaking away from Christianity, he had fled from
Oporto to Amsterdam, where he had joined the
Jewish congregation. But he soon came into con
flict with his new environment also, maintaining
that the Pentateuch was of human origin, rejecting
the doctrine of immortality and the validity of the
ceremonial law, and advocating natural religion as
a substitute for Judaism. On account of these
views, he was promptly excommunicated by the
Synagogue. He remained under the ban for fifteen
years, when, remarking that "among monkeys he
would be a monkey too," he renounced his heresies
and was reconciled to the religious organization.
But he soon relapsed ; and seven years later, in order
to be re-admitted to the fellowship of his brethren,
submitted to thirty-nine stripes, and, prostrating
himself on the threshold of the Synagogue, suffered
the congregation to pass over his body. Not long
afterwards, he put an end to his unhappy life by
suicide. He was no doubt a sort of freak, unbal
anced in mind, and unstable in character; but the
humiliations to which he was subjected showed
Spinoza, who could remember his fate, that no
heretic could expect any consideration at the hands
of the Elders.

14 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

While trouble between him and the religious au
thorities was brewing, Spinoza had occasion, pos
sibly on account of unkind treatment, to leave his
now almost empty home, and to take up his abode
for a time with a friend, possibly Van den Ende,
whom he would have been able to assist in his
school. As he now claimed his share of the inher
itance, his half-sister and the widower of his de
ceased sister Miriam conspired to deprive him of his
rights. After he had compelled them through the
courts to give him his due, he voluntarily relin
quished his claim to everything except a "very
good" bed. What motives prompted him to this
act, we are unable to determine. A desire to help
his hard-hearted and undeserving half-sister, would
not have been consistent with his subsequent habit
of spending all his income, avowedly in order to
prevent his kindred from inheriting anything. It
may be that at this time there was nothing else left
to which he attached any particular value ; espec
ially as he was already more interested in knowl
edge than in possessions.

Of the events that led to the actual rupture with
the Synagogue in Spinoza's twenty-fourth year, we
have no reliable account. There exists a story that
when the Elders discovered Spinoza's state of mind,
they promised him an annuity of one thousand
florins, provided he would continue to conform to
Judaism and would hold his tongue. This improb
able story seems to be based on an on-dit reported
by Bayle, and the testimony (recorded by the un
critical Colerus) of the artist Van der Spy ck, one of
Spinoza's subsequent hosts, whose creative imagin
ation was not always confined to producing pic-

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 15

tures.1 If Spinoza was destined for the rabbinical
office, as some suppose, we can understand how the
sacrifice of future salary involved in his apostasy
may have given rise to the story. It is related like
wise that about this time religious fanaticism in
the person of an unknown enemy attempted to
plunge a dagger into Spinoza's heart one evening
as he left the synagogue, or, according to one ver
sion, the theatre. But this story has a mythical
complexion also.2

In dealing with Spinoza, the Elders probably ad
monished him first, and then visited him with the
lower degree of excommunication, which excluded
him from the Society for thirty days. When this
proved fruitless, the final sentence of the Synagogue
was pronounced against him on the 27th of July,
1656. It was expressed in the Portuguese language,
and has been translated as follows :3

"The chiefs of the council do you to wit, that having
long known the evil opinions and works of Baruch de
Espinoza, they have endeavored by divers ways and
promises to withdraw him from his evil ways, and they
are unable to find a remedy, but on the contrary have
had every day more knowledge of the abominable here
sies practised and taught by him, and of other enor
mities committed by him, and have of this many trust
worthy witnesses who have deposed and borne witness
in the presence of the said Espinoza, and by whom he
stood convicted; all which having been examined in

1 For some of the mistakes of Colerus, based on the
testimony of Van der Spyck, see Freudenthal's "Spinoza,
etc.," Vol. I, p. 320. This particular incident Freuden-
thal is willing to regard as historical. Vide op. cit. I,
p. 68.

2Cf. Freudenthal, I, p. 69.
3 Pollock's "Spinoza," p. 17.

16 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

the presence of the elders, it has been determined
with their assent that the said Espinoza should be ex
communicated and cut off from the nation of Israel;
and now he is hereby excommunicated with the following
anathema:

"With the judgment of the angels and of the saints we
excommunicate, cut off, curse, and anathematize Baruch
de Espinoza, with the consent of the elders and of all
this holy congregation, in the presence of the holy books:
by the 613 precepts which are written therein, with the
anathema wherewith Joshua cursed Jericho, with the
curse which Elisha laid upon the children, and with all
the curses which are written in the law. Cursed be he
by day and cursed be he by night. Cursed be he in
sleeping and cursed be he in waking, cursed in going
out and cursed in coming in. The Lord shall not pardon
him, the wrath and fury of the Lord shall henceforth be
kindled against this man, and shall lay upon him all the
curses which are written in the book of the law. The
Lord shall destroy his name under the sun, and cut him
off for his undoing from all the tribes of Israel, with
all the curses of the firmament which are written in the
book of the law. But ye that cleave unto the Lord your
God, live all of you this day.

"And we warn you, that none may speak with him by
word of mouth nor by writing, nor show any favor to
him, nor be under one roof with him, nor come within
four cubits of him, nor read any paper composed or
written by him."

This is certainly a terrible curse. It should be
observed, however, that it was not one specially
invented for Spinoza. It was a general formula
which the Synagogue only applied to the particular
case before them.

It would be easy to misapprehend the nature and
significance of Spinoza's excommunication. We
should not forget that the Jewish congregation was
a voluntary association, and, like all such, it had a

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 17

perfect right to define for itself the conditions of
admission and dismission. Under the circumstances,
the mere expulsion of Spinoza can hardly be called
persecution; but to let loose such an avalanche of
curses upon his head was to go beyond mere ex
pulsion, and must be characterized as, at best, ex
treme religious fanaticism.

The effects of this anathema have often been ex
aggerated. It has generally been assumed that it
entailed practical consequences of a very serious
nature. But many things tend to show that in fact
it did him little harm. It cannot be regarded as a
hardship to forego the society of those with whom
one no longer possesses anything in common. In
deed Spinoza had already decided to sever his con
nection with the Synagogue, when the excommuni
cation saved him the trouble of taking the initiative.
Moreover, to be cast out by the despised Jews, on
account of dissent from their views, could at first
only commend him to the favor of the rest of the
community. Even the rending of family ties could
not have been a matter of serious importance. His
father, his own mother, his stepmother, and his sister
Miriam were already dead. Only one member of
the family remained, his half-sister Rebecca; and
her attempt to rob him of his share in the father's
estate, would indicate that he had nothing to lose
in her. Besides, he had already formed new asso
ciations that were much more congenial than the
old. But after all qualifications have been made, it
must still be recognized that the experience through
which he passed at this time could not have been
a pleasant one, especially for a person of Spinoza's
disposition.

18 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

To the act of excommunication Spinoza felt called
upon to publish a reply, which is no longer extant.

Lucas, an early but more or less untrustworthy
biographer, relates that the chiefs of the Synagogue
finally induced the Reformed clergy to unite with
them in demanding Spinoza's banishment, and that
the civil authorities, yielding to the pressure,
actually expelled him from the city. The story
lacks confirmation, and, in view of all the circum
stances, seems to us very improbable.1

Of Spinoza's movements and whereabouts during
the next few years, we have no certain knowledge;
but it seems probable that he remained in and about
Amsterdam. To the number of friends and ac
quaintances he had already acquired here, were now
added others, especially from among the Collegiants
and Mennonites.

The Collegiants, or Rijnsburgers, are generally
believed to have been a branch of the "Remon
strants," a name applied originally to those Dutch

1 Pollock (p. 19) is disposed to regard the incident
as historical. Freudenthal likewise (I, p. 81). Mar-
tineau (p. 38) states the opposite view as follows: "This
story, unsupported by personal or documentary evidence,
has every internal mark of fiction. The Amsterdam
magistrates were eminent for their firm guardianship of
every citizen's rights. No law can be cited under which
the alleged charge could be brought. If it existed, it
would give the clergy no voice in the case, but must be
executed by the civil power. The alleged offence included
no overt act of public speech or writing, and was evi
denced only by the hearsay of private conversation.
And the sentence is said to have been passed by a
tribunal conscious of its injustice." To these consider
ations should be added (what Martineau did not know)
that Casearius, Spinoza's private pupil of some years later,
was a theological student of the Reformed Church. This
fact would indicate that Spinoza was not even then gen
erally suspected of having cast off religion as such, and
was not yet seriously distrusted by the Christian clergy.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 19

Protestants who, after the death of Arminius, con
tinued to maintain the views associated with his
name, and in 1610 presented to the states of Hol
land and Friesland a ''remonstrance" formulating
the points in which they departed from the stricter
Calvinism. The strife that followed issued in the
complete victory of the stricter view at the Synod
of Dort, which placed the " Remonstrants " under
the ban. Deprived of their pastors, they conceived
the possibility of getting on without a regular
ministry. Accordingly they instituted meetings that
ignored all ecclesiastical forms and distinctions.
They were bound by no definite creed, although they
generally assumed that belief in the authority of the
Scriptures and in Christ as, in some sense, the Re
deemer, was essential to religion. They welcomed,
it is said, even Roman Catholics on the one hand and
Socinians (Unitarians) on the other. Instead of
ceremonies, ecclesiastical relations, and metaphysi
cal doctrines, they emphasized right living as the
only important element in religion. In many re
spects thety- resembled the Mennonites, an older
sect, and were finally absorbed by them. These like
wise dispensed with a regular ministry, held simple
beliefs, and laid the chief stress upon a right spirit
and right conduct. But the bonds of sympathy be
tween the members were not exclusively religious;
they were in great part political. And it is im
portant to note that among both sects were found
liberal-minded men; that in fact many secularists
and radical free-thinkers who had no religious in
terest were included under those names.

Of Spinoza's friends at this time the most im
portant were the Mennonites: Peter Balling, Jarig

20 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Jelles, Simon de Vries, and Jan Rieuwertsz ; and the
physicians: Lodewijk Meyer and Dirck Kerckring.
They all possessed considerable interest in knowl
edge, while Balling, Jelles, Meyer, and Kerckring be
came writers of note, though of no originality.

Spinoza's association with persons belonging to
these sects has been interpreted as an evidence of
strong religious interest. "The more devoutly he
had been attached to the religious ideas of his own
people," says his latest biographer, "the more
painful must have been the void he felt, as they
gradually paled before his eyes and finally appeared
as mere illusions. For everything his faith had
lost [in Judaism] he looked for a compensation in
Christianity. ' n And Spinoza 's association with Men-
nonites and Collegiants was prompted, he thinks,
by a religious desire to obtain from pious-minded
men a more intimate knowledge of Christianity.
Of course this is only a conjecture. We have no
knowledge of Spinoza's spiritual experience at this
time or earlier. We cannot say even that he had
ever been "devoutly" attached to the religious
ideas of his own people, if by this we mean that
those ideas satisfied deeply-felt religious needs.
That he was drawn into relations with sectarians
by a religious interest in Christianity, is an un
warrantable assumption. It is certain, on the con
trary, that if at this time his fundamental views,
as seems extremely probable, resembled those ex
pounded in the earliest records of his thought, his
rupture with Judaism resulted from a repudiation
of the primary religious postulates which Judaism
and Christianity have in common; and hence that

1 Freudenthal, I, p. 64.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 21

when he abandoned the one he could not have hoped
to find satisfaction in the other. Spinoza was not
seeking another " faith;" he had already passed
beyond faith. What attracted him was not any
supposed light they could give him on religious
problems; but rather "their fraternal union, their
tolerance amid intolerance, and not least the politi
cal fidelity they had shown to the wise and heroic
upholders of the Republic."1 In short, the bonds
of sympathy between Spinoza and the sectaries
in question were, so far as we can judge, in no wise
religious, but ethical and above all political. The
sects constituted political forces which could be
relied upon to support the government against in
tolerant demands of the Reformed clergy ; and hence
stood for liberty of conscience, a cause in which
Spinoza had the greatest interest, both theoretical
and practical. Accordingly Spinoza turned to the
Collegiants and Mennonites as his natural allies and
protectors. As regards religion, he agreed with
them only in their negations; in their rejection of
ceremonialism and ecclesiasticism, in their opposi
tion to intolerance, and in their distrust of the Re
formed clergy.

In the meantime, in order to be able to maintain
himself, Spinoza had learned the art of polishing
lenses. This occupation he seems to have chosen
before others because of its relation to the science
of optics, and because of Descartes' example. He
soon became skilled in his art, and easily sold
through his friends a sufficient number to enable
him to defray the expenses of his frugal life.

1 Martineau, p. 19.

22 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

While in and about Amsterdam, he doubtless
spent most of his time in reading and thinking,
and in conferences with his young friends. It
seems probable that before leaving this place he
composed his first work, the "Short Treatise on
God and Man and his Well-being,"1 and that he
either left it in the hands of his friends on his de
parture or sent it back to them soon afterward.
It was not intended for publication, but for circu
lation among his friends in manuscript. Both in
form and substance it contains many crudities which
stamp it as his earliest composition. It is character
ized by a profusion of religious expressions for con
ceptions that he emptied of all religious meaning;
a circumstance which is no doubt to be explained
by the fact that his friends and others into whose
hands the manuscript might fall, although open-
minded, must have been still more or less bound
to the religious ideas in which they had been nur
tured. In doctrine it reveals the same general point
of view as we find in his later works, although very
important differences in the details of his system.
Originally composed in Latin, it was soon trans
lated into Dutch by one of his friends, and after
wards lost to view entirely. Its existence was not
suspected by scholars until 1852, when Edward
Bohmer of Halle found an abstract appended to a
copy of Kohler's "Biography of Spinoza." This
soon led to the discovery of Dutch translations, but
no copy of the original has yet come to light.

1 Preudenthal thinks this work was composed chiefly,
if not wholly, after leaving Amsterdam. Op. cit., p. 105.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 23

5. Sojourn in Rijnsburg.

From Amsterdam Spinoza moved to Rijnsburg,
a village near Leiden, probably in the year 1660.
He is said to have accompanied thither a Collegiant
friend with whom he had lived some time in Ouwer-
kerk near Amsterdam. Rijnsburg was an important
centre for Collegiants, so important in fact that
they ,werq commonly called Rijnsburgers. Here
Spinoza spent two or three of the most important
years of his life.

From a letter written to Oldenburg toward the
end of 1661, l we learn that he had already been
occupied for an indefinite time with a work, "de
intellectus emendatione," which can have been
nothing else of course than the unfinished treatise
that has come down to us with this title. His re
flections and investigations had evidently caused
him to feel the need of working out more definitely
his theory of knowledge and of clarifying his ideas
in regard to logical method. The work represents
his studies in these subjects. As we have it, the
fragment occupies but thirty-seven printed pages.
From the preface to his "Posthumous Works," writ
ten by Lodewijk Meyer, who probably knew whereof
he spoke, we learn that the difficulties encountered
retarded the progress of the work, and even pre
vented its completion. Apparently influenced by
Descartes' "Discours de la Methode," he introduces
his subject in the form of a narration of personal
experience in search of the summum lonum. His
language in this part has often been regarded as
that of a profoundly religious nature. In another

'Ep. 6, p. 217.

24 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

connection we shall have occasion to quote and ex
amine the most significant passages.

In the meantime Spinoza had begun to give
private instruction in Descartes' philosophy to a
young theological student called Johannes Casear-
ius, who temporarily took lodgings in the same
house. This name was formerly thought to be
a pseudonym for Albert Burgh,1 a subsequent con
vert to Eoman Catholicism of whom we shall have
a word to say later. The fact that a student of the
ology belonging to the Reformed Church chose
Spinoza as instructor in philosophy is significant
as showing that Spinoza was not yet regarded with
much, if any, suspicion outside of the Jewish com
munity. The theological prepossessions of his
pupil Spinoza found a source of irritation and dis
trust, and he did not feel free to disclose his real
opinions. He therefore confined himself to a pretty
faithful reproduction of the doctrines of Descartes;
in a few cases even supporting with arguments of
his own the views he himself did not accept. In
metaphysics he followed the more recent scholastics
rather than Descartes, but frequently treated scho
lastic doctrines in a way to expose their invalidity
without expressly rejecting them. It was evidently
his desire cautiously to plant in his pupil's mind the
seeds of conversion to his own views. It is worth
noting that Johannes Casearius became in later
years an efficient minister of the Reformed Church
and also a botanist of recognized merit.

When Spinoza's friends at Amsterdam learned
that he had written an outline of the second part

1 Meinsma has set the matter right. Vide op. cit., pp.
182-190.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 25

of Descartes' "Principia" with, added " Metaphysical
Thoughts," they urged him to make a similar ab
stract of the first part, and to publish the whole.
This he consented to do, on condition that some one
would improve the style and write a preface ex
plaining that in many particulars the " Metaphysi
cal Thoughts" did not represent his real opinions.
The work appeared in 1663 under the title "Renati
des Cartes principiorum philosophiae Pars I et II,
More Geometrico demonstratae per Benedictum de
Spinoza Amstelodamensem. Accesserunt Ejusdem
Cogitata metaphysica. " The author himself proba
bly regarded it as of little importance, and in this
estimate we must concur; but the contemporaneous
public in Holland and Germany received it with
great favor. He had unexpectedly made for him
self a name.

In the meantime he had also begun his greatest
work, the "Ethics." Early in the year 1663, as we
learn from a letter by Simon de Vries,1 a portion,
if not all, of the "First Part" was in the hands of
his friends in Amsterdam. The work so early begun
remained on his table many years, and was not com
pleted until 1675. In form it is modeled after
works on geometry. Starting from a body of
axioms and definitions assumed to be self-evident,
it proceeds by propositions, demonstrations, and
corollaries from one point to another until the pre
conceived goal has been reached. The form in which
his argumentation is cast gives it the appearance
of correctness; and, as the difficulty of following
the tangled threads of his abstract reasoning has
generally discouraged serious study of the work,

'Epis. 8 (olim 26).

26 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

it has enjoyed the quite unwarranted reputation of
being a master-piece of iron logic.

Spinoza's friends in Amsterdam had already or
ganized themselves into a kind of club for the study
of his philosophy. It was their custom to read and
discuss together parts of his writings, and then
by letter ask Spinoza himself for further light on
whatever remained unclear. Spinoza's replies con
stitute an important source of our knowledge of his
thought.

It was during his sojourn in Rijnsburg that he
was visited by Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the
recently founded Royal Society of London. On a
journey through Holland and Germany in 1661, the
Secretary heard of the promising young philosopher,
and sought him out in his retreat at Rijnsburg.
Judging from the letter written soon afterward,
which opened a long and fruitful correspondence,
Oldenburg must have been charmed not only with
Spinoza's evident gifts of intellect, but with his
personality also.

6. Sojourn at Voorburg.

In the spring of 1663 Spinoza moved from Rijns
burg to Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague. His
motive in this may have been the desire not only
to avoid the many interruptions to which he was
subjected by visitors, but also to draw nearer to
influential acquaintances connected with the Gov
ernment. For he had already attracted the atten
tion and won the good-will of some of the great
political leaders of the time, among others, the
Grand Pensionary Jan de Witt.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 27

Here his time was spent in conferences and cor
respondence with eminent men, in scientific and
philosophical studies, and in grinding lenses. Two
works in particular now claimed his attention, the
" Ethics" and the "Theologico-Political Treatise."
The first part of the " Ethics," as we have seen, was
virtually completed before he left Rijnsburg. The
work was continued at Voorburg, and we have good
reasons to suppose was nearing completion in the
year 1665, when he suddenly laid it aside not to
take it up again for nearly ten years. He had de
cided to devote himself for the time to the prepara
tion of a book on the relation of Church and State,
entitled "A Theologico-Political Treatise."

To this step he was moved, it seems, both by the
trend of public events and by certain personal con
siderations. A conflict between Church and State
was raging, in which the Reformed clergy made
the most of public calamities (a plague and mili
tary reverses), in order to overthrow De Witt.
At the same time they redoubled their efforts to
secure legal restraints on freedom of thought; and
had already gained important successes. In 1662
the states of Friesland had banished on pain of
penal servitude those "servants of the Devil"
known as Quakers, Mennonites, and Socinians; and
in 1664 the magistrates of Amsterdam forbade the
Mennonitefe to preach doctrines that "smack of
Socinian heresies." In the midst of this revival of
clericalism Spinoza became alarmed and annoyed
by indications that he himself was now generally
suspected of atheism. In the year 1665 the com
munity in which he lived had occasion to elect a
new pastor of the Reformed Church, and there de-

28 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

veloped a strife between the liberals and the ortho
dox. Spinoza's host, as leader of the liberals, had
petitioned the competent authority in favor of a
certain candidate known to be a liberal. The or
thodox were scandalized of course, and in the heat
of controversy called the petition "the work of a
certain Spinoza, a Jew by birth, who is an atheist,
a scoffer, and a bad subject in this Republic, as
many learned men and ministers can testify." It
was in these circumstances that Spinoza conceived
the purpose of writing his " Theologico-Political
Treatise."

According to the author, the specific aim of the
work was: (1) To expose the prejudices of theo
logians which hinder men from applying themselves
to philosophy, and even to remove these prejudices
from the minds of the more reasonable among them ;
(2) As far as possible, to convince the people that
he was no atheist, as they seemed to suppose; (3)
To demonstrate the right to think what one
pleases, and to say what one thinks.1 By the preju
dices of theologians he meant their belief in the
Bible as an authoritative revelation of metaphysical
truth ; and their consequent opposition to all thought
calculated to invalidate biblical doctrines. It was
his intention to show that the only important and
valid element in biblical teaching is the ethical one,
namely its inculcation of "justice and charity"
in our relation to our fellow men. If by subjecting
the Bible to thorough criticism he could make this
appear, theologians would no longer be able to
justify their distrust of the freest philosophical and

1 Epis. 30.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 29

scientific inquiries, since these have to do not with
moral practices, but with theoretical opinions.

It will be observed that one of the declared ob
jects of the work was to win to his view not only
the public in general, but even the more reasonable
among the theologians themselves. Another object
was to show the people that he was not irreligious.
The author's consciousness of these two incidental
aims resulted in his producing one of the most
puzzling books ever written. When thinking of
open-minded theologians, he endeavors to present
his novel ideas in a way least calculated to shock
them, often making large concessions to their point
of view; and when in addition he remembers his
obligation to refute the charge of atheism, he goes
still further and almost hides himself in religious
phraseology. These aims were in fact incompatible
with his theoretical point of view, and in so far
his book failed to fulfil its mission; for it neither
made converts of theologians nor removed the
popular suspicion of atheism. But in spite of its
peculiarities, the thoroughness, learning, and spirit
of Spinoza's "Theologico-Political Treatise" re
quire us to rank it with the ablest works in biblical
criticism and with the noblest apologies of free
speech. We shall have occasion to quote it at
length.

While at Voorburg Spinoza's income was in
creased by a life-annuity fixed upon him by Simon
de Vries. This enthusiastic admirer and devoted
friend had at one time desired to present him with
2,000 gulden, but the offer was refused on the
ground that it was not needed. Later he proposed
to pass over his own brother and to make Spinoza

30 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

heir to all his property ; but this Spinoza considered
unjust. In the end De Vries left his estate to his
brother, with the proviso that he pay Spinoza an
annuity of 500 gulden. Of this Spinoza consented
to accept only 300 gulden ; a sum which he probably
regarded as sufficient, though barely sufficient, to
meet the demands of his simple life. At an un
known date De Witt also assigned him a pension
of 200 gulden, which was continued after the bene
factor's death. The two sources of income com
bined must have rendered him well-nigh independent
of his handicraft.

In the meantime the number of Spinoza's friends
and acquaintances had considerably increased.
Among those of political influence we have already
mentioned the Grand Pensionary Jan de Witt, who
befriended him until his violent death in 1672.
Another of this class was the Burgomaster Johan
Hudde of Amsterdam. One of the scholars with
whom he had come into close relations was a dis
tinguished scientist of the time, Christiaan Huygens,
who lived at The Hague from 1664 to 1666. He was
especially interested in Spinoza's skill in grinding
lenses. Through Oldenburg, secretary of The
Royal Society, Spinoza had also come into remote
relations with Robert Boyle and others in Eng
land. An acquaintance of quite a different type
was a certain Willem van Blyenbergh, a grain-
broker of Dort, who devoted his leisure to studies
in theology and philosophy. His interest in knowl
edge hardly measured up to what philosophers de
mand of a thinker, inasmuch as he permitted
"revelation" to set bounds to his inquiries. For

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 31

this reason writers on Spinoza have treated Blyen-
bergh with even more contempt than he deserves.
Spinoza's exposition of Descartes' "Principia" had
fallen into his hands, and he had read it repeatedly,
each time with increased pleasure, but still found
certain parts unintelligible. He therefore took the
liberty of writing to the author himself for explan
ations, at the same time professing supreme devotion
to the cause of "pure and sincere truth." Spinoza
naturally supposed he had found a man after his
own heart, and wrote him a frank and friendly
reply. But Blyenbergh was more puzzled than
ever; Spinoza's reasoning seemed to contradict the
primary postulates of theology. At the very be
ginning of his next letter, therefore, the amateur
philosopher declared that "the revealed word of
God" constituted for him one criterion of truth.
Alas ! the new-found truth-seeker was after all only
a theologian! Spinoza saw his mistake; but his
natural complaisance constrained him to continue
the correspondence. Several letters were exchanged,
and even a personal conference held; but all this
served only to bring out more clearly the irreconcil
able difference between the two points of view.
Finally Spinoza's patience gave way, and he term
inated their relation by frankly writing the impor
tunate friend that further correspondence would
be unprofitable. A few years later, Blyenbergh
published an alleged refutation of "the blasphemous
book entitled 'A Theologico-political Treatise;' '
and after Spinoza's death he again appeared in
print, this time as an unsympathetic, and also in
competent, critic of the "Ethics."

32 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

As Spinoza's sojourn at Voorburg was nearing
its end, the unhappy fate of a friend1 of his must
have caused him no little disquietude. Two
brothers, John and Adrian Koerbagh, the former
a student of theology, the latter of medicine and
jurisprudence, had expressed themselves disparag
ingly of the Bible, the Catechism, the doctrine of
the Trinity, and other matters; and in 1666 were
summoned before the Church authorities. On the
evidence heard, John was debarred from the minis
try; but, as he promptly recanted, he was restored
to his previous standing. A year later he was be
fore the Church again, and in 1668 was thrown into
prison, from which he was released, after ten weeks,
on promising good behavior for the future. But
as he was not yet cured of his heresies, as in fact
he proved to be incurable, he was finally declared
unworthy to fill the pastoral office. His brother
Adrian seems to have been a man of more conse
quence. His offense consisted in having written two
books entitled, "A Flower-Garden" and " Light in
Dark Places," in which he had attacked the prin
cipal dogmas of the Church. His case was preju
diced not only by his wantonly offensive manner,
but also by immoral teachings and practices. In
the course of the trial Spinoza's name was men
tioned, but Koerbagh asserted that Spinoza was in
no way responsible for his teachings. In the face
of imminent punishment his courage failed, as had
that of his brother, and he professed to repent of
his errors. It is indicative of how fiercely the spirit

1 Cf. Freudenthal's 'Spinoza," Vol. I, p. 140, and
Meinsma, op. cit., p. 272.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 33

of the Middle Ages still burned in the hearts of some,
or at least of how it still lingered in the forms of law,
that an officer of the court at first moved to send
the culprit to prison for thirty years, to cut off his
right thumb, and to bore his tongue through with
a hot iron. The punishment to which he was
actually condemned (July, 1668) was ten years
of imprisonment at hard labor, ten years banish
ment, and a fine of 6,000 gulden. After a little
more than one year of imprisonment, he was lib
erated by a welcome death.

In judging those who pronounced this sentence,
we need to remember that the culprit was con
demned not merely for teaching novel religious
doctrines, but also for sowing the seeds of immor
ality; and that the free-thinking Burgomaster
Johan Hudde approved the sentence. Indeed, it has
been argued that even Spinoza could not have con
sidered it unjust.1

7. At The Hague.

In the year 1670 Spinoza transferred his residence
from Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague, to the city
itself. In the Veerkade, a quiet street, he engaged
one room of the widow Van Velen, who was to
provide him with his meals also; but, as living-
expenses in the Capital were much greater than in
Voorburg, he soon found his slender means insuf
ficient for so much comfort. In May 1671, there
fore, he moved into new quarters on the near-by
Paviljoensgracht, in the house of the painter Van
der Spyck. The apartment consisted of two rooms

1 Freudenthal, "Spinoza," I, p. 145; cf. note p. 333
and p. 179.

34 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

on the second floor, and cost him eighty gulden a
year. In order to live within his means, and perhaps
also to give his impaired health the benefit of the
greatest liberty in the choice of diet, he now pre
pared his own meals. From Van der Spyck the
early biographers of Spinoza obtained, years after
ward, many facts, and, it seems, some fictions also,
in regard to the life of the philosopher.

The " Theologico-Political Treatise," as we have
seen, was already finished. In accordance with his
principles and habits, he now proceeded with the
utmost caution to arrange for its publication. His
customary prudence had not been diminished by
the recent fate of his friend Adrian Koerbagh;
although the punishment of this restless agitator
hardly indicated that Spinoza's life or liberty was
in danger. The two cases were quite different.
Koerbagh was an immoral teacher of immorality;
Spinoza a blameless teacher of virtue. Koerbagh
wrote in the vernacular, and propagated his views
orally among the common people; Spinoza wrote
in Latin for the learned and spared the feelings
of pious illiteracy. Koerbagh wantonly employed
shocking and provoking language ; Spinoza gen
erally sought to express his views in the least of
fensive form possible. But whether for sufficient
reason or not, Spinoza took every precaution against
evil consequences by omitting his own name and
that of the publisher, and by substituting Henricus
Kiinrath in Hamburg instead of Christoffel Koen-
rads in Amsterdam, the real name and place of the
printer. The work appeared in the first part of
the year 1670 (possibly before he actually settled
in The Hague), and was soon attributed to the right

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 35

author. Cries of execration greeted it on every
side. As early as July of the same year voices were
heard even from Germany denouncing the "bale
ful" and "godless" book. A number of refuta
tions appeared, the ablest of which was perhaps
that written in 1671 by Lambert van Velthuysens,
the scholar, jurist, and statesman. His imputation
of atheism alarmed and deeply stung Spinoza; for
had not one express aim of the "Treatise" been
to purge the author's name of that taint? Spinoza's
reply to the charge consisted in an appeal to his
manner of life: Atheists chase after honors and
excessive riches, which he had always despised,.
His words will claim our attention in another place.
In the meantime the ministers of the Reformed
Church had bestirred themselves to prevent both
the further circulation of this book and the publi
cation of others by the same author. Synods and
church councils vied with one another in denounc
ing it as blasphemous and dangerous, and in de
manding its suppression by the civil authorities;
but as long as Jan de Witt directed the affairs of
state they failed to obtain their desire. Under
William III. of the House of Orange, however, who
found it expedient to ally himself with the clergy,
the States-General of Holland issued an edict (July.
1674) forbidding the sale of the " Theologico-Po-
litical Treatise" along with certain other heretical
books. Alarmed by the hostility provoked, Spinoza
himself had already interfered (1671) to prevent
a Dutch translation, which would have made the
contents of the book accessible to the general
public.1 For all this hostility he must have been
JBpis. 44 (olim 47).

36 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

compensated in a measure by the noise his work
had made in the world and by its rapid sale. In
a few years not less than five reprints of the first
edition appeared, some of them, to be sure, under
false titles, as "The Surgical Works of Dr. Fran-
ziskus Henriquez de Villacorta," "Collection of the
Historical Writings of Daniel Heinsius," etc

While the storm was raging in the world around
him, Spinoza sat in his study revising and com
pleting his "Ethics," which had been discontinued
years before in order to write the "Theologico-
Political Treatise." The circumstance that the last
part of the "Ethics" was composed under these
conditions may not be overlooked, if one will
rightly estimate its significance. He had freely
employed religious language in an accommodated
sense in the "Theologico-Political Treatise," hoping
thereby to prevent the impression that he was hostile
to religion; but he had failed of his purpose. In
the last part of the "Ethics," composed when his
ears were ringing with the charges of atheism, he
carries further than ever his policy of clothing non-
religious conceptions in the phraseology of religion.

In July, 1675, just one year after the "Theologico-
Political Treatise" had been proscribed, Spinoza
betook himself to Amsterdam with the finished
manuscript of his new work for the purpose of ar
ranging for its publication; but he found to his
dismay that a rumor of the projected publication
had already gone abroad, and that certain theolo
gians were ready to make complaint against him to
the Prince of Orange and the Government. More
over, the Cartesians, jealous of their hard-won and
precarious exemption from persecution, were seek-

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 37

ing to maintain their respectability and security
by loudly repudiating Spinoza's doctrines and by
joining in active opposition to them. In the cir
cumstances he decided to defer indefinitely the pub
lication of the work; and in consequence it was
not given to the press until after his death.
Whether in this matter he was governed by exces^
sive timidity or only by justifiable prudence, is a
question about which there will be differences of
opinion. It is to be noted, in any case, that all the
opposition he had thus far encountered was di
rected against his writings, and not against himself.
No resolutions of church councils and no measures
taken by the civil authorities contemplated violence
to his person. Whether he possessed grounds un
known to us for fearing real persecution can not be
determined.

In the midst of hostile demonstrations from his
immediate environment, he received (1673), a
notable testimony to his reputation and a gratify
ing expression of confidence through a call to a
chair of philosophy in the University of Heidelberg
by the Elector Palatine Karl Ludwig. This en
lightened Prince proposed to allow him full liberty
of teaching, with one fatal reservation: he should
not assail the dogmas of the established church.
In this restriction Spinoza saw the possibility of in
finite trouble. After brief deliberation, therefore,
he respectfully declined the offer. This act has been
represented as an evidence of his divine indifference
to honors, position, and riches. We pay more
respect to his sanity when we attribute his refusal
simply to the plain dictates of common sense. The
chances were a hundred to one that the position

38 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

would at once cost him his independence and his
peace of mind, and ultimately cause him to be sacri
ficed to offended bigotry. He understood this very
well, and hence wisely declined the appointment.

In the meantime Spinoza's great patron, Jan de
Witt, had met with a tragic fate. An unexpected
invasion of Holland by a French army in 1672 had
found the Republic's military organization quite
unprepared to make effectual resistance. The in
dignant citizens naturally cast all the blame on
the strong man who had, perhaps in too arbitrary a
spirit, assumed supreme control of the government.
His downfall promptly followed. On the 27th of
August, when visiting his imprisoned brother Cor
nelius, an infuriated mob broke into the prison,
dragged forth the unhappy pair and beat them to
death in the streets. When Spinoza learned what
had happened, he lost his wonted composure, and
(according to Lucas) burst into tears of indignation
and grief. Spinoza afterwards told Leibnitz (so the
latter recounts) that in the night following the
murder he wished to post in the streets a placard
bearing the words "Ultimi barbaroruml", but was
prevented by Van der Spyck, who locked the doors
of the house.

The invading French army was commanded by
Prince Conde. While occupying the city of Utrecht,
this Maecenas was reminded by Jean Baptiste
Stouppe, a Swiss officer under him, that Spinoza
dwelt not far away. Curious to see the famous
author of the " Theologico-Political Treatise," he
commissioned Stouppe to write Spinoza in his name
inviting him to Utrecht. After some hesitation
Spinoza decided to go. His reasons for doing so

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 39

are not known, but it has been suggested that, after
consultation with men of the Government, he ac
cepted the invitation in hope of rendering some
service to Holland. On his arrival, Conde being
absent from the city, he was received with every
attention by Stouppe and the Duke of Luxemburg,
and was induced to remain several weeks awaiting
the return of the Prince. When word came that the
latter could not come again to Utrecht, Spinoza de
parted at once for The Hague. Colerus, who ob
tained his information later from Spinoza's not very
reliable host, relates that on his return Spinoza was
in danger of being maltreated by the populace,
which suspected him of treasonable relations with
the enemies of his country; and that his host was
afraid the house would be taken by storm. Nothing
is known of an actually assembled mob, and we are
unable to say whether there was any real danger
or not.

In his modest apartment at The Hague Spinoza
had the privilege of receiving many distinguished
visitors, the most noteworthy of whom were the
Swedish Chancellor Greiffencranz, the jurist Pufen-
dorf, and the philosopher Leibnitz. Leibnitz's re
peated visits possess particular interest, inasmuch as
he was the only philosopher of equal rank with
whom Spinoza came into personal relations. Cour
tier and politician as well as philosopher, Leibnitz
never succeeded in winning Spinoza's confidence;
although he became a careful and, at one time, it
seems, a sympathetic student of Spinoza's philos
ophy. Later he was willing to minimize his connec
tions with the "atheist" and to ignore his indebted
ness to him.

40 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

To the already numerous company of friends and
disciples Spinoza had now added several new names.
Among those who have not hitherto been mentioned
were the son and namesake of his publisher, Jan
Rieuwertsz, the physician Jean Maximilien Lucas,
who afterward wrote a biography of the philos
opher, and the three correspondents: Hugo Boxel,
Herman Schuller, and Walter von Tschirnhaus.
Tschirnhaus was the most important. Though
not an original thinker, he was a sharp critic, and in
his letters made some unanswerable objections, as
we shall see, to certain points in Spinoza's philos
ophy.

It was during this period that Spinoza received
an astonishing letter from a former pupil, Albert
Burgh by name, who was then travelling in Italy.
It conveyed the news that his pupil had become a
communicant of the Roman Catholic Church, and it
undertook to convert Spinoza to the same faith.
"Do not refuse [to be converted]," it concluded,
"for if you do not now heed the calls of God, his
wrath will be kindled against you, and there is
danger of your being abandoned by his infinite
mercy and of your becoming a miserable victim of
the all-consuming divine justice." The youth's well-
meant arguments and ardent exhortations — which
bear the marks if his father confessor — provoked a
sharp and indignant reply, which is of interest
chiefly as evidencing the depth of Spinoza's philo
sophical convictions. "You ask me," he says, "how
I know that my philosophy is the best of all those
that have been taught in the world, are now taught,
or ever will be taught ; which question I have a much
better right to ask you. For I do not assume to have

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 41

found the best philosophy, but I know I comprehend
the true philosophy."

Spinoza lived at The Hague seven years. In this
period his literary productiveness was not commen
surate with that of the preceding years. The fact
was perhaps due to failing health. The ' ' Theologico-
Political Treatise" had been completed and the
"Ethics" brought well nigh to a conclusion before
he left Voorburg. Nothing written at The Hague is
comparable with either. As the literary fruit of
this considerable period we have only the notes to
the "Theologico-Political Treatise," a short essay
on the rainbow, a fragment of a "Compendium of
a Grammar of the Hebrew Language," and an un
finished work entitled "A Political Treatise."

He had now reached the forty-fourth year of his
age. Though still a comparatively young man, his
physical constitution was broken. With the seeds
of consumption in his body, he had applied himself
too unremittingly to study, and had allowed him
self too little fresh air and recreation. Doubtless
the inhalation of fine glass-dust incident to his hand
icraft also affected his health unfavorably. About
four o'clock on Saturday, February 20, 1677, he came
down stairs, smoked a pipe of tobacco, and con
versed with Van der Spyck on various subjects,
including the sermon preached that afternoon by
the Lutheran pastor. He then retired to his rooms
and went early to bed. Sunday morning before
church time he came down again, and conversed
with his hosts. Meanwhile the physician whom he
had called (either Lodewijk Meyer or Schuller1)

1 Until recently the common assumption has been that
the physician in question was Meyer; but Preudenthal,

42 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

arrived, and ordered for him a bowl of chicken
broth. Of this Spinoza partook with relish at
noon. In the afternoon Van der Spyck and his wife
again went to church, leaving Spinoza at home with
his physician. Upon their return, they were sur
prised to learn that Spinoza had passed away. His
funeral, which took place four days later, was at
tended, we are told, by many eminent persons who
wished to show their respect and affection for the
departed lover of truth. He who had never accepted
Christianity, or, as we shall see, even recognized
the validity of any religion, was buried, as it hap
pened, in a Christian church — in the new church
on the Spuy. The earthly possessions he left be
hind were little more than sufficient to pay his
trifling debts and to defray the expenses of the
modest funeral.

In November of the same year, his friends pub
lished the "Opera Posthuma," consisting of the
"Ethica" and the three fragments: "De Intellectus
Emendatione," "Compendium Grammatices Lin
guae Hebraeae," and "Tractatus Politicus," to
gether with selected letters.

8. His Personality.

During the last years of his life and for a long
time after his death, Spinoza was frequently re
ferred to as an atheist, and occasionally by hostile
religionists as possessing what was popularly sup
posed to go with atheism, a diabolical spirit. But
even his antagonists did not charge him with any

following the Dutch writer, W. Meijer, concludes on
various grounds that he was Schuller. Op. cit., p. 303;
cf. note.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 43

specific lapses from moral rectitude or with any
specific flaws of character. Nevertheless the dero
gation of the man (as distinguished from the dis
paragement of his views), little and obscure as it
has been, has provoked in reply a glorification
amounting sometimes almost to apotheosis. In order
to vindicate his moral character against the insinu
ations supposed to be implied in the charge of
atheism, his admirers have emphasized his virtues,
even the most common virtues, so strongly as to
create the impression on the uninformed that he was
not only a saint, .but a sort of religious genius.
Characteristic utterances of this kind we shall
shortly have occasion to quote.

At the risk of appearing ungenerous, we will at
tempt to portray in a few words the real Spinoza;
and, for the sake of precision, we shall do so both
in negative and positive terms. What we are about
to say will appear fully justified only after studying
his writings. In characterizing him negatively, we
must say that he was no saint. (Not all abused
heretics are saints). We may not say even that he
was in any sense religious. (Not all Jews are re
ligious). He frequently went to church; he some
times even praised the preaching to which he
listened ; he used to tell his hostess her religion was
good enough, and exhorted her to give ear to the
instructions of her pastor; but all this, as we shall
see, was only the consistent observance of a funda
mental prudential maxim of his, enforced perhaps
by a natural considerateness for the feelings of
others. Himself and all emancipated minds he re
garded as above religion. Describing him in posi
tive terms, we must say that he was a sincere, harm-

44 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

less, amiable man; but these qualities do not place
him upon a pinnacle of unique moral excellence ; for
as much may be said of too many others. It is
certain that his most serious defect of character
was lack of moral courage. But this, as we have
already observed, is explained and extenuated by
the fact that he was nurtured in a community which
was compelled to practice discretion rather than
valor. If he had no personal interest in religion,
he had a supreme, one might say, exclusive interest
in knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge was a
passion with him, and it was the only passion that
possessed him. Probably there is not another ex
ample in history of a man whose thinking was so
little influenced by emotional and volitional ele
ments. To a unique extent he was disposed to look
at all things in the dry light of reason. It is this
that makes him so fascinating to men whose domin
ant interests are scientific and philosophical. And
it was because of his exclusive interest in knowledge,
not because of any ' * other-worldliness, " that he at
tached no value to money. His wants were few,
and beyond the satisfaction of these, money could
not procure him anything he prized.

CHAPTER II.

DIVERSITY OF OPINION IN REGARD TO SPI
NOZA'S RELATION TO RELIGION.

1. Various Expressions on the Subject.

From Spinoza's own time, but especially since the
latter part of the Eighteenth Century, there has pre
vailed the most extraordinary diversity of opinion
in regard to the significance of Spinoza and his
philosophy for religion.

Pierre Bayle, one of the first to give a biographical
notice of Spinoza, says, in his famous "Dictionnaire
Historique et Critique," that he was "an atheist
of an entirely new method,"1 and elsewhere that he
was "the greatest atheist that ever lived." Leib
nitz claimed that Spinoza denies intelligence to God
and puts a blind necessity in his place.2 Jakobi, an
appreciative student of the system, to whom was
due especially the renewal of interest in Spinoza in
the Eighteenth Century, regarded the system as
atheistic,3 although he expressed admiration for the
man. Kant confessed that he had not carefully
studied Spinoza's philosophy, but he did not hesitate
to relegate it to the class of fatalistic systems which

1 Article on Spinoza: "II a e"t6 un athee de systSme et
d'une mSthode toute nouvelle." Cf. Pens6es diverses sur
les Cometes. Both are found in Freudenthal's "Lebens-
geschichte Spinoza's."

'Works, by Gerhardt, I, 149: "Dicit Deum proprie non
intelligere ne velle." Theodic6e, Sec. 173: "II parait
avoir enseigne express6ment une necessity aveugle."

3Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza. Breslau, 1785.

46 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

deprive the World-ground of all understanding.
Fichte characterized Spinoza's "God" as one that
never becomes self-conscious, and Schelling calls
the principle of Spinoza's pantheism "blind" sub
stance. Hegel, as is quite intelligible, places a very
high estimate on the system as such, regarding it
in fact as the very type of speculative thinking, and
would call it "Acosmism" rather than "Atheism;'*
yet he finds that it lacks the principle of person
ality; for Spinoza's Absolute is only "rigid sub
stance, not yet Spirit."1 In his famous "Addresses
on Religion," Schleiermacher has referred to
Spinoza in language which implies that his philos
ophy is in the highest degree religious and that
Spinoza himself was a sort of Christian saint.
"Reverently offer with me," he exclaims, "a lock
to the shades of the holy cast-out Spinoza ! The ex
alted World-spirit penetrated him; the Infinite was
his beginning and end, the Universe his only and
eternal love! In holy innocence and deep humility
he gazed into the eternal world and saw how He was
its most lovable mirror. Full of religion was he,
and full of the Holy Spirit!"2 Of the post-

1 Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, III,
373-7: "Wenn man anfangt zu philosophieren, so muss
man zuerst Spinozist sein." "Der Spinozismus 1st also
Akosmismus."

2 Reden iiber die Religion. Piinjer's edition, p. 52:
"Opfert mit mir ehrerbietig eine Locke den Manen des
heiligen verstossenen Spinoza! Ihm durchdrang der
hohe Weltgeist, das Unendliche war sein Anfang und
Ende, das Universum seine einzige und ewige Liebe, in
heiliger Unschuld und tiefer Demut spiegelte er sich in
der ewigen Welt, und sah zu wie Er ihr liebenswiirdig-
ster Spiegel war; voller Religion war er und voll heiligen
Geistes; und darum steht er auch da, allein und uner-
reicht, Meister in seiner Kunst, aber erhaben iiber die
profane Zunft, ohne Jiinger und ohne Biirgerrecht."

RELATION TO RELIGION 47

Hegelian philosophers in Germany, S. G. W. Sig-
wart,* A. Trendelenburgh,1 and J. H. Loewe2 have
attempted to show that Spinoza's God must be re
garded as self-conscious. Schopenhauer, who was a
careful and appreciative student of Spinoza, observes
that he deprived the Absolute of personality, and
that "God" is only the euphumistic name which he
gave to matter in order to make it respectable. Johann
Ed. Erdmann3 concedes a peculiar kind of self-con
sciousness to Spinoza's Absolute, and Christoph Sig-
wart4 also seems to think that the "Ethics" at least
contains sufficient grounds for this assumption. On
the other hand, Kuno Fischer,5 Th. Camerer,6 and
James Martineau7 take the opposite view; although
Kuno Fischer misleadingly asserts also that Spinoza
was in agreement with essential Christianity.8
Frederick Pollock, in his recent work, affirms that
in Spinoza's system "God" is impersonal, but not
unconscious ;9 and, assuming an attitude character
istic of many other writers, adds: "We decline to
enter on the question on which chapters if not vol
umes might be spent, whether Spinoza's way of

* Der Spinozismus historisch und philosophisch erlau-
tert. Tubingen, 1839.

1 Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie, p. 55.

2 Die Philosophie Fichtes. Mit einem Anhange. Ueber
den Gottesbegriff Spinoza's und dessen Schicksale. Stutt
gart, 1862.

"Grundriss d. Geschichte d. Philosophie, Sec. 272, 7.
4 Spinoza's neuentdeckter Traktat, pp. 94-95.
8 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Fourth ed., p.
359.

• Die Lehre Spinoza's, p. 1.

T Study of Spinoza, Third ed., pp. 330-350.
•Descartes u. seine Schule, II, p. 152.
•Spinoza: His Life and Philos., p. 328.

48 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

looking at the world and man is to be called a reli
gion or not."* Pfleiderer fails to determine with
sufficient precision Spinoza's conception of "God,"
but assumes that it is a religious conception, and
that Spinoza was a man of strong religious interest.
"With all his daring in the fight against traditional
opinions," he says, "Spinoza is as far from being
an enemy of true religious faith as was Luther in
his bold attacks on Romish dogmas."1 But Van
Vloten, the enthusiastic Dutch student of Spinoza,
who has given us the latest and best edition of his
works, expresses himself as follows: "By retaining
the name of God, while he did away with his person
and character, he has done himself a great in
justice It is in his having done away

with final causes, and with God along with them,
that Spinoza's true merit consists."2 While Freud-
enthal, speaking in a vein typical of many, says:
"The heart of his teaching is pious self-surrender to
an infinite Divine Being. There is no justification,
therefore, for his having been long calumniated as
an impious corrupter of morals and as an atheist.
He who seeks his happiness and freedom in the love
of God cannot be called irreligious. He who regards
virtue as its own reward cannot be a corrupter of
morals. And no atheist is he who, like Spinoza,
finds in the idea of God the foundation and com
pletion of all knowledge."3

* Ibid., p. 333.

1 Geschichte d. Religionsphilosophie, 45.

2 Quoted by Matthew Arnold in his essay, "Spinoza and
the Bible," from Van Vloten's "Supplementum."

8 Spinoza. Sein Leben und seine Lehre. Stuttgart,
1904—1, 310.

RELATION TO RELIGION 49

Many who have not been critical students of
philosophy have not hesitated to express quite posi
tive judgments in regard to Spinoza's relation to
religion. Most of these have assumed as a matter
of course not only that Spinoza himself was a man
of the strongest religious interest, but that his Ab
solute is an omnipotent, omnipresent conscious
ness, — the God of religion par excellence. Herder,
for example, one of the earliest admirers of Spinoza
in Germany, seemed to see in his infinite substance
the fullness of all spiritual perfections ; and ranked
Spinoza himself with the Apostles, saying: "The
flame of all thought and of all feeling is love. It is
the highest reason as well as the purest divine ex
ercise of the will. If we will not believe this on the
authority of Saint John, we may do so on that of
the doubtless still more divine Spinoza!"1 In the
same vein writes Von Dalberg in a letter to
Herder: "Spinoza and Christ, in these two alone
is found pure knowledge of God ; in Christ the secret,
higher way to divinity ; in Spinoza the highest peak
that reasoning can reach."2 Friedrich von Harden-
berg (Novalis), in his emphatic ascription of a re
ligious character to Spinoza, called him the "God-
intoxicated philosopher" — a phrase that has since
become famous. Hegel's characterization of the
system as acosmism, though understood by students
of philosophy, has often been mistaken by others for
an authoritative expression of the view that for Spi-

1 Gott. Einige Gesprache von J. G. Herder, p. 41.

8 In Herder's Reise nach Italien, p. xxx. Quoted in
Van der Linde's "Spinoza: seine Lehre und deren erste
Nachwirkungen in Holland."

50 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

noza the world was nothing and God was every
thing, — God, that is, in the religious, not the merely
metaphysical sense of the term. Alfred Tennyson
once remarked that Spinoza, though often misunder
stood, was in fact "so full of God that he sees Him
everywhere, — so much so that he leaves no room for
man;"1 and applied to him the oft-quoted phrase
gottbctrunkcii—1 ( God-intoxicated. ' '2 Ernest Renan.
in his commemorative oration, exclaims: "Listen,
listen, Gentlemen, to the recipe of the * prince of
atheists' for finding happiness. It is the love of
God. To love God is to live in God. Life in God is
the best, the most perfect; for it is the most reason
able, the happiest, the fullest."3 Coleridge, who was
anxious to vindicate Spinoza from the charge of
atheism, seems in one passage to admit that he
denies all intelligence to the Absolute.4 Referring
to the view of Van Vloten cited above, Matthew
Arnold asserts that "compared with the soldier of
irreligion M. Van Vloten would have him to be,
Spinoza is religious;"5 and he quotes at face value

1 Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir by his Son, Vol.
II, 424.

3 Daniel G. Brinton, in his recent "Religions of Primi
tive Peoples," incidentally confesses to the same view
of Spinoza: "It makes no difference whether we analyze
the superstitions of the rudest savages, or the lofty
utterances of John the Evangelist, or of Spinoza the
'God-intoxicated philosopher;' we shall find one and the
same postulate to the faith of all." p. 47.

3 Spinoza. Discours prononce a la Have le 21 fevrier
1877, a 1'occasion du 200e anniversaire de sa mort, — p.
20. La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff. 1877.

4 Compare citations given by Martineau ("Study of
Spinoza," pp. 329 and 333) from marginal notes by
Coleridge in a copy of Paulus' Spinoza now in the
Library of Manchester New College, London.

5 Essays in Criticism, p. 252.

RELATION TO RELIGION 51

Spinoza's own language, ''The love of God is man's
highest happiness and blessedness."1 The German
poet Heinrich Heine has expressed himself in re
gard to Spinoza's life in language which can mean
only that personally Spinoza was an intensely re
ligious character, and by implication that Spinoza's
system is a religious conception of the world.
"His life," says he, "was a copy of the life of his
divine kinsman, Jesus Christ." Goethe, in a letter
to Jakobi, once said of Spinoza: "He does not prove
the existence of God; for him existence is God.
And if on this account others abusively call him an
atheist, I want to call him, to his praise, superla
tively theistic, superlatively Christian."2

2. Causes and Significance of the Diversity
of Opinion.

The foregoing quotations present a formidable ar
ray of doctors who disagree, and are calculated at
first to create the presumption that the point in ques
tion is hopelessly obscure. It will be observed, how
ever, that not all of them are entitled to serious con
sideration. They may be divided into three classes:
(1) rhetorical expressions, (2) opinions of those
who are not competent to form an intelligent judg
ment in the matter, and (3) the judgments of philo
sophical critics. In regard to the first class, it must
be said that, in highly wrought language that has
a rhetorical motive behind it, we should not look

1 Ibid., p. 249.

2 Griinwald, "Spinoza in Deutschland," p. 119: "Er
beweist nicht das Daseyn Gottes, das Daseyn ist Gott.
Und wenn ihn andere deshalb Atheum schelten, so mochte
ich ihn Theissimum und Christianissimum nennen und
preisen."

52 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

for accurate statements of truth, but for the strik
ing expression of half-truths or of plausible un
truths. Such language has but little logical value
even in the mouth of a philosopher; and we should
attach no importance to it in the present contro
versy. For this reason we may not take very seri
ously the glowing words of Schleiermacher. Although
recognizing that, on account of the peculiarities of
his own thinking, Schleiermacher must naturally
have been attracted by Spinoza's doctrine of an
infinite immanent cause, and must also have acknowl
edged, in common with all unprejudiced persons,
the blamelessness of Spinoza's life, we are com
pelled nevertheless to make considerable allowance
for rhetoric. That sort of reference to Spinoza at
the time when the educated public was doing tardy
justice to his philosophy and personality, was well
calculated to win from that class a hearing for the
claims of religion, and this was the aim of Schleier
macher 's "Addresses."

The opinions of the second class, — of those,
namely, who are not competent judges in the mat
ter — do not deserve of course serious consideration;
although they are the most confidently asserted and
the most frequently met. As a matter of fact,
there are very few who have a right to express any
views on the subject. No value may be attached to
the opinions of any one who is not a student of
philosophy in general and has not given long and
patient thought to Spinoza in particular. The ut
terances, therefore, of such men as Herder, Tenny
son, Heine, and even Goethe have no importance.
In general they are only impressions gained from an
uncritical or partial reading of Spinoza's writings.

RELATION TO RELIGION 53

Some of them have no better foundation than mere
hearsay.

As to the philosophical critics, whose opinions
require respectful consideration, it will be recog
nized that they have not always clearly distin
guished between three different questions; namely,
(1) What was Spinoza's personal character? (2) Is
Spinoza's God to be regarded as intelligent or not?
and (3) Does his system furnish an adequate theo
retical basis for religion? Each of these questions
should be answered by itself, — even the third; for,
notwithstanding that it would really be answered
in answering the second, the identity of the two is
not always clearly recognized. Indeed, a cross-
examination of witnesses would certainly bring out
the fact that many expressions which imply opposite
views of Spinoza's attitude toward religion repre
sent at bottom different opinions, not in regard to
Spinoza's teaching, but in regard to what constitutes
religion on the one hand and atheism on the other.
For this reason the same author will often seem to
imply different views of Spinoza in different pas
sages. Freudenthal, for example, whom we have
quoted above, is able to deny that Spinoza is an
atheist, and at the same time to say: "To pray to
the Deity, to whom he attributes neither understand
ing nor will, appears to him to betray a mental
weakness, at which he smiles."1

The failure to make the distinction referred to
has not in every case been an unwilling one. On
this question, in fact, as on every other that relates
in any way to religion, there has been a regrettable
want of frankness. Those who have regarded Spi-

1 "Spinoza: Sein Leben u. seine Lehre." I, p. 197.

54 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

noza's philosophy as irreligious, or anti-religious,
have often seemed to shrink from saying as much
in unequivocal language. Apparently there has pre
vailed a fear that such an expression might be in
terpreted as a detraction1 of Spinoza's character;
or that it might precipitate upon the head of the
critic the reproach of being in secret sympathy
with hostile theologians; or, in case appreciation
of Spinoza were sufficiently warm to disarm this
suspicion, that it might expose the critic to the
charge of being at heart an atheist himself. Accord
ingly we find that most of those who have unam
biguously expressed the opinion that Spinoza's
system is irreligious and that Spinoza himself pos
sessed no religious interest are clear-headed theo
logians on the one hand and avowed atheists, such
as Schopenhauer and Van Vloten, on the other, —
a very significant agreement.

Another circumstance that sometimes makes it
difficult to determine precisely the thought of those
who have expressed, or implied, judgments in re
gard to the point in question, is the indefinite mean
ing of the terms employed. In philosophical dis
cussion, even the word "God" is employed in two
senses, namely; either for the Absolute in the meta
physical sense — which may not possess a single
character in common with the God of religion, save
absoluteness — or for the theistic, i. e. religious, con-

1 This apprehension has not been groundless. Matthew
Arnold, for example, (Essays in Criticism) characterizes
Pierre Bayle's language in regard to Spinoza as a "de
traction," although Bayle says merely that Spinoza's
system is atheistic. Matthew Arnold thus does what he
can to perpetuate the now obsolescent habit of making
mere theoretical opinions grounds for imputations
against a man's character.

RELATION TO RELIGION 55

ception of the Absolute only. When, therefore,
someone insists that Spinoza believed in "God,"
we are no wiser than before, until we know which
God is meant. And as for "atheism," it is a word
that has acquired from its associations such an of
fensive odor and such vagueness of meaning that, as
a recent writer has remarked, "polite and intelligent
persons" have lately shrunk from using it. When
it is employed without definition, we do not know
whether to take it as an abusive epithet or simply
as the name for an anti-religious — but not neces
sarily immoral — world-view. If some one, therefore,
resents the suggestion that Spinoza was an atheist,
we cannot be sure this means more than that Spi
noza, in his opinion, was a harmless man. It would
conduce to greater clearness of thought in the field
of religious-philosophical discussion, if we agreed to
retain the word in its etymological signification as
designating simply an anti-religious conception of the
Absolute, without implying any reflection on the
character of the person who holds it. The spirit
of charity and tolerance is now so far advanced
that it is generally recognized that all varieties of
purely theoretical views are compatible with eleva
tion of character ; and it ought to be possible at last
to call systems of philosophy by unambiguous names.
In so far as there has been any real difference of
opinion among students of philosophy in regard to
Spinoza's attitude to religion, it has been due to
varying estimates of the value of his religious termi
nology. Those who have either left the question
undecided or taken Spinoza's philosophy for a re
ligious system, seem to assume that the expression?
he borrows from religious language retam more or

56 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

less of their original meaning. Beginning with the
prejudice that Deus must mean "God," they meet
this and kindred expressions so constantly in read
ing Spinoza that they never quite succeed in getting
rid of the prejudice, in spite of the fact that Spinoza
gives his own definitions of nearly all the terms he
employs. The ideas commonly expressed by a word
become so inseparably linked with it through asso
ciation that a constant effort is required to think
it in a new or modified sense ; and it is not surpris
ing that we find the subtle influence of Spinoza's
terminology manifest in the judgments of other
wise clear thinkers. If no other change were made
in his system than the substitution throughout of
the word " nature" for "God" — a substitution
which he himself expressly permits — it is probable
that no religious character would ever have been
ascribed to his philosophy, and it is certain that the
title "God-intoxicated philosopher" would never
have occurred to anyone.

In view of the state of philosophical nomen
clature in his time, it ought to be recognized that,
even if he had desired to employ unambiguous
terms, he would have found them with difficulty.
It is not quite obvious, in fact, with what word he
could have replaced Dens. "Nature" has been
proposed, but this word suggests the changing world
of immediate sense-perception rather than a change
less ultimate condition, or cause, of the sense-
world, — the object which Spinoza defines as Deus.
We have, however, good grounds for supposing that
he did not always intend to employ unequivocal
language. We know it was his conviction that a
high degree of accommodation, both in language

RELATION TO RELIGION 57

and in practice, to unemancipated minds could help
on the cause of science and philosophy. The first
among his regulae vivendi for the devotees of
knowledge runs as follows: "To accommodate our
speech to the mind of the multitude and to practice
all those things [in vogue] which do not hinder us
from attaining our end. For we are able to obtain
no little advantage from the multitude, provided we
accommodate ourselves as far as possible to the
mind of the same. Moreover, as a result of this
policy, they will lend friendly ears to the truth."1
He seems, therefore, to have thought it the part of
wisdom and of zeal for the progress of sound knowl
edge, to render the bitter pills of new truth more
palatable by sugar-coating them with traditional
phraseology, and, as far as possible, to conform in
conduct to current conventionalities.

Not only did he define this attitude as sound in
theory, but there exists the best of evidence that he
reduced theory to practice. As this fact is persist
ently ignored by influential writers, and as a recog
nition of it is a necessary condition of understanding
Spinoza's doctrine of religion, we are compelled to
emphasize it to a degree that might otherwise seem
ungenerous.

1 De Intellectus Emendatione, p. 6. The text reads as
follows: "Ad captum vulgi loqui, et ilia omnia operari,
quae nihil impedimenti adferunt, quo minus nostrum
scopum attingamus. Nam non parum emolument! ab
eo possumus acquirere, modo ipsius captui, quantum fieri
potest, concedamus; adde, quod tali modo arnicas prae-
bebunt aures ad veritatem audiendam." Some one will
no doubt try to understand ad captum vulgi loqui as mean
ing, "to accommodate our language to the capacity of
the multitude," in the sense of avoiding learned and
technical language, but this would not be consistent with
the fact that Spinoza always wrote in Latin, nor in
harmony with the context.

58 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Of his outward conformity to popular customs
with which he could have had no inward sym
pathy, we have an example in his frequent attend
ance on public worship, where he reverently en
dured tedious expositions of orthodox theology.
That he sometimes employed accommodation in
language, and even in ideas, he expressly declares.
After he had dictated to a pupil a course of lectures
in Descartes' philosophy, which he had supple
mented with a discussion of his own in regard to
certain points in metaphysics, he printed his notes
for the benefit of intimate friends. The resultant
work he refers to in a letter to Oldenburg
as a treatise " which I had dictated to a
certain youth to whom I was unwilling to
teach my opinions openly; 'n and adds that the
appended "Metaphysical Thoughts," purporting to
contain his own views, were so far from doing so
that on certain points they expressed "precisely
the opposite." Before printing the manuscript, he
had in fact required a preface to be written warn
ing readers that not all the views expressed in the
work were his own. Hence it cannot, of course, be
charged that in this case the accommodation was
to the mind of the public ; but the fact remains
that on his own testimony he had accommodated
his instruction to the views of his pupil. His friend
Lodewijk Meyer, who wrote the preface, specifies,
among the things which Spinoza did not accept,
the doctrine of free will, and adds: "It must also
not be overlooked here, that into the same category,
i. e. of things to be affirmed only from the standpoint
of Descartes, must be put the expression found in

1Epis. 13 (olim 9).

RELATION TO RELIGION 59

many passages, namely, 'this or that is beyond the
reach of the human mind;' for this is not to be ac
cepted as if our author, in saying such things, spoke
according to his own way of thinking." What
Meyer says about this expression ought to be care
fully noted, for it occurs in other of Spinoza's
works. In regard to its use here, we may properly
remark only that as the doctrine of the will is re
ferred to by Meyer as but one case ex multis of
anti-Spinozism contained in the work, we may as
sume that Spinoza had not discussed frankly with
his pupil any subject in regard to which he dissented
from traditional theology.

That the preface must have been submitted to
Spinoza and have received his express approval,
appears from his letter to Oldenburg, where he says
the only condition on which he had permitted the
work to be printed was that, me praesente, some one
should revise the style and write a preface. It is
quite certain therefore that, in matters touching
religion, Spinoza was disposed indirectly to intro
duce his own ideas into the mind of his pupil while
formally teaching opposite views. In the preface,
Lodewijk Meyer says indeed that Spinoza thought
himself bound in conscience to give his pupil nothing
which would contradict Descartes, since he had
promised to instruct him in Descartes' philosophy.
But this is not what Spinoza himself writes to
Oldenburg. Without considering himself obliged
to justify what he has done by asserting the claims
of duty, Spinoza frankly declares that he was
simply "unwilling" to teach the youth his real
opinions "openly." His unwillingness to do so
"openly" implies his willingness to do so indirectly.

60 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

His disappointment in his pupil is no doubt to be
explained in part by the latter 's inaptitude to in
doctrination of this kind.

The warning to his confidants at Amsterdam by
no means to reveal his real opinions to the young
man,1 shows that his caution in this case was due
chiefly to motives of personal prudence. The fear of
disagreeable consequences is, in fact, something
which was much of the time present to Spinoza's
consciousness when writing. This too constant
state of mind formulated itself in the general maxim
which, in one form or another, the reader of his
works often meets, that "it is a common vice of men
to confide their counsels to others."1 It is a signifi
cant fact, well illustrating how great a role prudence
played in his life, that even his seal-ring bore the
inscription, ' ' Cautious ! ' '3

This excessive prudence caused him to defer
from time to time the publication of differ
ent works, and even to hesitate about publishing
at all. "I shall rather be silent," he writes to
Oldenburg, who constantly and earnestly urges him
to publish his thoughts, "I shall rather be silent
than obtrude my opinions upon men against the
will of my country, and thus render them hostile
to me."4 That words like these should ever have
been represented as only expressions of a noble

1 Epis. 9 (olim 27). Cf. Martineau, p. 43, note.
2Tractatus Theol.-Polit, (V. VI. & L.) I, p. 603.
Quoted by Martineau.

3 Freudenthal, "Spinoza," vol. I, p. 177. A cut of the
seal is given on the title page of V. VI. & L.'s edition of
his works.

4 Epis. 13 (olim 9) p. 235. — Silebo potius, quam meas
opiniones hominibus invita patria obtrudam, eosque mihi
infensos reddam."

RELATION TO RELIGION 01

self-effacement, shows how little candor and impar
tiality admirers of Spinoza have sometimes ex
hibited. His habitual attitude of timid caution ap
pears also in his counsel to the friends to whom he
entrusted the manuscript of his "Short Treatise."
"Since the character of the time in which we live,"
says he, " is not unknown to you, I will earnestly
entreat you to take great care in regard to the
making known of these things to others."1

When, after the publication of his exposition of
Descartes' philosophy, he became involved in cor
respondence with Blyenbergh, whom he had too
hastily judged to be in sympathy with thorough
going speculation, he told his unprofitable corres
pondent plainly that he regretted having revealed
to him his whole mind. "But I see," says he, "that
I should have done much better to answer you in
my first letter with the words of Descartes;" and
explains that he had not done so, because "I
thought, if I did not reply to you in harmony with
my real opinions, I should be sinning against the
obligations of the friendship which I so heartily
offered you."2

It is certain therefore that Spinoza's timidity, or,
if you will, his peaceable disposition, as well as his
theoretical maxims, determined him, when dealing
privately with individuals of religious interest,
sometimes to conceal and sometimes to veil his real
opinions, and occasionally even to express views
diametrically opposed to his own. To question or
ignore this patent fact would be as foolish as it
would be disingenuous.

1Korte Verhandeling, II, Cap. XXVI, Opera III, p. 97.
2Epis. 21 (olim 34) p. 278.

62 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

But more important than an acquaintance with
his practice in private relations, would be a knowl
edge of how far his caution and his belief in the
expediency of accommodation affected his modes
of expression in the writings composed for the
public. That those factors should have more or less
influence was natural and inevitable. And in fact,
although Spinoza's thinking was to a unique degree
independent both of external influences and of sub
jective interests, his modes of expression were in
fluenced in the highest degree by deference to his
environment and by considerations of persona]
prudence. This was the natural consequence of the
union in one person of an unparalleled cognitive
interest and excessive timidity. The general result
of the above-named influences upon the writings
intended for publication may be stated as follows:
(1) The retention throughout of religious terms for
ideas which Spinoza had consciously emptied of all
religious content; (2) The elaborate and artificial
deduction of more or less irrelevant conceptions
bearing a formal resemblance to religious notions;
and (3) In matters of little importance to his system
as such, but of religious significance, his expressly
saying, in a few instances, what he did not mean in
any sense. Proofs of these assertions will be pointed
out from time to time in the course of the following
pages.

By adopting this policy, Spinoza hoped not only
to disseminate his doctrines more widely, but es
pecially to possess great advantage when called
upon, as he certainly would be, to defend himself
against the assaults of religionists. If they said
he was an atheist, he could point to the fact that

RELATION TO RELIGION 63

"God" was the Alpha and Omega of his system.
If they said his doctrines were incompatible with
practical religion, he could reply that the charge
was so far from being true that he had in fact
elaborately proved the "love of God" to be the
summum bonum. And in reality this is just the
defense he always made. How well his purpose was
served is shown by the whole subsequent history
of Spinozism, but more especially by its history
since the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century.
For the question whether Spinoza and his system
are in conflict with religion has been met by most
interpreters in the same way in which Spinoza met
it, generally by quoting his own words. In their
intemperate zeal to vindicate an abused member of
the philosophical guild, they have thus used Ian- ,
guage which has practically served the cause of
untruth. Instead of frankly meeting the issue and
saying he was or was not a religionist, they have
indulged in irrelevant declamation to the effect that
Spinoza was no glutton, no drunkard, no libertine,
no reckless assailant of the foundations of society,
but a man of serious purpose and of good morals;
and have cited his words in favor, not only of
' ' brotherly love, " but of " the service of God. ' ' The
result is that there still prevail not only among lay
men, but among students of philosophy, the vaguest
possible notions in regard to Spinoza's relation to
religion.

While aiming in the way described to temper the
opposition of some and to parry the blows of others,
Spinoza trusted that philosophical minds would look
beneath mere words, and discern his real meaning.
He never suspected, I imagine, that he would be

64 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

misunderstood by any whose judgment he valued;
but alas! he went so far that, in regard to his reli
gious views, he has sometimes deceived, it seems,
the very elect.1

From Spinoza's point of view his accommodation
does not appear wholly unjustifiable. He honestly
believed that the vast majority of men are incurably
blind and ignorant, and that they will remain so
to the end of time. The modern idea of a gradual
development of society by which all classes of men
are eventually to be redeemed, in some measure at
least, from ignorance and folly, was foreign to his
thought, and in general to the thought of his times.
It must be remembered also that the rights of free
speech were not yet established. In Holland, where
Spinoza wrote, there was to be sure a partial ex
ception, but only a partial exception, to the general
prevalence of intolerance. The question for Spi
noza, therefore, was not how to make the masses
intelligent, but how the elect sons of reason were
to adjust themselves to the masses as hopelessly
irrational and dangerous. And among the masses
(vulgus) he probably classed, not merely the un
educated — these were unable to read his writings,
as they were composed in Latin — but all theologians
who took their theology in earnest, and other
learned men whose views were determined more
by authority, or by considerations of practical
utility, than by rational insight. From his stand
point he could consistently seek nothing more than
a modus rivendi with these classes.

1 This remark applies more especially to some who
seem to have read the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus"
without having studied carefully the "Ethics" and the
"Short Treatise."

RELATION TO RELIGION 65

The extent of Spinoza's accommodation was not,
of course, a constant quantity; it must have varied
with his consciousness of hostile surroundings and
with his moods. In writings whose preparation ex
tended over years we are not surprised therefore
to find many verbal contradictions in regard to mat
ters of religious significance.

In view of the circumstances, the interpretation
of Spinoza should evidently proceed according to
the following principle: Whenever two passages con
tradict each other, one of them expressed in religious
terminology and the other not, we are bound to regard
the latter as conveying Spinoza's real meaning;
and, in general, whenever religious phraseology implies
views clearly in contradiction with the first
principles of his philosophy, ice must accept as his real
opinions, not those implied in the religious phraseology,
hut those in harmony with the first principles of his
philosophy. It will hardly be questioned that, in
the present case, this procedure is in accord with the
axiomatic principles of sane criticism.

CHAPTER III.
SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. Certain Peculiarities of Spinoza's Psychology.

In the unity of the one substance (God, Nature)
co-exist, according to Spinoza, an infinite number of
incommensurable and mutually independent attri
butes, with only two of which, extension and
thought, we are acquainted. All objects of our
knowledge are modifications, or modes, of one of
these two attributes. The relation between them is
such that for every mode of one attribute there ex-
; ists an exactly corresponding mode of the other.
Accordingly everything in the Universe is composed
of a mode of extension and a mode of thought. All
things, therefore, have souls — "omnia, quamvis di-
versis gradibus, animata."1 There exists, however,
no causal relation between the modes of one attri
bute and those of another, between body and spirit.
No event in one produces any effect whatever in the
other.2 The correspondence is simply that of par
allels. Now it is in harmony with this general
doctrine, that the human mind, or soul, is defined as
the idea whose object (corresponding mode of
extension) is the human body. What is meant
by this expression, will be more exactly understood
after a brief exposition of Spinoza's somewhat ob
scure doctrine of bodies.

1 Eth. II, 13, scholium.
2Eth. Ill, 2.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 67

The most simple bodies (atoms?), the elements
out of which all other bodies are built up, differ
from one another only by reason of the fact that
some are in motion and others are at rest, or that
some are in more rapid motion than others. In ap
parent contradiction with this statement, however, it
is affirmed that when one simple body1 produces
an effect on another, this is the resultant of the
"natures" of both, as though after all a simple body
may have some peculiar character other than that
given by its rate of motion. Wherein this qualita
tive difference consists is not explained; but, as
bodies are not distinguished ratione substantial,2
we may suppose it to be only a peculiarity in kind
of motion.

When a number of elementary bodies come into
very close relation to one another, they form a com
posite body, or individuum of the first order. Bodies
constituted by other composite ones of different
natures are individua of the second order, and those
which in turn are constituted by several bodies of
the second order are individua of the third order,
etc.3 As elementary bodies differ in that some move
and others are at rest, or in that some move more
rapidly than others, composite bodies differ by
reason of the peculiar "ratio" of rest and motion
which each contains. The more complex the body,
the greater is the power of knowing possessed by
the mind associated with it.4 Now, as the human
body is composed of many individua of different

1 Eth. II, axioms 1 and 2.
3Eth. II, Lemma 1, dem.
3 Eth. II, Lemma 7, scholium.
*Eth. II, prop. 13, sch.

68 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

natures, which are themselves in a high degree com
posite,1 and is therefore capable of being affected
in a great variety of ways by other bodies, the
human mind has uncommon capacity for knowledge.

We may now inquire, just what does Spinoza
mean when he says that the human mind is the
"idea" of the body? What are we to understand
by idea? Unfortunately Spinoza himself does not
seem to have clearly understood what he meant by
the word, and hence has employed it in quite differ
ent senses.

In the first place ''idea" denotes what we now
call a presentation in an individual mind, such as
a perception, a memory, or a thought image con
structed by the imagination. The use of the word
in another sense is occasioned by the circumstance
that every mental experience, no matter of what
kind, has its physiological correlate. This, Spinoza
calls an "object." The ideas of things outside of
us, therefore, must have two objects, the event in
our body on the one hand, and the thing on the other.
The one is unknown, the other known. Nowadays
we know that even in sense-perception we do not
perceive what takes place in our ears, for example,
when we hear a strain of music, nor what takes
place in our eyes when we view a landscape. This
is always something quite different from the music
and the landscape, which are the only objects of con
scious thought. And indeed Spinoza did not sup
pose the affections of the body in perception to be
literal images of the things perceived. He expressly
warns us that we must not take his use of traditional
terminology to imply this view; for the so-called

'Eth. II, Postulate 1, p. 87.

DOCTRINE OP KNOWLEDGE 69

"images" do not in fact convey "figures" (pictures)
of the objects.1 When, therefore, he calls a given
sense-perception the "idea" of a corresponding
event in the body, it is not clear, even in this case,
that he means a presentation which has for its con
tent that physiological fact, although his phrase
ology always implies as much. But whatever his
thought in the case of sense-perception, it becomes
certain, when we take account of his "clear" ideas,
that he did not regard all mental experiences as
literal transcripts of their physical correlates.
Clear ideas can contain nothing else than what we
see in them. Now among them are the conceptions
of substance, of modes, of love, of hate, etc. In
deed, according to Spinoza, there is no human pas
sion of which we cannot form some clear concep
tion.2 But, as none of these clear ideas are defined
in terms of physical elements and motion, we may
not suppose that Spinoza means that they are lit
erally ideas of bodily affections. For, to hold that
they are really cognitions of the contemporaneous
physiological events, would be tantamount to saying
that when we conceive any one of them we have
before our minds a number of physical elements in
motion. This view certainly no one will ascribe to
Spinoza.

In the two senses above-mentioned an "idea" is
assumed to be an event in consciousness. But by
Spinoza's postulate that everything without ex-

1 Eth. II, 17, schol. — Porro, ut verba usitata retinea-
raus, corporis human! affectiones .... rerum imagines
vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt.

2 V, 4, cor. — Hinc sequitur, nullum esse affectum, cujus
non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare con-
ceptum.

70 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

ception on the side of extension is accompanied by
its double on the side of thought, the word seems
at times to denote an unconscious entity. The
"idea" which in this sense belongs to a tree, is not
the idea that Peter has when he perceives the tree,
nor the one that Paul or James has ; it is something
independent of human consciousness. But is it it
self an individual consciousness? Spinoza does not
directly answer the question. We have no reason
to suppose, however, that he regarded the spiritual
counterpart of every object (of a stone, a clod, or
a pool of water, for example) as endowed with
consciousness. If he had been asked to explain this
matter more fully, he must have said substantially : In
the case of the higher organisms (the more complex
individua), the corresponding ideae are conscious; in
the case of the lower organisms, they are only the
undeveloped rudiments of consciousness; and in inor
ganic objects, they are of a still lower order, inert
souls as it were.

This view would be quite in harmony with his
way of thinking; for, as we have seen, he expressly
declares that in proportion to their complexity
bodies are "diversis gradibus animata." In read
ing Spinoza, therefore, we have to reckon with a
possible extension of the meaning of "idea" (and
also of "cognitio," as we shall find) to unconscious
spirit. These are unsuitable terms, to be sure; but,
on account of the poverty of language, they perhaps
serve as well for the expression of his peculiar
thought as any he could find. His preference for
them was due, as we shall see later, to his intellec-
tualistic psychology.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 71

In these three senses, then, Spinoza employs the
term "idea." This circumstance increases the dif
ficulty of understanding his doctrine of knowledge
all the more, as the common name "idea" often
conceals from his mind the differences of meaning,
and leads him into logical fallacies. In particular,
it is to be noted that, as his psychological intellec-
tualism inclines him always to see in an "idea"
knowledge of some kind, this sense is often tacitly
assumed where, if taken literally, it would be quite
incomprehensible.

"We will now recur to Spinoza's conception of the
essential nature of the human mind. The first
utterance on this point we find in the "Ethics,"
Part II, prop. 11: "The first thing that constitutes
the actual being (actuate esse) of the human mind
is nothing else than the idea of some particular
thing actually existing." The expression "first
thing" implies, as appears from the demonstration
following the proposition, that the human mind in
its fundamental nature is a presentation and not
a feeling nor a volition; and that these latter are
only derivative and secondary phenomena. In
other words, it announces his psychological intel-
lectualism, of which we spoke. The rest of the
proposition signifies merely that the object of this
presentation belongs to the class of "particular
things," by which term he designates all objects of
the temporal, changing, perishable world. Propo- <
sition 13 of the same Part declares further that this
particular thing "is the body." Now, as a presen
tation of the body, the human mind may be re
garded in two different aspects: first, as a "com
plete" or "adequate" idea exactly representing the

72 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

body in all its relations, immediate and remote, to
the rest of the material universe ; and secondly, as
an "incomplete" or "inadequate" idea, i. e., as an
idea that embraces the complete idea only so far as
the individual consciousness extends. Now when
we take into account Spinoza's doctrine of bodies,
the idea which constitutes the conscious mind be
comes the "incomplete" idea of a certain pro
portion of rest and motion. But idea in what sense ?
Clearly it is at least the spiritual counterpart-
From the explanation above it follows also that it
is rather of the nature of a presentation than of a
volition or of a feeling. But may we go a step
further and say that of the proportion of rest and
motion which constitutes the essence of the body
the mind is a presentation in the sense that it is a
perception (or conception) which has this for its
content? The above-mentioned ambiguity of the
term "object" vitiates his thinking at this point,
and leads him to obscure and confused statements.
As we proceed, however, we hope to make clear that
he does not consciously and explicitly teach this
absurdity, although, when the exigencies of his ar
gumentation require it, he often tacitly assumes it.
The question now arises, what is this idea so far
as it extends beyond human consciousness? As
we shall see when we come to consider Spinoza's
doctrine of clear ideas and of causality, it ought to
be the rest of the body's spiritual double, i. e., that
on the side of spirit which, when added to the human
consciousness, completely represents the body in
clusive of all its causal relations to the rest of the
material universe. But is it of the nature of con
scious thought? In other words, does the body's

DOCTRINE OP KNOWLEDGE 73

idea, so far as it is not contained in the human
consciousness, fall in a universal consciousness ? We
shall find grounds for concluding that it does not.
Spinoza conceives the spiritual as, in its deepest
nature hypostatized logic, and as such it is always
at least the content of possible thinking, when not
conscious thought; and, if in speaking of such an
idea as we have described he ever employs the lan
guage of consciousness, calling it "clear," " ade
quate/' etc., it is because he applies the same term
inology to the thinkable as to actual thought.

The further question naturally presents itself:
How are the manifold elements of consciousness re
lated to the fundamental idea which constitutes the
primum of the mind? This point Spinoza has left
in obscurity. He affirms, indeed, that the idea is
"not simple, but composite,"1 and thus accounts for
the multiplicity exhibited in consciousness ; but he
does not explain how the unity of the same is to be
conceived. However, if the basal fact of the mind
is the spiritual double, in some sense, of the formula
that expresses in general terms that proportion of
rest and motion which characterizes the human body
as such, particular mental states may be conceived,
in accordance with Spinoza's doctrine of composite
bodies, as doubles of those particular variations of
the general formula which may take place without
altering its total value. As a matter of fact Spinoza
sometimes treats the mind as an aggregate of ideas
that have no organic connection, and at other times
as a very real unity, conceiving the different ideas
as activities and states of a psychical entity, or, as
we should say, of a substantial soul. The latter way

lEth. II, 15.

74 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

of treating it is seen in Eth. V, 31 : "The third kind
of knowledge depends on the mind as a real cause,
in so far as the mind itself is eternal. ' n

The mystery of self-consciousness is explained as
follows: The idea of the body, the mind, is no less
a piece of reality than is the body. Viewed in this
aspect, it is an object and must itself have a cor
responding idea. For the same reason, to be sure,
the idea of an idea must in turn have its idea, and
so on ad infinitum; and Spinoza, in fact, admits
this consequence and cites to confirm his theory the
empirical fact that whoever knows anything knows
in that very fact (eo ipso) that he knows it, and at
the same time knows that he knows that he knows
it, etc., etc.2 In this way he seems to wish to ex
plain (1) the self -consciousness of the mind in every
act of knowledge, and (2) the continuity of self-
consciousness. The difficulties involved in his
thought we may at present ignore. He adds that
the idea of the mind (i. e. idea ideae) is in fact noth
ing else than the forma (distinctive quality) of the
idea so far as this is considered as a mode of
thought apart from its relation to an object. This
would seem to imply that self-consciousness is the
inherent character of mind, and to contradict the
above-noticed apparent assumption on his part that
an idea is not always fully developed self-conscious
ness. Accordingly his language here has been in
terpreted as having far-reaching significance and as

1 Cf, Korte Verh. I, Cap. 2, Zamenspreeking, p. 18,
where, in an illustration, both points of view appear con
fusedly together.

2 Eth. II, 21, dem. and schol.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 75

necessarily implying self-consciousness in the Ab
solute.1

Its bearing upon his conception of God will be
more accurately estimated after we have penetrated
further into the details of his system.

2. The Imagination, "Imaginatio."

By this word Spinoza means in the first place
what we call sense-perception. It must always be
borne in mind, however, that, according to Spinoza,
our ideas of sense objects are not caused by these
objects. Events in the spiritual world are entirely
independent of events in the spatial world, although
the two series correspond. It is only through the
principle of parallelism that sense-perception takes
place. The physiological and psychological pro
cesses involved, he describes as follows: When the
body (a sense organ) is affected by an external body,
the character of the physical affection is determined
not only by the nature of the human body, but also
by the nature of the external body; and, as every
effect involves its cause, this affection "involves"
the nature of the external body, and contains, as
it were, its image. Now by virtue of the principle
of parallelism the human mind "contemplates" this
affection, i. e. has an idea that involves the nature
of the external body and that affirms (ponit) its
actual existence;2 and so the mind "contemplates"
the external body as present, or as actually exist
ing." It would seem therefore that the form which
the "idea" of a bodily affection takes is the percep-

1 Recently by Joachim, "A Study of the Ethics of Spi
noza," p. 72.

2Eth. II, 17, dem. Cf. Eth. II, 26, Cor., dem.

76 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

tion of the external body. But, if we are to take
in earnest Spinoza's declaration that the images in
our bodies (sense organs) are after all not pictures
or copies, but only the effects, of the external body
so far as these indicate its nature, the process be
comes less simple. The idea of the bodily affection
is then only the ground for the construction of the
mental image of the thing and for objectifying the
same. Between the "contemplation" of the bodily
affection therefore and the "contemplation" of the
external body, we should have to supply in the
process a link that would be of the nature of an
immediate (and unconscious) inference.1 But, as
Spinoza has not expressly so explained the matter,
we cannot be sure that this was clearly his thought.
As the problems of a later time in regard to subject
and object did not exist for him, it is not improb
able that the hiatus in the process described by him
escaped his notice; and that, for his thinking, "to
have an idea which involves the nature of the ex
ternal body" sufficiently explained "our contem
plating it as actually existing."

The value of the knowledge obtained through
sense-perception Spinoza estimates very low. It
lias several defects. In the first place, as the char
acter of every affection of the body is determined
by the nature of the human body as well as by that
of the external body, and, as what is contributed
by the one is inseparable from what is contributed
by the other; the corresponding idea is so mixed

1 The idea of the bodily affection is indefinitely con
ceived as the means through which the external body is
perceived. — Eth. II, 26, cor., dem. Cum mens humana
per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa con-
templatur, etc.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 77

that what refers to the external body is not clearly
distinguishable from the rest.* Every perception
therefore, conveys only a confused and unclear
knowledge. In the second place, as an external
body affects the human body only through a part
of its characters, it leaves there incomplete traces
of its nature. Consequently, that complete idea of
a perceived body which, according to the principle
of parallelism, must exist somewhere, lies partly
within and partly without the human mind. For
the human mind, therefore, the idea is incomplete,
mutilated (mutilata).1

The term imagination, as employed by Spinoza,
includes also the memory. According to his defini
tion, this consists only in an association of sense-
perceptions in that accidental (non-logical) order
in which they occur in experience.2 It has to do,
therefore, with unclear and mutilated ideas alone.
From a passage in ' ' The Improvement of the Under
standing,"3 it appears that one motive for relega
ting the memory to the domain of the imagination
was the effort to vindicate to all those ideas which
belong to the rest of the mind a non-temporal char
acter. Another, no doubt, was the fact that the
memory is a source of error. But how he accounts
for the remembrance of other than sense objects,.

* Eth. II, 16, et cor. 2.

'Eth. II, 25; II, 40, sch. 2; II, 49, sch.; De Intellectus
Emendatione p. 23.

aEth. II, 18, sch. But compare De Int. Em. pp. 25-26.
Sterns' German translation of "corruptionem" in this
passage by "Falschung" is a mistake. Cf. Eth. II, 31,
cor., where "corruptibilis" in a similar connection must
mean "perishable."

8De Intel. Emend., p. 26.

78 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

or whether this problem distinctly presented itself
to his mind at all, cannot be determined.1

Without attempting any further analysis of the
imagination, it will suffice to know that Spinoza
himself never sought to determine its limits through
adequate psychological investigations, but accepted
the traditional Aristotelian distinction between the
passive and the active parts of the mind, and identi
fied the "imagination" with the passive. "For my
part," he says, "you may understand by imagination
what you please, provided only it be something else
than the intellect and be that on account of which
the mind possesses a relation of passivity."2 The
proper criterion, however, by which a given idea
is known to belong to the imagination is not any
demonstrable connection of the idea with a passive
psychological process, but its peculiar character,
i. e. its unclearness, vagueness, inadequateness, etc.
"For it is a matter of indifference what you under
stand [by the imagination] after we know that it
is something vague."3 "In so far as the mind has
inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive."4 If we
can discern the inadequate ideas, therefore,
we need no psychological observation in order to
define the realm of the imagination; it is exactly
conterminate with the sum of inadequate ideas.

1 It is perfectly clear, however, that memory "quid
diversum esse ab intellectu, et circa intellectum in se
spectum nullam dari memoriam, neque oblivionem."
De Intell. Em. 26. — "Nam a solis corporibus afficitur
imaginatio." — Ibid.

2 De Int. Emend, p. 26. — "Unde anima habeat rationem
patientis."

3De Int. Emend. 26-27.
4Eth. Ill, 1, III, 3, dem.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 79

What then is that peculiarity which constitutes
for our minds the distinguishing mark of these ideas ?
They are variously described as incomplete, unclear,
(non clarae), vague (vagae), mutilated (mutilatae),
truncated (truncatae), confused (confusae), and in
distinct (non distinctae). Any of these char
acteristics ought to be sufficient to enable us to
recognize them, but unclearness and indistinctness
seem to be looked upon as most properly the dis
tinguishing characteristics. As according to Spi
noza clear knowledge of objects includes a knowl
edge of their causes, inadequate ideas are some
times regarded as of the nature of consequential
absque prcemissis.1

We must now note just how the imagination is
related to error. All ideas, to employ Spinoza's
own phraseology, are true "in so far as they are
related to God;" for all ideas, when considered as
belonging to God (total reality) correspond per
fectly with their objects (ideata).2 Error, then,
consists in nothing positive,3 but is due to the par
tial character of the knowledge contained in the
inadequate ideas, which exist in individual finite
minds only.4 How this assertion is to be under
stood, appears from the declaration that sense-per
ceptions, ideas constructed by the imagination
properly so-called, and the associations of ideas in
the memory, do not, in themselves considered, con
tain error; for the mind does not err because it
possesses such ideas, but only because sometimes it

lEth. II, 28, dem.

'Eth. II, 32.

»Eth. II, 33.

'Eth. II, 36, dem. Cf. II, 35.

80 SPINOZA- AND RELIGION

has no occasion to doubt their reliableness and there
fore allows them to pass for more than mere ideas
of the imagination (imaginationes) . Accordingly
the deficiency involved in inadequate ideas becomes
the cause of error only in the absence of a true idea
through which their real character is manifest.1 It
is this deficiency that must account also for errors
of judgment and of inference. In the case of a false
judgment, the error consists in our affirming of a
thing something that is not contained in its concept
or definition.2 Here we have, either of the subject
or of the predicate, an inadequate knowledge which
the mind does not recognize as such.

But the nature of error will become clearer after
an explanation of Spinoza's doctrine of the reason.

3. TJie Reason, "ratio."

Reason is the antithesis of the imagination, con
stituting the "active" part of the mind. Its es
sential characteristic is expressed in the fact that
through it alone all adequate ideas have their
origin. The term is sometimes employed by Spi
noza in a more extended sense than at others. In
the more restricted sense it designates the mental
activity (or faculty) by virtue of which we acquire
the so-called notiones communes and deduce from
these other adequate ideas.3 It is in this sense that
we will consider it first.

In discussing the inadequate ideas, he showed that
we cannot gain an adequate knowledge of any indi
vidual thing in the actual world, and apparently

TEth. II, 17, sch.; 35, sch.; 49, sch., p. 113.

3De Int. Emend, p. 22.

•Eth. II, 40, schol. 1 and 2. Cf. II, 29, schol.

DOCTRINE OP KNOWLEDGE 81

excluded the possibility of adequate knowledge
altogether. We are now reminded, however, that
there are other objects of knowledge, namely, the
properties of things, and, in particular, those
properties which are common to all bodies and are
the same in every part as in the whole,1 but do not
constitute the " essence" of any particular thing.2
Extension is an example. Of such objects we can
evidently acquire adequate ideas, despite the con
ditions which were found to render impossible an
adequate knowledge of individual bodies: for that
which is common to all bodies must leave in an af
fection of the human body not partial, but complete,
traces of its nature. The idea of any external body,
therefore, though not conveying an adequate knowl
edge of that body as such, contains all the data for
an adequate idea of the common qualities of all
bodies. For the same reason we can, of course, have
adequate ideas also of all those properties which the
human body has in common with only a few other
bodies.3 It is to be observed, however, that the
mind never gains adequate ideas immediately
through sense-perception (the abstract ideas that
originate in this way are in the highest degree con
fused),4 but only through a sort of comparison, in
that the mind is inwardly determined to "contem-

'Eth. II, 37.

2Eth. II, def. 2.

3 Eth. II, 39. — The question arises, What sort of
knowledge should that be which is gained when one part
of our body affects another, through the sense of touch,
for example? It ought to follow that we get in this way
an adequate knowledge of that which is the same in each
part as in the whole, i. e., of that general proportion of
rest and motion which constitutes the essence of the body.

* Eth. II, 40, schol. 1. — "summo gradu confusas."

82 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

plate several things at the same time and to take
cognizance of their agreements, differences, and in
compatibilities."1 This account of the matter was
necessary in order consistently to exclude all pas
sivity from the reason.

In the mind's relation to the body, therefore, all
rational activity, as being self-determined mind,
must correspond only with physiological changes
that have their source not from without, but from
within the body itself, that originate in its inde
pendent nature. But as we proceed, it will appear
that neither the independence of the one order of
change nor of the other can be maintained without
contradicting fundamental assumptions of Spinoza's
system, and that the possibility of adequate ideas
is, after all, only apparent.

The above-mentioned notiones communes are the
most general of the adequate ideas, and constitute
the "foundations" of reason, i. e. the points of de
parture for deductive procedure. Spinoza has no
where enumerated them. It has been supposed,
however, that by inference they can be shown to
be the following: (1) conception of substance;
(2) conception of attribute; (3) conception of mode;
(4) thought; (5) extension; (6) idea; (7) motion
and rest.2 As Spinoza has given no list, and as
there is no evidence that he himself had determined
their exact number, we can not be sure that this
table is either exhaustive or correct. It may be
doubted whether Spinoza thought of the conceptions

1 Eth. II, 29, schol.

2 Of the univcrsalia realia, which we regard as but
another name for the notiones communes, Leibnitz made a
list that differs somewhat from this. See M. Pouscher
de Careil, "Leibnitz, Descartes, et Spinoza," pp. 122-7.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 83

of substance, attribute, and mode as falling in this
category. As defined by him they must, of course,
be regarded as adequate ideas; but as when speak
ing of notiones communes he seems to have in mind
only such ideas as have for their content "proper
ties" of "real" things, it would appear that only the
last four may be confidently classified as notiones com
munes.1 It is possible, however, that Spinoza re
garded the others also as involved in our perception
of real things, and therefore as in a certain sense
"properties."

^ In its more extended sense the term ratio includes
the so-called scientia intuitiva, or "third kind" of
cognition. The specific difference which distin
guishes this from reason in general, is that it pro
ceeds from the adequate ideas of certain attributes
of God (Nature) immediately to the adequate
knowledge of the essences of things.2 Although the
relation of intuition to reason in general is not in
all respects clear, it seems certain, (1) that it at
tains its results in a peculiar way, i. e. not through
syllogistic processes, but through immediate in
sight; and (2) that it has a peculiar function,
namely, that of discovering the "essences" of par
ticular things. We may suppose therefore, what
seems to be everywhere assumed, that ordinary ;
reason is not equal to this task. It is to be observed, >
however, that the results of the different kinds of
rational activity, so far as they extend, are of equal
validity.3

xEth. II, 38, cor.; De Intel. Emend, p. 30.
3Eth. II, 40, schol. 2. Cf. Eth. V, 36, schol.
3Eth. II, 41 and 42.

84 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

To rational knowledge in general belong certain
peculiar characteristics: (1) ''It is not of the nature
of reason to view things as contingent, but as nec
essary."1 (2) "It is of the nature of reason to per
ceive things under a certain aspect of eternity,"2
i. e. in purely logical relations, and so "in no tem
poral relation."3 (3) "All adequate ideas," the
products of reason, "are clear, and distinct, and
true." "Adequate" and ''true" are in fact used
interchangeably by Spinoza. "Adequate" has ref
erence to the completeness of the idea considered
in itself; "true" takes account of the relation of
the idea to its object, signifying its agreement with
the same.4

The question now arises, what is for Spinoza
the ultimate criterion of truth? His answer to this
question is explicit and repeated. It consists in a
peculiar character that belongs to the ideas as such :
"It is certain that true thinking is distinguished
from false, not only by what is extrinsic (the object),
but especially by what is intrinsic ; " " that there
is in the ideas some real quality by which the true
are distinguished from the false."5 Now this cre
dential badge of all true ideas is, of course, nothing
else than that characteristic which we have already
had repeated occasion to mention, namely, "clear
ness and distinctness." "All ideas that are clear

1 Eth. II, 44.

2Eth. II, 44, cor. 2.

3 Eth. II, 44, cor. 2, dem. — "absque ulla temporis rela-
tione."

4Epis. 60, p. 386 (olim 64). — Cf. Eth. II, def. 4.

5 De Intel. Emend, p. 21. Cf. ibid. p. 22. — Forma verae
cogitationis in eadem ipsa cogitatione sine relatione ad
alias debet esse sita. And Eth. II, def. 4.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 85

and distinct can never be false."1 Of these terms
Spinoza has given us no formal definitions. We
may safely assume, however, that for him they mean
nothing else than they meant for Descartes, from
whom he seems to have taken them. Descartes
gives the following definitions, which do not estab
lish a very definite distinction between the two
terms: "I call clear that [idea] which to the at
tentive mind is present and open: but distinct that
[idea] which, when it becomes clear, is so severed
from all others and so precise that it plainly con
tains nothing else than what is clear."2

Clearness and distinctness must always and in
evitably produce certainty in the knowing subject.
"Whoever truly knows a thing must at the same
time be certain."3 "He who has a true idea, knows
at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can
he doubt the truth of the thing. ' '4 It is a matter of
indifference, therefore, whether we regard clearness
and distinctness of the ideas, or certainty on the
part of the subject, as really the ultimate criterion
of truth. It should be carefully noted, however,
that for Spinoza certainty is more than the mere
absence of doubt, it is something positive,5 i. e., I
suppose, a degree of conviction that arises only after
attentive and critical examination of an idea. Ac
cordingly it is possible to have no doubt as to the
validity of a false idea, and thus to fall into error;
but it is never possible to be certain of that valid-

Ibid. p. 21. Cf. Descartes, Principia, I, 43.
Prin. P. I, § 45.
Eth. II, 43, dem.
Eth. II, 43.

Eth. II, 49, schol. — nam per certitudinem quid positi-
vum intelligimus, non vero dubitationis privationem.

86 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

ity. One can err only by allowing the absence of
doubt to pass for positive certainty.

4. Logical Presuppositions.

"Adequate ideas," as we saw, are reached, when
the mind "is determined from within, by its contem
plation of several things at once, to understand their
agreements, differences, and contrasts."1 This
language, which seems to have particular reference
to the formation of adequate ideas of the common
properties of sense-objects, is supplemented by a
remark of more general application: "as often as
in this way or in any oilier way [the human mind]
is disposed (disponitur) from within, it views
things clearly and distinctly."2 In order to dis
cover truth, therefore, the mind noods only to act
on its own motion, undisturbed by inroads of the
emotions and of the senses. Spinoza assumes, in
fact, that human reason is able, by its independent
activity, apart from the data of experience, to frame
clear conceptions, which necessarily have corres
ponding objects in the world of reality. His onto-
logical proofs of the existence of the Absolute, for
example, which we shall soon have occasion to con
sider, presuppose this assumption. In respect of
his general philosophical standpoint, therefore, he
is to be characterized as a thorough rationalist.

In this position he was confirmed by the un
critical assumption, common to the leading thinkers
of his time, that mathematics is the pattern of all
science. The unerring validity of mathematics in
its own province of numerical and spatial relations,

1Eth. II, prop. 29, schol.
2 Ibid. The italics are ours.

DOCTRINE OP KNOWLEDGE 87

caused them to suppose that the same methods of
reasoning applied to other sciences would yield
equally infallible results. But they overlooked the
essential difference between mathematics and all
other sciences. In geometry, for example, which
Spinoza took for his special model, we possess in
the data of a given problem and in the nature of the
space idea common to all minds, everything im
plicitly that becomes explicit in the result. In no
other sciences have we anything of the kind. Any
conceptions from which we may choose to proceed
by deduction can embody only certain properties
with which we have become acquainted by ex
perience, and the mind has no a priori principles,
like those involved in the space idea, that enable
us to go beyond the given properties to other new
ones. But if in common with the thinkers of his
time Spinoza overlooked this circumstance, it is one
of his merits that, by his thorough-going application
of the geometrical method to philosophy, he made
manifest its inadequacy in this field. He does not
shrink from entitling his chief work, "Ethica ordine
geometrico demonstrata," and from announcing
further that it is his intention to treat "God,"
"mind," and "human actions" "ac si qucestio de
lineis, planis, aut de corporibus esset."

In accordance with his predilection for the
methods of mathematics, he takes as his starting
point axioms and definitions. His assumption of
axioms is in harmony with his methodological pre
supposition that in dealing with quite simple ideas

'Eth. Ill, end of the introductory paragraph. Cf.
Eth. I, Appendix p. 68. — "Nisi mathesis . . ;? . aliam veri-
tatis normam hominibus ostendisset, etc."

88 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

error is impossible.* Definitions must express, if
perfect, the innermost nature of the objects denned,
so that out of the definitions will logically follow
all the more particular properties of the objects.
It is in assumed harmony with this proposition that
he requires the definition of a finite thing to include
its proximate cause. A circle, therefore, must be
defined as follows: "It is a figure that is described
by any line, one end of which is fixed, the other
movable." This definition obviously includes the
proximate producing cause, if it does not, as Spi
noza mistakingly supposed, permit all properties of
the circle to be deduced from it.1 When it is not a
question of a geometrical figure, but of a real
thing, the proximate cause would often be only that
which is represented by a more general term.2 For
in this connection it is to be carefully noted that
by the word "res" Spinoza designates not merely
things in the ordinary sense of the term, but also
the properties of things, especially their common
properties. These he characterizes as "eternal,"
since they are, so to speak, "omnipresent" and
therefore in his view independent of the existence
of the particular individuals presented by the world
of change. They are individual things (singularia),
to be sure, but they are universal individuals (uni-

* De Int. Emend, pp. 19-20. — "inde sequitur primo,
quod si idea alicujus rei simplicissimae, ea non nisi clara
et distincta poterit esse."

1 In geometry we discover the properties of the circle
by studying the figure, and not by analysis of the defini
tion.

2 De Int. Emend, p. 31. — Unde haec fixa et aeternae . . .
erunt nobis tanquam universalia, sive genera defmiti-
onum rerum singularium mutabilium, et causae proxi-
mae omnium rerum.

DOCTRINE OP KNOWLEDGE 89

versaMa). Examples are presumably (he himself
has given none) extension, motion, etc. They cor
respond, therefore, to the notiones communes already
mentioned.1 Of this kind of "things" it is not
difficult, as we saw, to obtain clear and distinct
ideas ; and they are to be employed as general terms,
or (according to his way of thinking) as "proximate
causes," in framing definitions of particular things
properly so-called.2

From this starting-point of self-evident truths
expressed in axiomatic propositions and in defini
tions, Spinoza proposed to advance by deduction to
other important truths and finally even to an ade
quate knowledge of individual things.3 These were
to be deduced, let it be observed, from those "uni-
versals" and never constructed from the manifold
data given in the sense-perception of any particular
object. Spinoza hoped to get behind the data of
the senses. His method assumes that every idea is
of such a nature that from it logical consequences
may be drawn and that every thing (even every
eternal thing, despite its peculiar character) must
produce effects.4 True conceptions of the individual
things of the sense world would be inferences from
the "universals," and the individual things them-

1 Page 80. See Eth. II, 40, schol. 1 and 2. Cf. Eth. II,
29, scholium.

8 It would be erroneous, however, to suppose that Spi
noza ever pretended to have arrived at an adequate
knowledge of any particular thing in the outer world.
He has nowhere attempted to define one.

3 That is, to a knowledge of their nature but not to a
knowledge of the conditions which determine their time,
place and number.

4 Eth. I, 36. — Nihil existit, ex cujus natura aliquis
effectus non sequitur. Cf. Eth. I, 16, dem.

90 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

selves (i. e. their objective essences) are products
of the hypostatized universal^.1

To deduce the "essences" of particular things
from universals, or "eternal things" is the peculiar
function of the scientia intuitiva or "third order"
of cognition. Spinoza first hypostatized the general
properties of the material world and then regarded
them as both the logical ground and the real cause
of the special qualities of individual things, attribut
ing to the human mind the power of intuitively
discerning this relationship.

From what has been said it appears that Spinoza
conceived of causal connection as a logical connec
tion of an analytical kind. This fundamental pre
supposition is expressed in one of his first and most
frequently repeated axioms: "The knowledge of
an effect depends on a knowledge of the cause, and
involves the same."2 He assumes, therefore, what

1 De Int. Emend., p. 31. — Haec [intima essentia rerum]
vero tantum est petenda a fixis atque aeternis rebus, et
simul a legibus in iis rebus, tanquam in suis veris co-
dicibus inscriptis, secundum quas omnia singularia et
flunt et ordinantur; imo haec mutabilia singularia adeo
intime atque essentialiter (ut sic dicam) ab iis fixis
pendent, ut sine iis nee esse nee concipi possint.

It is commonly assumed that Spinoza is a thorough
going nominalist. This view of him has become tradi
tional, and is accepted without examination even by
careful writers. Sir Frederick Pollock, for example, in
his interesting and widely-read book on Spinoza has been
quite misled, it seems to me, by the tradition. He says
(p. 142): "Spinoza's nominalism which we have always
to bear in mind, is a sufficient warning against assuming
that the 'eternal things' have anything to do with kinds,
qualities, or classification." As a matter of fact, Spinoza
is as thorough a realist in Ms own way as was Plato. Cf.
Martineau's "Study of Spinoza," pp. Ill and 150, note,
and Fullerton's "The Philosophy of Spinoza," passim.

2 Eth. I, Ax. 4 — Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae
dependet, et eandem involvit.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 91

the subsequent development of philosophy has
shown to be erroneous, that it is possible so fully
to grasp the nature of things that by an analysis
of our conceptions of them, we can discover what
their effects must be.1 It is a consequence of his
axiom that we may not assume any causal relation,
to exist between objects the conceptions of which
contain nothing in common. Hence extension and
thought, body and soul, can produce no effect on
each other. The same presupposition, which resulted
in an inconsequence in Desoartes' philosophy, gave
rise to Occasionalism in the minds of Geulincx
and Malebranche, and led in the case of Spinoza
to the doctrine of Parallelism.

In accordance with these methodological presup
positions, Spinoza was convinced :

1. That it is possible to apprehend and to define
the Being " which is the cause of all things;"

2. That from this Being the "essences" of all
things in nature are to be deduced;

3. That the intelligible arrangement of concep
tions would correspond to objective nature; that ac
cordingly the mind would become a mirror of
nature, for it would "have subjectively the essence,
arrangement, and connection of the same."1 But
it is to be observed that when Spinoza speaks here of
an "intelligible arrangement" of things, he has in
mind only that of the "eternal" things, i. e. a sort

1 It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that he
assumed an adequate knowledge of any individual things
given in the external world, though he hoped to know
these adequately sometime by means of intuition.

2De Int. Emend, p. 30. — nam et ipsius essentiam, et
ordinem et unionem habebit objective. "Objective" must
be translated nowadays by "subjectively" or "ideally."

92 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

of classification of general conceptions.* From the
beginning Spinoza renounced all hope of being able
to make intelligible the temporal succession of
perishable things.1

We have described the salient features of Spi
noza's logical theory. It was for him only an ideal,
which hovered before his mind and constantly in
fluenced his thinking, but never reached full reali
zation and application. In regard to the "third
order of cognition," which plays so important a
role in his theory, he confesses in "The Improve
ment of the Understanding" that those things which
he had been able up to that time to learn by means
of it were "very few. ": If he had been asked
for a concrete example, the very few things would
certainly have turned out to be none. At no later
time could he have given a more satisfactory answer ;
for he was counting on a power of the mind that
does not exist.

That characteristic of Spinoza's method which
is of the most practical importance is his identifi
cation of real (ontological) cause with logical
ground or logical presupposition of any kind, — es
pecially a more general conception. In the world
of change "cause" may mean for him either onto
logical cause or logical presupposition ; in the world

* De Int. Emend, p. 30. — Sed notandum, me hie per
seriem causarum, et realium entium, non intelligere seri-
em rerum singularium mutabilium; sed tantummodo
seriem rerum fixarum aeternarumque.

1 De Int. Emend, p. 30. — Seriem enim rerum singu
larium mutabilium impossible foret humanae imbecilli-
tati assequi ....

2 Ibid. 8. — Ea tamen, quae hucusque tali cognitione
potui intelligere, perpauca fuerunt.

DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE 93

of changeless realities, " cause" means only logical
presupposition.1

1 This will appear in a subsequent chapter on "Sub
stance and Modes."

PART I.

SPINOZA'S CONCEPTION
OF GOD

CHAPTER I.

HIS DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE AND HIS
PROBLEM.

The objects of our knowledge we spontaneously
analyze into the properties of things^and the things
themselves which possess the properties. We as
sume that behind the various sense-properties of
an object there exists a real, substantial unity in
which these inhere. This we call substance. The
question whether this spontaneous assumption is
rationally justified and how, after a critical exam
ination of our knowledge, we are to conceive of
things, has always constituted the chief problem
of metaphysics.

Aristotle's conception of substance was domin
ant with all leading thinkers until a considerable
time after the opening of the modern period of
philosophy. According to the best known of his
definitions, it is that which "is neither predicated
of any subject nor is in any subject ; as, for example,
a certain man or a certain horse."1 Ignoring the
confusion of ontological with logical subject which
appears in Aristotle's language, we may paraphrase
his definition in harmony with his general doctrine
as follows : Substance is always the particular thing
(in distinction from the universal), and indeed the
particular thing -in-it self , so to speak, the possessor

^ATHFOPIAI, 5.— ovffLa 84 4<rriv 17 Kvpidrard re ical irp^rus KO.\
ftd\ia-Ta \eyo/j.^VTj, t) HJTC Kad" viroKetptvov rivbs X^yerat /Aijr' Iv
rivl fonv, olov 6 rls AvBpwirot, f) 6 rls

98 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

of properties, which is itself no property of any
thing else.

Under the influence of the Aristotelian tradition,
Thomas Aquinas defines substance as " being sub
sisting per se;"* which is explained by the further
statement: "for we say that those things subsist
which do not exist in others, but in themselves."1
Accordingly substance is that which exists not only
in itself, but through itself. John of Damascus gives
a similar definition: "Substance is a self-existent
thing that does not need anything else as a sup
port."1 J. Martini expresses himself in almost
identical language.3 Suarez says that "substance
stands under the accidents in such a way that it
itself does not require a similar support."4 With
Descartes we find two definitions, one of which runs
as follows: "Everything in which inheres immedi
ately anything which we perceive, i. e. any property,
or quality, or attribute, the real idea of which is in
us, is called substance."5 The other resembles in
expression that just quoted from John of Damascus :
"By substance we can understand nothing else than
a thing that so exists that it needs no other thing
in order to exist."6 Let it be observed that ac-

* Sum. Th. I, qu. 3, art. 5 — "ens per se subsistens."

1 Sum. Th. I, qu. 29, art. 2.

8 " ff ov<rla fori TTpSiyfjia avdtiirapKTOv }J.T) 8e6fj.€vov ertpov irpbs fftiffra-

fflV."

3 Metaphys. p. 487. — "rem per se subsistentem nee
indigentem alterius ope ut sit."

*Disp. XXX, p. 299. — Substantia ita substat acciden-
tibus ut non idigeat ipsa simili sustentaculo.

5 Def. 5. — Rationes more geometrico dispositae.

B Prin. I, 51. — Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere
possumus quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re
indigeat ad existendum.

DEFINITION OP SUBSTANCE 99

cording to this definition, strictly construed, sub
stance is no longer merely that which does not need,
like qualities, to be regarded as inhering in a sub
ject (this was Aristotle's idea) ; but it is that which
is absolutely independent and unconditioned. The
obvious consequences of this thought seem not en
tirely to have escaped Descartes, for he concedes
that God alone can be substance in the most proper
sense of the term.1

We come finally to Spinoza's definition: "By
substance I understand that which is in itself and
is conceived through itself; i. e. that whose concep
tion does not need the conception of any other
thing by the aid of which it must be formed."2
Spinoza regards substance, therefore, as the inde
pendently existent, and this not merely in the sense
of not inhering in a subject, i. e. of not being a
property of something, but in the sense of the ab
solutely independent, the unconditioned.

Down to the time of Spinoza it was customary
to assume along with the infinite substance, or God,
a multitude of finite substances. But as the finite
substances depended in some way on God, their
proper substance character could not, according to
the definition of substance as the independently
existent (if taken literally), be consistently main
tained. Before Spinoza, no one had definitely and
decisively drawn this obvious conclusion, although
Descartes had reduced the multitude of substances
to two (or to two kinds), and had logically done
these away by admitting that the only substance

1 Ibid.

2Eth. I, def. 3. — Per substantiam intelligo id, quod
in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus
non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.

100 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

which clearly needs no other thing is God.1 Granted
that particular things after all are not substances,
the thought lay very near that they must then be
' ' accidents, " " affections, " " modes, " " modifica
tions," of the one substance, the Absolute; for, ac
cording to tradition, all reality was divided into
substances and accidents or modes. Whatever was
not a substance, therefore, was necessarily a mode.
It was in this way that for Spinoza the problem
arose: How to comprehend all things as in their
real nature only particularizations, so to speak, of
the Absolute. Owing to his predilection for the
method of mathematics, his solution of the problem
was cast in the form of a deduction of the particu
lar from the general ; although like all philosophers
who have followed the deductive method, he was
compelled first to determine the nature of the gen
eral from the particular, in order then apparently
to deduce the particular. His real aim was only to
make intelligible in some way the self-sufficiency,
or self-existence, and the unity, organic and sub
stantive, of the world.

1 Prin. Phil. I, 51. — "Substantia quae nulla plane re
indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus."

CHAPTER II.
THE FORMAL ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE.

The argumentations about to be examined are a
stumbling-block to the modern reader and would
severely tax our respect for this truly great thinker,
if we did not take account of Spinoza's place in
history. They represent scholastic elements that
have gone over into his philosophy, and show to
what a degree the most independent thinkers of the
first period of modern philosophy remained under
the influence of Scholasticism, even when they de
veloped their own thoughts in conscious antithesis
thereto.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume as a
matter of course that the ontological demonstrations
which we are about to cite had the same motive as
those of traditional Christian theology. The onto
logical reasoning of theology aimed to establish
the existence of a transcendental God. But for Spi
noza, who identifies God, Substance, and Nature,1
the existence of "God" must be just as certain as
that of the world, and requires no demonstration.
All knowledge, according to Spinoza, involves the
knowledge of God. Accordingly his ontological
arguments were not really intended to make sure
the existence of "God," but to establish the self-
existence and therewith the eternity, the infinity,
etc., of Nature.

1 Eth. IV, Praefatio, p. 180. — "Deus seu Natura."

102 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

1. The Self -Existence and Eternity of Substance.

The self-existence of substance is proved in the
following manner: According to definition, sub
stance is "that whose conception needs the con
ception of no other thing. " But that whose
conception needs the conception of no other
thing can not have any cause outside of itself, for
the cause would in this case necessarily be included
in the conception, since "the knowledge of an effect
depends on a knowledge of the cause and includes
the same." Now as substance can have no outer
cause, it must be "causa sui," self-existent. There
fore existence pertains to the nature of substance.1
This demonstration is, of course, a petitio principii-,
since, in order to be cogent, it must assume just that
existence of substance which is to be proved. For
if something has no outer cause, it follows that it
has an inner one only after we have assumed that
it already exists and needs a cause of this existence.
Yet Spinoza is quite in earnest and supposes he has
demonstrated both the existence and the self-ex
istence of substance, though of course his interest
is really in the proof for the self-existence. He
tacitly admits, however, that the result of his dem
onstration does not after all go beyond what is im
mediately contained in the definition, and hence in
a note he founds the self-existence of substance upon
the naked definition: The idea of existence belongs
to the clear and distinct conception of substance
(id, quod in se est), consequently substance exists in
objective reality ; the thought that substance does not
exist would be a contradiction. Or, to vary the

1 Eth. I, prop. 7. — "Ad naturam substantiae pertinet
existere."

ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE 1Q3

phraseology, we can conceive the essential nature
of anything except substance without thinking the
existence of the same ; existence, therefore, is not an
element of its content; but substance, according
to the definition, we cannot conceive without think
ing existence as belonging to it. In harmony with
his doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, then, the
existence of substance is not only in the idea of
substance, but in substance itself, "extra intellec-
tum."1

From the attribute of self-existence is derived
that of eternity. Since the conception of "causa
sui" includes no ground or cause for passing away,
but unqualifiedly posits existence, the attribute of
eternity is for Spinoza's way of thinking so obvious
a consequence, that he says he understands by
eternity nothing else than just this self -existence.2

2. The Infinitude of Substance.

From the self-existence of substance follows for
Spinoza also its infinity. As the definition of sub
stance represents an unqualified affirmation of ex
istence, and includes no negation or limitation, sub
stance must necessarily be infinite. Because the

1 Eth. I, prop. 8, schol. 2. — Si autem homines ad na-
turam substantiae attenderent, minime de veritate 7.
prop, dubitarent; imo haec prop, omnibus axioma esset,
et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per sub-
stantiam intelligerent id, quod in se est et per se con-
cipitur. ... Si quis ergo diceret, se claram et distinc-
tam, hoc est veram ideam substantiae habere et nihilo
minus dubitare, num talis substantia existat, idem hercle
esset, ac si diceret, se veram habere ideam, et nihilomi-
nus dubitare num falsa sit.

2 Eth. I, def. 8 (Cf. Cogitata Metaphysica, I, cap. 4;
Epis. 12; Eth. I, 19, dem.) — Per aeternitatem intelligo
ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definiti-
one necessario sequi concipitur.

104 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

word existence means existence and in no way
non-existence, the existent (substance) is affirmed
to be absolutely unlimited.

But this demonstration is too simple to satisfy
Spinoza, and it is followed by a more complicated
one. He tacitly makes the erroneous assumption
that the same content cannot belong to a plurality
of objects, and then draws the consequence that
there cannot be a plurality of substances of the same
nature.1 From this it follows that substance is not
finite; for, if it were, it would have to be limited
by another substance of the same nature, since by
"finite"2 we mean nothing else than "limited by
a similar." But, as there are not two substances
of the same nature, substance cannot be finite.

The basis of this argument, namely, that only one
substance of the same nature can exist, Spinoza
thought he could prove directly from the idea of
substance, as follows : A cause is required not only
for the nature of a thing, but also for its existence,
i. e. for the existence of the particular number of
individuals possessing that nature. This cause
(ground) is included either in the definition of the
thing or is outside of it. In the case of most things,

1 Eth. I, 5, dem. — Si darentur plures distinctae, deber-
ent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel
ex diversitate affectionum. Si tantum ex diversitate at-
trioutorum, concedetur ergo, non dari nisi unam ejusdem
attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substan-
tia sit prior natura suis affectionibus, depositis ergo
affectionibus, et in se considerata, hoc est vere consid-
erata, non poterit concipi ab ilia distingui, hoc est, non
poterunt dari plures, sed tantum una. — It will be ob
served that the fallacy consists in using "distinctae" in
the two senses of qualitatively distinct and numerically
separate.

'Eth. I, def. 2.

ATTRIBUTES OP SUBSTANCE 105

it is outside. The idea of man, for example, does
not imply the existence of man or of any men. But
in substance we have a thing the idea of which im
plies necessarily existence. The " cause " of its ex
istence (i. e. the ground for affirming its existence)
is included in its definition. ' l But from its definition
cannot follow the existence of several substances."
Therefore only one substance of the same nature
exists.*

Now the infinitude of substance, which is thus
established, is not merely the infinitude which we
may ascribe to a particular qualitative content (as,
for example, to extension, which permits us to think
other co-existent infinitudes of a different kind),
but an absolute infinitude that embraces all possible
qualitative infinitudes. Substance is infinite ''ex
istence," and as such embraces not only all known
kinds of relative infinitudes, but also an infinite
number of unknown kinds. It consists of an infinite
number of "attributes," each of which is infinite
in its kind constituting a particular qualitative con
tent.1

This result is reached by Spinoza by virtue of the
assumption that "the more reality or being each
thing has, the more attributes it has."2 This propo
sition, which he adopted from tradition, contains
the same play on words that we noticed above, where
Spinoza inferred the self-existence of substance from
the affirmative character of the conception of "ex
istence." Only it is here the other sense of the
ambiguous expression "non-negatived existence"

* Eth. I, 8, schol. 2.

1 Eth. I, 10, schol.

2 Eth. I, 9.

106 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

that is employed. The unconditionally affirmative
" existence" there meant the exclusion of all tem
poral limitations, i. e. "eternity;" here it is thought
according to logical extension, and means that an
infinite number of positive qualitative attributes
must be ascribed to substance.*

It is not necessary to consider in further detail
Spinoza's ontological arguments for the infinitude
of substance. Our purpose is only to determine in
essential particulars his conception of the Absolute,
and to define its relation to the religious conscious
ness. We may add only that he supposed he could
have dispensed with the demonstrations cited above
and have proved the absolute infinitude of substance
immediately from the idea of an absolutely infinite
and perfect being, since non-existence implies a
limitation and an imperfection.1 He offers also an
a posteriori demonstration for the existence of an
infinite substance: We know a posteriori that
finite things exist; and, if these things which we
know, had the power to exist and the infinite did not
have it, the finite would be mightier than the in
finite; which is absurd.2

* "ad ejus essentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam ex-
primit et negationem nullam involvit."

1 Eth. I, prop. 11, dem. 2 and 3. — This demonstration
also, like so many others employed to establish the meta
physical attributes of substance, consists in a play on
words. It is affirmed that "posse non existere impotentia
est, et contra posse existere potentia est." The proof
of this ''self-evident" proposition (it is "per se notum")
is apparently only the etymological kinship of "posse"
and "potentia." But "posse" is used in the problematical
sense and "potentia" in the sense of "power," and not
in the sense of "possibilitas," which is the substantive
correlative of "posse" as here used.

2 Eth. I, prop. 11, schol.

ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE 107

3. The Solitariness of Substance.

That there can not be several substances of the
same attribute, we have already seen ; that there can
be no plurality at all of substances, has not yet been
expressly affirmed and proved. This follows, how
ever, from what is assumed to be already established.
If substance is absolutely infinite and every attribute
must be ascribed to it, a hypothetical second sub
stance could have no attributes which did not
already belong to the infinite substance. But in
that case there would be two substances having a
common attribute; which we have found to be im
possible. There is therefore only one substance.1

The unity (solitariness) of substance, Spinoza
thinks, must be regarded as unique. Strictly speak
ing, it is not correct to characterize it numerically.
We conceive things numerically only after we have
brought them into a common class. But substance
cannot be so treated. Unity (unitas) is only a
mode of thinking whereby we distinguish one thing
from others which agree with it in some way. The
terms "one" (unum) and "single" (unicum),
therefore, can only very improperly be applied, to
substance.2

4. The Immutability of Substance.

It is entirely in accord with the peculiarities of
Spinoza's thinking that he regards substance as

1 Eth. I, 14. — This demonstration, it will be noticed,
is based on the ambiguity contained in prop. 5, namely,
that of the word distinctae, which means either "qualita
tively distinct," or "numerically separate."

2Epis. 50; Cog. Met. I, Cap. 6. Cf. the doctrines of
Plotinus.

108 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

unchangeable. The fact that he strives to reduce all
reality to a transcript of logical conceptions and
relations renders change something for which he
can consistently find no place in his thought.
Logic knows nothing of change and nothing of time.
All true ideas are immutable, but all true ideas, ac
cording to Spinoza, have their exact counterparts
in the realm of objective reality. Consistently,
therefore, Spinoza should regard all reality as
changeless. Hence it is only what we should expect
when substance, the fundamental reality, whose
definition moreover expresses a mere fixed relation
(in se esse), is pronounced to be immutable, to
gether with all its attributes.* The language em
ployed in this connection is especially instructive.
Because the definition of substance expresses noth
ing but "existence," its "existence" is identified
with its "essence."1 Both the "existence" and the
"essence" of substance are "eternal truths." Now
if there occurred any change in substance, it would
have to be either in its "existence" or in its "es
sence," but both are "eternal truths" and any
change would involve their becoming "false;"
which is absurd.2

It would be a mistake, as we shall soon learn,
to apply this immutability to moral attributes, as
has always been the custom in Christian Theology;
for according to Spinoza we may not ascribe any
moral attributes to the Absolute.

* Eth. I, 20, cor. 2. — Deum, sive omnia Dei attributa
esse immutabilia.

1 Eth. I, 20. — Dei existentia ejusque essentia unum et
idem sunt.

2 Ibid. cor. 2.

ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE IQQ

5. The Perfection of Substance.

Another character of substance is perfection.
This familiar term means for Spinoza nothing else
than reality.1 Ens absolute perfectum, therefore
becomes identical for him with ens realissimum.
But this traditional conception of Scholasticism ac
quires in the language of Spinoza a special meaning,
inasmuch as he understands by it a being with an
infinite number of infinite "real"2 attributes. "If
a being is infinite, its attributes must also be in
finite (i. e. infinite in number and in extent) ; and
just this is what we call a perfect being."3 But
since, according to Spinoza, the reality of an object
increases in proportion to its logical extension, and
since every determination of content occasions a
restriction of extension (omnis determinatio est
ncgatio), it must follow that ens absolute perfectum
and ens realissimum are each identical with ens
absolute indeterminatum. How he combines the
two conceptions ens realissimum and ens absolute
indeterminatum will appear further on. Here it is
sufficient carefully to note that perfection as a char
acter of substance is in no respect to be distinguished
from the infinitude explained above.

1 Eth. II, def. 6. — Per realitatem et perfectionem idem
intelligo.

2 That is, as we shall see, representing some qualita
tive content of actual or possible perception.

8Korte Verhandeling, Deel I, Cap. II, pp. 11 and 12.-
" . . . . Zo het wezen oneyndelijk is, zo moeten ook zijne
eigenschappen oneyndelijk zijn, en even dit is het dat
wy een volmaakt wezen noemen." I translate "oneyn
delijk" by "infinite in number and extent," because it
would be easy to show that this must be his meaning.
His use of the word in either sense and in both at the
same time often accounts for a lack of precision in
thought.

110 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

6. Substance as Cause.

Finally, substance is the only cause of all that
exists. Accordingly it is called the "absolutely first
cause"1 of all other things, and also the "cause of
itself." It is therefore a "free" cause, in the sense
that it can undergo no compulsion from without,
and indeed the only free cause.2 It is likewise an
"efficient" cause.3 But in all these aspects it is an
"imminent" cause.4

In carrying out these assumptions in regard to the
causal relations of substance without surrendering
any of the characters hitherto attributed to it and
without violating certain presuppositions as to the
nature of causality, Spinoza encounters, as we shall
soon have occasion to point out, his greatest dif
ficulties.

By reviewing the formal characters of substance
which we have just considered, it will be seen that
they correspond to the "metaphysical" attributes
of the traditional conception of God. In so far,
therefore, Spinoza is justified in calling his sub
stance "God," and in saying: "By God I under
stand the absolutely infinite being, i. e. a substance
consisting of an infinite number of attributes, each
of which expresses an infinite essence (qualitative
content)."5 But to read into Spinoza's concep-

1 Eth. I, 16, cor. 3. — Deum esse causam absolute pri-
mam.

2 Eth. I, 17, cor. 2. — Solum Deum esse causam liberam.

3 Eth. I, 16, cor. 1.

4 Eth. I, 18.

B Eth. I, def. 6. — Per Deum intelligo ens absolute
infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis at-
tributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam
essentiam exprimit.

ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE HI

tion of God the content of the Christian concep
tion, would certainly be a great mistake. It is to
be carefully noted and constantly borne in mind
that the characters we have thus far enumerated
are merely formal and therefore shed no light on
the real (qualitative) nature of the Absolute. They,
considered alone, have so little significance for the
religious consciousness that the most anti-religious
thinkers may accept them. It is from the qualita
tive predicates of Spinoza's substance that its re
ligious value is to be determined. But these are
expressed in the infinite "real" attributes, among
which are "extension" and "thought." We turn
next, therefore, to the consideration of his doctrine
of real attributes.

CHAPTER III.
SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF REAL ATTRIBUTES.

1. Relation of Attributes to Substance.

"By attribute," he says, "I understand that which
intellect perceives concerning substance as consti
tuting its essence."* The meaning of this sentence
becomes plain when we recall the teachings of
Descartes from whom Spinoza borrowed his doctrine
of attributes.

Descartes divides the qualities of things into at
tributes and modes, an attribute being a primary
quality, one that presupposes no other. This is as
sumed to represent or to "express" the nature of
a given thing: "There is one special property of
each substance that constitutes its nature and es
sence."1 The only known attributes of finite sub
stances are extension and thought, the first express
ing the nature or "essence" of material substance,2
the second that of thought substance. An attribute,
therefore, comprehends the entire essence of the
substance to which it belongs, so that there can be
but one attribute for each substance. Spinoza agrees
with Descartes, as far as his own problem will per
mit, and accordingly by "essentia" as applied to
substance he means the nature of substance that is

* Eth. I, def. 4.

1 Prin. Phil. I, 53.

2 Prin. Phil. I, 53. — "quod corpori tribui potest, ex-
tensionem praesupponit, estque tantum modus quidam
rei extensae."

REAL ATTRIBUTES 113

faithfully expressed in a primary quality, or, what
amounts to the same thing, the primary quality
itself.

The expression, "what intellect perceives con
cerning substance (quod intellectua de substantia
percipit)" also becomes intelligible from the tra
ditional doctrine of substance and attribute. From
time immemorial substance had been regarded as
an independent something behind the properties
of a thing whose essential nature is truthfully re
vealed in them. Descartes gives expression
to this thought in one of the definitions
quoted above. That the perceived properties
(especially the "attributes") truthfully represent
the nature of the substance itself, was accepted by
him as a matter of course; "for it is evident to
reason that an attribute must be the attribute of
something real."1 The expression "quod intellectus
de substantia percipit" is for Spinoza only another
form of expression for the same way of thinking,
and means nothing else than, "what we in cognition
refer to an underlying substance that is otherwise
concealed from us." Only for Spinoza, in harmony
with his general doctrine of knowledge, it is "w-
tellectus," in express distinction from sense-per
ception, that is named as the faculty whose function
it is to determine which of the properties are to be
considered as attributes. The definition, therefore,
may be paraphrased as follows: By attribute I
understand a primary property, which, in conse
quence of the agreement of our ideas with reality,

1 Respons. more geom. dispositae. Def. 5. — quia na-
turali lumine notum est nullum esse posse nihili reale
attributum.

114 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

reveals to us the qualitative nature1 of an other
wise hidden substance to which we refer it.

It is apparently with a view to establishing the
rational necessity of the irreducible, presupposition-
less character of an attribute, and also to identify
ing attribute and substance, that he lays down the
proposition: " Every attribute of substance must
be conceived through itself."2 This language, it
will be observed, is the same as that employed in the
definition of substance. If we take it to mean that
attributes are in respect of qualitative content ab
solutely heterogeneous, it is intelligible. But if we
are to understand that they are absolutely presup-
positionless in the sense that the same language is
employed in the definition of substance, it is unin
telligible; for the very idea of attribute, as Spinoza
himself generally assumes, presupposes a correlative
(a substance) to which it is attributed. Moreover,
as in this case all distinction between attribute and
substance would be removed, it would be tanta
mount to expressly positing as many separate sub
stances as there are attributes. Nevertheless, it is
certainly his intention by this proposition to iden
tify attribute with substance not only in qualitative
but in formal nature also. Attribute must be, like
substance, underived, self-contained, independently
existent ; for according to definition it expresses the
nature (essentia) of substance.3 The circumstance

1 Cf. Epis. 9, where attribute is explained as certa talis
natura attributed to substance.

2Eth. I, prop. 10.

8Eth. I, prop. 10, dem. — Attributum enim est id, quod
intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam
constituens; adeoque (per def. 3 [i. e., per def. substan-
tiae] ) per se concipi debet." Another proof of the prop
osition lies in the fact that all attributes of substance are

-REAL ATTRIBUTES H5

that one attribute (extensio) has nothing in com
mon with another attribute (cogitatio) and may
therefore be said to be conceived through itself as
regards qualitative nature, is taken to mean that
it is conceived through itself absolutely. Intelligible
motives for thus identifying attribute and substance,
in spite of the contradiction involved, will appear
as we proceed.

It seems therefore that the word "essentia" in
the definition of attribute may, after all, mean more
than we have expressed above in our paraphrase
by "qualitative nature;" it may mean "qualitative
nature and self-existence." But whether we think
the more limited or the more extended meaning, it
is impossible to save the unity of substance ; for,
in any case, we have incommensurable attributes,
each of which expresses truthfully the ultimate
nature of substance. The one substance posited
above on other grounds now resolves itself inevi
tably into an aggregate of substances. Though Spi
noza does not see the contradiction involved in his
representations, he feels it as a difficulty, and seeks
to defend his thought at length against possible ob
jections. But his defense consists only of unclear
explanations, which, in the light of the later philo
sophical development, are seen to be vacillations
between the realistic and phenomenalistic stand
points. Extension and thought are different "ex-

co-eternal and none of them therefore are produced by
others; but if one involved the idea of another, they
would be related to one another as cause and effect
(Pars I, Ax. 4). It will be observed that the dem. as
sumes that two things of related nature necessarily stand
in relation of cause and effect, which does not follow
from "the knowledge of an effect involves a knowledge
of cause."

J16 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

pressions" of the same substance: "thinking sub
stance and extended substance are one and the
same substance, which is comprehended (compre-
henditur) now under one attribute and now under
the other. So also a mode of extension and the idea
of that mode are one and the same thing, but ex
pressed in two ways."1 This language was occa
sioned apparently by the circumstance that the con
tent of an idea corresponds with its object, or, to
speak in the terminology of the time, that an idea
contains objective what exists formaliter in the
thing. According to this way of thinking, substance
ought to be the common content of extension and
of its idea, which content exists, however, neither
after the manner of extension nor after the manner
of idea, but after the manner of substance. Yet
how the common content of extension and of its
idea existing after the manner of substance can be
anything else than just extended substance, is in
conceivable; for that common content is simply
extension. From the standpoint of realism, there
fore, the phrase "expressed in two ways" turns
out to be incomprehensible. In fact it is intelligible
only from the standpoint of phenomenalism. For
the agreement of an idea with its object can not be
a ground for the assumption that they literally con
stitute the same substance ; it would indicate at most
that they have a common source, of whose nature
we can say nothing more than that it is so consti
tuted that it can produce both thought and
extension. And Spinoza often seems vaguely to
conceive of substance thus as the unknown unit that
is to be postulated as the condition of the two
1 Eth. II, 7, schol.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 117

heterogeneous attributes. But when so thought, it
.is neither extended nor thinking; neither attribute
represents its real nature, for if one does, the other
cannot, since they have nothing in common. This
way of thinking, therefore, though it is scarcely
more than an implicit tendency with Spinoza, con
tradicts the realistic sense of his doctrine of attri
butes, according to which an attribute constitutes
the very essence of substance. Moreover, all these
explanations presuppose, what contradicts his
general teaching, that an idea can represent nothing
but the extended; for every idea must agree with
an extended object as its ideatum, else the assumed
common content vanishes. Further, they ignore
altogether the infinite number of other attributes.
As soon as we take these into account, a more
serious difficulty arises; for every attribute must
agree with all the rest in the same way that thought
agrees with extension, because they all are only
different "expressions" of the common substance;
the idea, for example, of an other attribute than
extension would have the same content as the idea
of extension. Consequently all attributes, except
the attribute of thought, would have to be conceived
as extension. This is not the only connection in
Spinoza's thinking, as we shall see, where the infinite
ly numerous unknown attributes threaten to be
swallowed up in extension.

Some of the expounders of Spinoza have under
taken to show that his doctrine of attributes is con
sistent with the unity of substance. To discuss in
detail the different attempts would be too tedious.
That of Johann Ed. Erdmann is the most worthy
of consideration, inasmuch as he renounces from the

118 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

beginning all hope of being able to think the incon
ceivable. The expression quod intellectus de sub-
stantia percipit contained in the definition of
attribute, he interprets as meaning that attributes
are only subjective modes of thought, the mind's
way of looking at the one identical substance.
They are not to be regarded as objectively real
constituents of substance; they are only so many,
appearances. This view he finds supported in par
ticular by Epistle 9, where Spinoza explains that
by attribute he means the same as by substance,
''except that it is called attribute in respect of the
mind which ascribes a certain nature to substance."1
Spinoza goes on to illustrate his meaning by two
examples showing how the same thing may properly
be called by two names: (1) By "Israel," is to be
understood the third patriarch, and by "Jacob,"
the same person, but with reference to the fact that
at birth he had hold of his brother's heel. (2) By
a "plane" he understands that which reflects all
rays of light without mutation ; the same thing is
meant by "white," except that it is called "white"
with reference to the man who looks at the plane.
This sounds at first reading very much like the
language of phenomenalism. But it is certain that
Spinoza never aims to be a phenomenalist ;2 he is
always in intention a thorough-going realist. Knowl
edge for him is knowledge of reality in the most
literal sense of the term ; although he has not always
been able to adhere to his standpoint with entire

1 .... nisi quod attributum dicatur respectu intellec-,
tus, substantiae certain naturam tribuentis.

2 Herbert Spencer, however, has classified him as such.
Cf. First Principles.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 119

consistency. This fact in itself, that an interpreta
tion of the passage in the sense of conscious and
express phenomenalism, would place it in sharp
contradiction with the tenor and complexion of his
whole system, has generally been considered a suf
ficient objection to Erdmann's view. But Spinoza's
language, read in the light of his manner of think
ing, will be seen to be consistent with his realism.
When he says that attribute and substance are but
different names for the same thing (and this is
really what he says), he does not mean that attri
bute is less objectively real than substance, but that
the distinction between the two is only a logical
one, a distinctio rationis.1 Attribute and substance
cannot be separated, though they may be dis
tinguished in thought, attribute applying to sub
stance in its qualitative aspect. In objective reality
there are no attributes existing apart from substance.
Neither does he mean that the distinction between
one attribute and another attribute is a mental
fiction (what Erdmann's interpretation would as
sume) ; for he is not speaking of the relation of
attributes to one another, but of attributes to sub
stance. These cannot be separated any more than
Israel and Jacob, or than the whiteness of the plane
and the plane itself. But they may be distinguished
in thought, attribute referring to substance in its
qualitative aspect, just as " Jacob" applies to
Israel, though referring especially to the patriarch's
posture at birth. This would be quite in harmony
with Spinoza's realism and particularly with his

1 Cf. Cog. Met. Cap. V, Notice, however, that what
he says here about distinctions between different attri
butes applies only to the so-called moral and metaphysical
attributes discussed by theologians.

120 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

complete identification of attribute and substance
noticed above. The example of the plane, it should
be observed, is also to be thoroughly divested
of the phenomenalistic associations of a later time,
and be regarded as illustrating precisely the same
point as the example of Israel and Jacob, namely,
the unreality of the distinction between " plane'*
(as defined by Spinoza) and ''white," but not the
unreality of " white."

Kuno Fischer, in an earlier edition of his well-
known "Geschichte der neuern Philosophic" at
tempted to illustrate by an example the possibility
of thinking the heterogeneous attributes as consti
tuting one substance. In his illustration empty
space plays the part of substance, and a series of
mutually exclusive geometrical figures that of the
attributes. On account of the criticism of Camerer1
he has omitted the illustration from the later editions
of his work. It applies obviously only to the relation
between attributes and modes, and not to that be
tween substance and attributes. Nevertheless he
still holds that Spinoza's thought is consistent.2
But even if we admit with him that substance is to
be conceived only as efficient cause and the attributes
accordingly as underived, ultimate "forces," it still
remains impossible to save the unity of substance.
Efficient cause means force ; first efficient cause
means the ultimate force. If now the ultimate force
(substance) be thought as a universal, the particular
ultimate forces (attributes) become mere modes;
for they have something in common with one
another and are no longer conceived each through

1 Die Lehre Spinozas p. 6.

2 Vol. I, Part 2, p. 366.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 121

itself alone. But if, on the other hand, substance
(the ultimate force) is not thought in a more general
sense than the attributes, the one ultimate force
resolves itself inevitably into a plurality of inde
pendent ultimate forces.

It is worth while to point out the motives in Spi
noza's presuppositions and in his self-imposed
problem which occasioned the unclear conception
of the relation between substance and attributes.
It will then appear that he could not do otherwise
than conceive it contradictorily, and that accord
ingly all attempts to make him consistent at this
point must be fruitless, so long as we do not ascribe
to him thoughts that are not his.

One occasion of his way of thinking lay, as men
tioned above, in the Cartesian doctrine of attributes
which he uncritically accepted in the main. By
Descartes the presuppositionless properties of things
(extensio and cogitatio) were distinguished by the
name " attributes" from the other properties, which
were called ''accidents" or "modes." An attribute
represented the ultimate nature, essentia, of the
corresponding substance; extensio that of material
substance ; cogitatio that of thought-substance.
For him, therefore, "substance" and "essence,"
or "substance" and "attribute," could be synony
mous terms without giving rise to any contradiction,
because to each of the two substances belonged only
one attribute (essence) ; but in the case of Spinoza,
who had to do with several attributes belonging to
one substance, the unquestioned Cartesian tradition
could not but lead to the positing of a plurality of
absolutely heterogeneous "essences," or ultimate
natures, in a unity, i. e. to a contradiction.

122 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

If, further, we take account of Spinoza's self-im
posed problem, it will be seen that he could not have
given up the Cartesian view of attributes, even if
he had wished to do so. For he aims to establish
the existence of an ultimate reality of which all
things are only modifications, i. e. to find an idea
from which the ideas of all other things are de-
ducible through logical determination; and he
recognized (what some philosophers have not)
that from the absolutely indeterminate1 absolutely
nothing can be derived. As he could not determine
the nature of this ultimate reality a priori, he was
content to start with the things known to our im
mediate experience and work backward by general
ization. Accordingly the most general qualitative
characters of Nature (extensio and cogitatio) he re
garded as that which constitutes the nature of the
Absolute. Otherwise it would have been impossible
for him to derive therefrom the actual world of
matter and mind. His ultimate being could not be
other than a "real" one, i.e. one which, as to its
qualitative nature, would admit of predicates be
longing to the things of the actual world.2 Spinoza

1 See p. 128, where the sense of Spinoza's expres
sion ens absolute indeterminatum is explained.

2 De Intell. Emend, p. 30. — '"Unde possumus videre
apprime nobis esse necessarium, ut semper a rebus pky-
sicis, sive ab entibus realibus, omnes nostras ideas deduca-
mus, progrediendo, quoad ejus fieri potest, secundum
seriem causarum ab uno ente reali ad aliud ens reale,
et ita quidem ut ad abstracta et universalia non transea-
mus, sive ut ab iis aliquid reale non concludamus, sive
ut ea aliquo reali non concludantur: Utrumque enim
verum progressum inteUectus interrumpit." By "seriem cau
sarum" as he explained, he means the "series of the fixed
and eternal things," i. e., the series of common properties
of things, arranged according to their relative universal
ity. By "entia realia" he means the same. By "abstracta

HEAL ATTRIBUTES 123

was compelled, therefore, by the implicit aim of all
his thinking so to conceive of the fundamental unit
as to make it share in thought and extension. Each
of these attributes, let it be observed, had not merely
to pertain to the Absolute in some loose way, but to
constitute its nature, its ''essence," to be identical
with it, whether this identity were capable of being
clearly conceived or not. His earnest realism re
quired nothing less. Spinoza could not posit a more
ultimate reality than thought or a more ultimate
reality than extension; for such a one would have
been qualitatively undefmable, and thus have occa
sioned an impassable gulf for our cognition between
the actual world and the absolute. And just because
the unity of substance can not be thought without
positing something above the attributes to mediate
between them, Spinoza's representation of the rela
tion between substance and attribute had to be con
tradictory. As often as the thought of that unity
was really complete in his mind, he himself could
not avoid thinking that more general something;
though the true character of his mental operation
was in great measure concealed from him by the
circumstance that the definition of substance ex
presses a mere empty relation,1 while mind and
matter belong to the category of things. For as
often as substance is conceived as a mere relation,
in which matter and thought may both stand, one
has at least a counterfeit of union, and of a union

et universalia" he means here those general terms that
originate in the "imagination." For explanation of why
he applies the word causa to the entia realia see p. 89.

1 So also the designation of substance as "ens" (Cog.
Met. I, Cap. 3) and as "absolute existence" (cf. p. 105).

124 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

too which does not presuppose anything "real" be
yond those attributes.

The result of our examination of Spinoza's ac
count of the relation between attribute and sub
stance may be summarized as follows : The task that
Spinoza set himself was to deduce the world from a
single knowable reality', the accomplishment of the
task, however, was rendered impossible by certain
presuppositions. Hence the actual outcome was
something else. If we accept the logical result of
what he says in regard to attribute and substance,
then he has traced all things back to a plurality of
knowable realities. But if we do not press his fate
ful doctrine of attributes to its logical conclusion,
and accept the asserted oneness of substance, this
unit becomes unknowable, since it must lie beyond
thought and extension. In this case the outcome is
the tracing back of all things to two underived
knowable phenomena of one ulterior, unknowable
reality. "Phenomena" we say, and not "modes";
for different modes of the same thing must have
something in common. It is possible that Spinoza
would have expressly accepted this latter position,
if his earnest realism had not stood in his way. In
fact, the effort to combine a plurality of hetero-
genous attributes in a unity occasions a constant
tendency toward phenomenalistic ways of thinking,
and not infrequently his language threatens, in spite
of himself, to express this point of view. Ens, qua-
tenus ens est, per se solum, ut substantia, nos non
afficit.1 It is a condition of rightly understanding
much of Spinoza's thought that we clearly recog-

1 Cog. Met. Pars I, Cap. III. Cf. Eth. II, 7, schol.;
Epis. 64 and 66.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 125

nize his constant vacillation between realism and
phenomenalism, neither of which he can consist
ently accept, although in intention he is unquestion
ably a realist. To assume that he is consistent will
lead to serious misinterpretations.

For our particular task it is most important to
have established that, for Spinoza, substance and its
attributes are indistinguishable as regards their
nature, and hence that the entire content of sub
stance is contained in the sum of the attributes.

2. The Significance of the Infinite Number of
Unknown Attributes.

For the sake of simplicity we have thus far taken
little account of the infinite number of unknown
attributes. Their relation to substance is of cotirse;
the same as that of extension and thought; and the
unclearness of this relation became, in the case of
the unknown attributes, of the greatest significance
for the shaping of the entire system. His starting
from two irreconcilable assumptions, the oneness of
substance and the absolute incommensurability of
its attributes, has for a consequence difficulties and
contradictions in the details of his system, which
must have led to its reconstruction, if he had been
able to doubt his first assumptions. From the one
side he is compelled to maintain the absolute mutual
exclusiveness of the modifications of different attri
butes; and from the other side he must secure the
participation of each modification in the nature of
substance, i. e., in the sum of all the attributes that
constitute the essence of the one substance. Ac
cordingly, since "thought substance and extended
substance are one and the same substance," body and

126 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

soul as modifications of the one substance are one
and the same thing, only ' ' expressed in two different
ways."1 In reality, therefore, they are one and the
same modification; but this modification, and every
other one, "as it is in itself,"2 must, as part of the
substance consisting of an infinite number of attri
butes, be expressed not merely in two ways, but in
an infinite number of ways.3 Consequently every
thing possesses at bottom not only the properties
that can be referred to matter and mind, but along
with them an infinite number of other unknowable
properties derived from the rest of the attributes.
(Hence every thing is also expressed in an infinite
number of ways in the "Intellectus Infinitus,"4
which will claim our attention further on.) The
question naturally arises: Why then can the human
mind not discover the other attributes?5 Man's
ultimate nature must, according to this way of
thinking, participate in all the qualitative determin
ations of the infinite substance; and, if the mind is
only the nature of man expressed under the attri
bute of thought, why can it find in itself only ideas
of the* properties expressed in two attributes? To
this question Spinoza can of course give no satisfac
tory answer.

The relation of these other attributes to "intel
lect" deserves to be noticed. They are defined to be

1 Eth. II, 7, schol.

2 Ibid. — Quare rerum, ut in se sunt, Deus revera est
causa, quatenus infinitis constat attributis. Cf. Eth. I,
prop. 16.

3 Cf. Eth. I, prop. 16: Ex necessitate divinae naturae
infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia, quae sub intel-
lectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.

4 Epis. 66.

5 Cf. Tschirnhausen's letter; Epis. 65.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 1T7

" whatever is able to be perceived by an infinite
intellect as constituting the essence of substance."1
Without giving a full account of the expression,
" infinite intellect," which we have reserved for an
other place, it will suffice here to point out that they
must sustain essentially the same relation to intel
lect as do extension and thought. They are such,
therefore, as the human mind, if its vision were
unbounded, would discover by following the same
process as it has followed in the case of the two
known attributes ; i. e., they are all the positive,
"real," suo genere infinite predicates that the mind
would then be able to derive from the immediate
objects of knowledge. It cannot be too much em
phasized that when Spinoza speaks of ascribing all
possible attributes to substance, he has no thought
of fictitious creations of the imagination, or of ab
stractions, or of moral qualities, etc.; but only of
properties which are the objects of possible per
ception. Every attribute is concrete, "real," i. e.,
derivable from hard and fast reality. None can be
deduced a priori either from the conception of sub
stance or from any other ground.

Before dismissing the subject of the attributes we
would distinctly point out the great significance of
Spinoza's conception of attribute for his idea of
God. It is in fact indispensable, and in this circum
stance lies another motive for his holding it fast,
in spite of the difficulties in which it involves him.
It enables him to give a definite nature to the Abso
lute without impairing its infinity. Omnis determin-

1 Eth. II, 7, schol. — quidquid ab infinite intellectu per-
cipi potest tanquam substantiae essentiam constituens.

128 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

atio est negatio1 is a proposition of logic to which
Spinoza attached great importance. It means that
the more definite the meaning of a term, the less the
number of objects to which it will apply; or, in the
language of logic, increasing the ''intension" dimin
ishes the "extension" of terms. But if this is true,
how can we speak at all of attributes (qualitative
determinations) of the infinite, the all-inclusive?
Of Spinoza's infinite (provided we admit with him
its unity) we may very consistently do so. The
character of each attribute is such that it has nothing
in common with any other. On this account they
cannot limit one another; for a limitation can occur
only through a similar.2 Each one, therefore, is in
finite in its kind, and yet by its qualitative determin
ation does not negative anything else. A plurality
of infinites is possible only when they are absolutely
heterogeneous. But out of such Spinoza has consti
tuted an Absolute of infinite qualitative content,
without violating the principle, Determinatio est
negatio. But thereby, we repeat once more, he has
logically though not consciously, destroyed the unity
of the Absolute. It becomes only an aggregate of
independent realities, each of which is infinite in
its kind.

When Spinoza defines God to be the ens absolute
indetcrminatum^ he can consistently mean nothing
else than what we have just described, a being that
possesses all kinds of qualitative contents, each of
which is unlimited in its kind, and in so far also inde
terminate.

1 Epis 50.

2 Eth. I, dcf. 2.

3 Epis. 50.

REAL ATTRIBUTES 129

Some might be tempted perhaps to find a place
among the infinite attributes other than extensio
and cogitatio for all those which Christian theology
ascribes to the Absolute. After what has been said,
however, it will be seen that such an inclination
would be misleading. If self-consciousness, knowl
edge, purposeful activity, moral qualities, etc., are
to be claimed for the Absolute, they must be derived
from the attribute of thought, which alone exhausts
all the spiritual content of Substance. In how far
this attribute fulfills the demands of the religious
consciousness, will appear as we proceed.

But before we undertake to determine more closely
the meaning of cogitatio and extensio, it is well to
give an account of the relation that exists between
substance (or attributes, if you will) and modes.

CHAPTER IV.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES : GOD AND THE
WORLD.

Spinoza's aim, as determined in a previous chapter,
is really double: (1) to comprehend all reality as
qualitatively determinate pieces, so to speak, of the
Absolute; and (2) to comprehend all reality causally
as necessary effect of the Absolute. The two prob
lems were never clearly distinguished in his think
ing, a circumstance that greatly increases the diffi
culty of understanding him. The second one
naturally occasioned him the most trouble.

He was compelled by his hypostatization of
thought relations to regard the Absolute not only
as eternal but as unchangeable. Any solution of his
causation problem, therefore, was rendered impos
sible in advance by the character of the actual
world. For the changeable and the transient can
not be understood as logical consequences of the
eternal and unchangeable. Further, by his assump
tion that only infinites can result from infinites,1
variety and multiplicity are also excluded. To be
consistent, Spinoza should, like Parmenides, have re
garded the changing and the manifold as illusion.
His attempt to bridge over the chasm between the
two antitheses could not but plunge him into obscuri
ties and contradictions. Without following here his
demonstrations in all their deviations, it will suffice

1Eth. I, 21.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 131

to explain merely the character of the connection
established between the infinite and the finite.

Spinoza's assumptions in regard to the nature of
causality in general should not be forgotten. We
saw that he presupposes that the same relation ob
tains between cause and effect as between premise
and conclusion. The idea of the cause involves the
idea of the effect and conversely the idea of the
effect involves that of the cause. Through an illicit
extension of this proposition he regards also, as often
as it serves his purpose, anything as cause which
happens to be presupposed by the idea of a given
thing. Accordingly any condition is sometimes
treated as cause. Extension, for example, being the
only ultimate property of material substance, is that
from which motion is assumed to result. It is space,
the condition of motion, that is regarded as its
cause. The general also is often treated as the cause
of the particular, because the definition of the par
ticular contains the idea of the general. No clear
distinction is made between a changeless condition
and a dynamic cause.

The most important declaration in regard to sub
stance as cause is contained in the proposition,
"God is the immanent, but not the transient, cause
of all things."1 This view was of course unavoid
able, as it expresses the assumed unity (in some
sense) of the Absolute and the world. In fact the
immanence of the ultimate cause seems to have been
simply postulated at first as a consequence of the
already established unity of reality, and was only
negatively defined as a "non-transient'* relation. In
the "Short Treatise," in a part where his thoughts

1 Eth. I, 18.

132 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

are cast in the form of a dialogue between Love,
Intellect, Reason, and Desire, Reason says to Desire :
"You say then that the cause, in so far as it is the
originator of the effects on this account must be
outside of them, and this you say because you know
of the transient cause only, and not of the immanent
cause, which latter brings forth nothing at all out
side of itself, as the mind, for example, which is the
cause of its ideas. And therefore the mind is called
by me a cause (in so far as, or seeing that its ideas
depend on it) ; and again a whole, seeing that it con
sists of its ideas. So God also is for his effects or
creatures no other than an immanent cause, and also
a whole, in view of the second remark/'1 From
this, taken literally, it would appear that the im
manent "God" is nothing else than the sum of all
things, but nevertheless the cause of all things.
It is not improbable that this dialogue is
one of the earliest of Spinoza's compositions. The
language quoted, in so far as it can be construed,
would almost warrant the assumption that according
to Spinoza's original way of thinking, unmodified
substance is only an abstraction, and that substance
actually exists only as modifications, which taken
together embrace the whole of reality. Another
part of the "Short Treatise" (no doubt a later one),
though repeating that God produces nothing outside
of himself, clearly conceives of him in his causal
relation as distinct from the sum of things, saying:
"God is the proximate cause of the things that are
infinite and immutable, of which we say that they

1 Korte Verb. I, Cap 2, Zamenspreeking, p. 18. Cf.
I, Cap 3.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 133

are immediately created by him; but he is the last
cause in a certain sense of all particular things."1

The proposition from the Ethics affirming that
"God is the immanent cause of all things, but not
a transient cause/'2 is proved in two ways; first by
showing that all things are "in God" in the sense
that they involve the conception of God (substance),
and secondly by showing that there is no substance
outside of God, from which a cause from outside
could arise. Here the immanent cause is identified
with its effects, or modes, only in an accommodated
sense, — in the sense that from its nature the effects
can be logically deduced. From Eth. I, 28, scholium
it appears quite clearly that no closer kind of unity
than this is implied by Spinoza's causa immanens:
' ' God can not properly be said to be the remote cause
of particular things, unless perhaps for this reason
that we may distinguish these from those things
which he has produced immediately, or rather which
result from his absolute nature. For by remote cause
we understand such a one as is in no way connected
(conjuncta) with the effect." We may infer, there
fore, that the meaning of "immanent cause" (non-
remote cause), in certain relations, is filled out by
one that is in any way connected with the effect.

For Spinoza 's mature thought ' l God ' ' the Absolute
is an immanent cause only in the sense that he is
in the world and does not transcend it, — in the sense
that there are no miraculous incursions, creative or
otherwise, from without the self-sufficient system
of nature. That "(rod" is the immanent cause of
everything in the sense of being the immediate
cause, is not his doctrine. In his system, as truly as

1Korte Verb. I, Cap. 3. 2 Eth. I, 18.

134 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

in any other, there exist two distinct spheres; that
of the conditioned, and that of the unconditioned;
and they are connected only by a series of links
in a chain. His thoughts concerning "God" as im
manent cause may be expressed, in so far as they are
definite, in three propositions: (1) The conditioned
presupposes the unconditioned, upon which it de
pends; (2) The unconditioned — and this is the im
portant matter — will bear the same predicates (ex
tension and thought) that apply to the conditioned.
(This is all that can be consistently made of Spi
noza's saying that "God" produces nothing outside
of himself) ; (3) The conditioned world can accord
ingly be deduced from the unconditioned. In
harmony with this loose conception of immanence,
the expression "in God" when employed by Spi
noza does not generally mean "in the Absolute,"
as the uncritical reader would suppose, but only
"somewhere in the system of nature."

Turning our attention now specifically to the way
in which the chasm between the infinite and the
finite is actually bridged over, we find that Spinoza,
like the Neo-Platonists (in spite of the fact that his
world-view is in many respects the antithesis of
Neo-Platonism), posits a series of intermediate
realities, but with no better result. Spinoza's inter
mediate realities are the so-called "infinite modes."
Since every idea, as we saw, contains consequences,
and since the "order and connection of causes is
the same as the order of ideas," everything pro
duces results, results moreover that are proportion
ate to itself. Accordingly that which is infinite pro
duces infinite effects. Substance, therefore, must
produce under each attribute an infinite creation,

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 135

an infinite "mode." From extension follows im
mediately "motion and rest." Since every im
mediate mode must be just as infinite as the attribute
itself, there can be only one such mode for each at
tribute.1 Consequently it must "express" the cor
responding attribute in a particular way, and never
theless be like the attribute, infinite.

The second step from substance toward the actual
world is represented by the modes that result in
turn from those of the first order. These modes
(or "things") must, according to the assumption
above-mentioned, also be infinite.2 Apparently we
are to understand that from these last flow still
other infinite modes.3 There are, as we said, only
one mode of the first order for every attribute: the
consequences of these immediate modes on the con
trary resolve themselves each into a multiplicity.
But a plurality (except of attributes) is not com
patible with the infinity of the individual units,
and, in order to overcome this difficulty he betrays
here the tendency to take "infinite" in the sense
of "eternal." What these last modes, "eternal
things, ' ' are, is not clearly explained. We may safely
assume, however, that all eternal things that are
subordinate to the immediate infinite modes belong
in this series. If we take account of the peculiarities
of Spinoza's thinking, we may regard them as all
the links in a system of relatively universal proper
ties of empirical nature, a system in which these
properties would appear as successively resulting
determinations of the immediate modes, and ulteri-

1Eth. I, 21; Cf. Korte Verhand. I, Cap. 9.
8Eth. I, 22.
«Eth. I, 23.

136 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

orily of the attributes. Concrete examples are not
given. Such a classification, projected but not yet
worked out, is presumably what hovered before his
mind when he spoke of an "intelligible arrange
ment" of things and of a series rerum [causarum]
fixarum aeternarumque.*

The ultimate class of "eternal things" is constitut
ed by the "eternal essences" of the individual things
of the empirical world. In treating these, Spinoza
either takes account of the infinite number of attri
butes, and then a thing is a determination of the
many-sided substance, i. e., the sum of an infinite
number of qualities; or he ignores all attributes ex
cept extension and thought, in which case a thing is
conceived as a specific modification of extension, "o&-
jective" reflected to be sure, in a corresponding mode
of thought. After what has been said above, we may
for the sake of simplicity take no account here of
the infinite number of attributes.

It ought to be noted that the word "essence" with
Spinoza does not always represent the same thing.
Apparently it is sometimes thought as synonymous
with quality, as when extension is treated as one of
the essences of substance1 ; at other times it signifies
what he has expressed in his definition : "I say that
to the essence of any thing belongs that which when
granted posits the thing, and when canceled cancels
the thing. ' ' The examples given under the definition
are taken from geometry, the essence of a triangle
being the affirmation or idea that the sum of its three
angles are equal to two right angles2. According to

* De Int. Emend, pp. 30-31. Cf. Eth. II, 18, schol.
lEth. II, pr. 45, 46, 47, with demonstrations.
8 Eth. II, prop. 49, dem.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 137

this definition, extension cannot be called " essence"
of substance,* for it can be conceived without posit
ing the infinite substance at all, and be cancelled
without making it impossible to conceive substance,
thought substance being just as thinkable without
extended substance as with it. Nor is extension the
essence, in the sense defined, of particular kinds of
bodies; for, although the abolition of extension
would involve the abolition of bodies, the positing of
extension would not posit the particular kind of
bodies. But the essence would be that particularized
extension that is peculiar to the kind of bodies in
question, distinguishing them from all other objects.
In short, essence corresponds to the content of a cor
rect definition,1 the generic characters being involv
ed, but the distinctive characters being the ones that
are emphasized.

As an essence is that which is expressed in the
definition, and as this is an adequate idea, an
"eternal truth," the essence also is sometimes called
an eternal truth,2 and is always in harmony with the
principle of parallelism, regarded as eternal at least.
Accordingly the essences of things have an existence

* It is possible that Spinoza's treatment of the incom
mensurable character of the attributes (see p. 114) was
determined in part at least by the desire to approximate
his use of the word essence in the definition of substance
to his use of it as applied to the "essence" of things.

1 Epis. 9 p. 223 ... definitio . . . tatum circa rerum,
rerumve affectionum essentias versatur. Cf. Thomas
Aquinas, Sum. Theol. I, 29, Art. 3: Essentia proprie
est id, quod signiflcatur per definitionem.

* Epis. 10 Quod porro petis, anne res etiam, rerum

affectiones, sint aeternae veritates? Dico, omnino. Cf.
Heerebord, Meletemata, 307, I, where "aeternae veri
tates" means, aliquid reale extra intellectum.

138 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

of their own, eternal and independent of temporal
existence.1

This is the way Spinoza conceives " essence" in
that connection of his thought with which we have
to do at present ; but it would be a mistake to suppose
that he is consistent in his use of the word.

We saw that true ideas, or definitions, of particular
things are never immediately derived from the data
of experience, but only deductively from the ''uni
versal things" (i. e., the common properties of
things) ; that consequently these definitions presup
pose an adequate knowledge of those properties ;
and that the faculty by which the particular things
are to be derived is intuition. But it is difficult to
see why ordinary reason is not regarded as capable of
attaining this knowledge; especially as it possesses
the power of determining the ' ' universals, " and of
deducing from them clear and distinct ideas ; and as
the "essences" are only final links in the chain of
"eternal things" of which the "universals" are the
first. Possibly it was only after an unsuccessful
attempt to reach them in this way, that Spinoza
had recourse to intuition.

Although the "eternal essences" are certainly
links in the chain of successive determinations of the
attributes (or of substance), they are sometimes dis
tinguished from the rest of the "eternal things;"2
but as they are immediately related to temporal ex
istences, this is not unnatural.

Whether the intermediate links between the at-

1 Eth. II, 8, Cor., schol.

2 This is the case in De Int. Emend, pp. 30-31. In
order to obtain a correct notion of Spinoza's doctrine of
essences, a careful study of this passage is indispensable,

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 139

tributes and the essences of particular things are
numerous or not, cannot be clearly determined.
We can with certainty say nothing more than that
they constitute a ''series."1

In the mediation between the infinite and the finite
we have arrived as far as to the eternal essences of
particular things; but we have not yet reached the
changing and perishable world of sense. This last
step in the process, constituted Spinoza's chief dif
ficulty. In order to explain the temporal "exist
ence" (the temporal origination and limited dura
tion) of real things, he distinguished between the
"absolute nature" of God (or of any attribute)
and "God so far as he is modified by a modification,
which is finite and has a limited existence." From
the absolute nature of God, the eternal modes, in
cluding the eternal essences of particular things,
necessarily result, and the eternal modes alone.
But from God so far as he is modified by a modifi
cation that is finite and that has a determinate ex
istence, results the temporal "existence" of things.
On the one hand, we have the declaration that "all
things which result from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God must exist always and infinitely,
or are through that attribute eternal and infinite ; ' '2
and that "what is finite and has a determinate ex
istence can not be produced by the absolute nature

1 In the Korte VerTiandeling, Preface to Part II, note
7, he says that "each and every particular thing [body]
which attains to actual existence, does so through motion
and rest." This statement seems to ignore the existence
of any other eternal modes than motion and rest. It
must be regarded as an abbreviated expression, or we
must assume that after writing the Korte Verhandeling
he increased the number of eternal modes.

zEth. I, 21.

140 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

of any attribute of God."1 On the other hand, it
is asserted that "each single thing, i. e., each thing
that is finite and has a determinate existence, is not
able to exist, or to be caused to act, except it be
caused to exist and to act by another cause which
also is finite and has a determinate existence; and
this cause in turn is not able to exist or to be caused
to act, except it be caused to exist and to act by
another which is also finite and has a determinate
existence; and so on in infinitum."2

Thus, to account for the changing and transient
things of the sense world, Spinoza has recourse to
a twofold causality, — a direct and an indirect. The
direct is the source of the existence as such, the being
of things, connecting them intimately with substance,
the "absolute existence," by means of the "eternal
essences" and other infinite modes, and is called the
"power by which every thing perseveres in exist
ing;" the indirect is the cause only of the temporal
and ontological limitations of things. Both causalities
are, in the last analysis, ' ' God " ; for the finite cause
that determines a particular thing to exist and to act
is "God, so far as he is modified, etc." In so far as
he produces things through the direct causality, he
is their proximate cause; in so far as he produces
them through the indirect causality, he is their
mediate or ultimate, "last,"3 cause. Yet it would
not be correct to call him the remote cause ; for by a

lEth. I, 28, dem.

2Eth. I, 28.

•According to Korte Verhandeling, Deel I, Cap. Ill,
"God" is in one relation the proximate cause, in the
other the last cause: "God is de naaste oorzaak van
die dingen, die oneyndelijk zijn, en onveranderlijk . . .
dog de laatste oorzaak is hy en eenig zins van alle de
bezondere dingen."

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 141

"remote cause" Spinoza understands a cause that is
"in no way connected with the effect."1 But the
arbitrary assumption of a double causality did not of
course solve the difficulty. The possibility of the
limited existence of things remains unproved; for,
in order to explain it, Spinoza simply presupposes
it. All that he says about the causal relation of the
Absolute to the changing and transient reduces itself
logically to this: The infinite substance can only
produce what is eternal; but it has nevertheless pro
duced also the transient. Spinoza could not avoid
this contradiction, without abandoning fundamental
assumptions which he regarded as indisputable.

Besides a limitation as regards duration, finite
things suffer, as already hinted, an ontological limi
tation also. The essences of things do not, in fact,
come to full realization in temporal existence, and
this for the reason that through their interaction
they are partially repressed, or enter a state of
passivity.

We may here show how the peculiar existence
attaching to the "eternal" essences independently
of the temporal existence of things is to be conceived,
and how these essences are related to the changing
things of the sense world. Owing to the fact that
the essences stand in relation both to the changeless
eternal and to the changing temporal world, they are
capable of two different states, so to speak. Before
the origination of a thing as a part of the empirical
world, its essence exists in one way; and after that
origination, in another. These two states he could

1 Eth. I, prop. 28, schol. — Nam per causam remotam
talem intelligimus, quae cum effectu nullo modo con-
juncta est.

142 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

not allow, to be sure, without contradicting his fun
damental assumption that everything results with
mathematical necessity from the changeless nature of
the Absolute ; for such a necessity makes all change,
and hence all origination and passing away incom
prehensible. All that is must always have been.
The difference between the two states consists in
the circumstance that the essence of a thing when it
becomes a member of the empirical world " involves
existence." It is really the idea of the thing, of
course, that involves the idea of existence, i. e., I
suppose, the idea of the thing possesses after the
origination of the thing, characters like those which
compel us to regard a perception not merely as a
subjective thought, but as a part of the objective
world. But although it is properly the idea that in
volves existence, two different states of the real es
sences must be assumed also; for every event and
fact in the realm of thought has a counterpart in
the realm of extension. With its entrance into tem
poral existence, therefore, every essence takes on a
special form. To the element already given through
the direct causality comes a new one through the
indirect.

In order to prove the correctness of this inter
pretation and to illustrate other details of Spinoza's
thought in this connection, it will be necessary to
cite at length two important passages, one from the
early ''Short Treatise" and the other from the
mature "Ethics." His specific aim in these passages
is to elucidate the relation obtaining between the
material essences and the thought essences at the
moment when things emerge into temporal existence.
"Yet it must be remarked," he says in the "Short

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 143

Treatise," "that these modifications [the material
eternal essences], in view of the fact that no one of
them is [yet] actual, are nevertheless continuously1
contained in their respective attributes ; and, as there
are no inequalities (discreteness) in the attributes
or in the essences of things, there can be no particu
larity in the Idea [Dei],2 since there are none in
Nature. When, however, some of these modifica
tions put on their particular being and are thereby
separated in a certain way from their attributes. . . .

then there appear particularities in the

essences of the modifications, and consequently in
the thought essences which are necessarily contain
ed in the Idea Dei."3

The other passage is "Ethics" II, 8: "The idea of
those particular things or modes which do not exist
must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God,
as the essences of the particular things or modes are
contained in the attributes of God." This proposi
tion is established by a reference to the familiar
principle that "the order and connection of ideas is
the same as the order and connection of things,"
and is followed by the corollary : ' ' Hence it follows,
that, as long as the particular things do not exist
except so far as they are comprehended in the at
tributes of God, their thought being, or ideas, do4
not exist except so far as the infinite idea of God
exists; and when the particular things are said to

1 Dutch, "gelijkmatig."

2 The Idea Dei, as we shall see, is the sum total of
thought essences; i. e., the Intellectus Infinitus.

* Korte Verhandeling, Aanhangsel, p. 102.

4 1 translate the Latin plural verb by the English
plural so as to transfer the thought exactly as it lay
in his own mind.

144 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

exist, not only so far as they are comprehended in
the attributes of God, but so far also as they are said
to have duration,1 their ideas also involve the ex
istence by which they are said to have duration."
The thought is further elucidated by a scholium: "If
any one should desire an illustration for the further
explanation of this matter, I should not be able in
deed to give any that would adequately explain the
thing of which I speak, inasmuch as it is unique ; nev
ertheless, I shall endeavor to illustrate it as far as
possible. A circle is of such a nature that the rectan
gles constructed2 from the segments of all straight
lines which intersect each other within it are equal
to one another ; wherefore in a circle an infinite num
ber of equal rectangles are contained ; and yet no one
of them may be said to exist, except in so far as the
circle exists; nor may the idea of any one of these
rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as it is
contained in the idea of the circle. Now let two only
of that infinite number, E
and D, be conceived to exist.
Their ideas also exist now,
not only so far merely as
they are contained in the
idea of the circle, but also so
far as they involve the exist
ence of those rectangles; by
which it happens that they
are distinguished from the ideas of the rest of the
rectangles. ' '3

1 Durare, the word employed to denote temporal exist
ence.

2 The Latin expression is sub segmentis.

3 The obscurity of this passage has occasioned frequent
misinterpretations. Sterne (Reclam Library) translates

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 145

From all this it appears: (1) That the material
essence as well as the thought essence of a particular
thing possesses an eternal existence which is inde
pendent of its origination in time; (2) That in
this pre-actual state the two are related to each other
according to the principle of parallelism, which is not
violated by the temporal origination of the thing, a
change occurring in the thought attribute that corre
sponds exactly to the change in the attribute of
extension; (3) That each exists as a consequence
(or product) of the attribute to which it belongs;
and (4) That in their pre-actual state, they are not
to be conceived as distinguishable individuals.

How the last two assumptions are more precisely to
be understood is, at first reading, by no means clear.
It is said that the eternal essences are " continu
ously, " or * ' uniformly, ' ' contained in the attributes ;
that there are no "inequalities" in the attributes or
in the essences ; that, when any particular thing comes
into actual existence, it is thereby distinguished, or
separated, in some way from its attribute, and that
"a particularity" at the same time appears in the
essence. The geometrical figure serves to show
further that, in the pre-actual state, the essences are
related to their "attributes" after the manner of
logical implications. From these expressions, one

rectangula by Rechtecke (rectangles) in the first half of
the scholium and by Dreiecke (triangles!) in the
second half. The English translation of Johann Ed.
Erdmann's "History of Philosophy" misrepresents the
German text by employing the word "rightangle" instead
of "rectangle" (§272,4). This would leave out of
account altogether the nature of the circle, which is
essential to the illustration. The rectangula referred
to can only mean the rectangles constructed from the
segments a b and b c on the one hand and from d b and
b e on the other.

146 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

would be inclined at first to infer that the eternal
essences are after all nothing but the uniform sub
stance which has not yet resolved itself into multi
plicity, that they are contained in substance only in
the sense in which all effects are contained in their
causes, i. e., potentially. For it would seem that the
essences are distinguished neither from one an
other, nor from the higher modes, nor from the at
tributes.

But this interpretation would certainly be mis
taken. It would contradict Spinoza's assumption
that the system of eternal modes mediates between
substance and particular things ; for the essences of
things and the other eternal modes would stand in
precisely the same relation to substance. It would
in fact cancel the eternal modes altogether; for, as
all differences between them and the attributes
would be effaced, the expression "eternal modes"
would no longer have any meaning. They would
not be real consequences of the nature of the Ab
solute, but merely consequences that are not yet in
any degree effectuated. One might perhaps call
them "potential" modes, but yet only in the sense
in which we may speak of unmodified substance as
potential modes. The view would contradict also
Spinoza's general assumption that all that is in
substance as causal Nature must necessarily exist
also as effectuated Nature, and would consequently
remove every ground for his sharp distinction be
tween Natura Naturans (substance) and Natura
Naturata (totality of modes).

On the part of the Neo-Platonists, when seeking to
portray the transition of the one World-ground into
the multiplicity of the actual world, we find similar

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 147

modes of expression. Similar, I say, not identical;
since the peculiarities of Spinoza's system, necessi
tated certain differences. Plotinus , for example,
who conceived the i/ovs as at once "Thought"
and "Being" shows many significant points of re
semblance. "Inasmuch as the vov? is the highest
Being, the five categories of the intelligible belong

to it -. being, motion, permanence (orao-is),

identity, and difference The common

reality which is more closely determined by the
categories Plotinus calls the unlimited or intelligible
matter. In it lies the ground for the multiplicity
which the vov? has in itself in distinction from ....

the Indeterminate that stands above Thought

and Being, and by virtue of which [ multiplicity]
it resolves itself into the supersensible numbers, the
Ideas, one of which must correspond not only to
every species but to every individual, as the
original image of its peculiarity . . . and since they
are not separate from one another, but are in one
another, yet without mixing, they unite also again
into the unity of the intelligible world."1 Some
thing similar to Spinoza's expressions, but essenti
ally different in meaning, may be found also in the
scholastic disquisitions on the relation of God to the
world.2 If the passage cited from the "Ethics"

1 Zeller, Grundriss d. Geschichte d. griech. Phil. pp.
288-9. Cf. Plotinus, Enneades I, VIII, 2 — [6 i/ous] eXei
trdvra. Kal £<rrl irdvTa Kal <rtiv€<mv tttfrcfj <rvv&v Kal €%« irdvTa otf/c f'X.<i>v-
6v yap a\\a, 6 d£ &\\of ovdt xwpls ZKCUTTOV r&v tv duT<J3- 6\ov re ydp
tffTiv f-Kaffrov Kal iravraxv irav Kal ov ffvyKfyvrai, d\\a a5 xwp/s.

2 The passages cited from Spinoza might be understood
as an attempt to adapt the following thoughts of Heere-
boord's to his own system: In intellectu divino rerum
essentiae fuerunt per ideas ab aeterno, antequam mun-
dum creaverit . . .: in suis causis res dicuntur esse,

148 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

did not harmonize so well with, the one from the
"Short Treatise," which was composed several years
earlier, one would be tempted to assume that here
we have a borrowed way of thinking, or rather mode
of expression, which he never entirely assimilated to
his own thought. If he was not influenced from
these sources, the similarities of expression are to
be explained by the common difficulties of mediating
between two antithetical worlds. But Spinoza had
the peculiar difficulty also of guarding his causa
immanens. This fact made it easier for him no doubt
to employ in this connection language which veiled
the differences between the Absolute and the im
mediately conditioned, i. e., between substance and
the system of eternal modes.

But his thought is not unintelligible. It must
not be overlooked that the illustration of the geo
metrical figure is not to be taken too precisely. He
is trying to describe two different ways of existing
and there is but one known to our experience, the
only describable reality being an object of possible
perception.1 No illustration, therefore, could really
illustrate ; and he himself recognizes this fact, saying
that as the matter is ' ' unique ' ' he can not ' ' adequate
ly" illustrate it. We must assume, therefore, that
lie does not intend here expressly to contradict what

ctuatenus sunt in illarum potentia activa . . .; sic rerum
essentiae, antequam fuerunt in tempore creatae, fuerimt
in potentia activa Dei ab aeterno; in seipsis extra causas
suas dicuntur essentiae rerum esse, quando jam actu
productae a Deo, aut potius, quando sunt productae:
sic nullae essentiae ullarum rerum sunt aeternae. —
Heereboord, Meletemata, 307-8 — ,,De essentiis rerum
aeternis." — That Spinoza had read Heereboord appears
from Cog. Met. Pars II, Cap XII.

1 1 use the word perception here in a broad sense as
including self-consciousness as well as sense-perception.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES H9

he has so plainly said elsewhere, and that he means
to allow some kind of distinction between the
essences and the higher modes, between these and
the attributes, and between one essence and another,
although not a distinction of the same kind and de
gree as between the actual world and the non-actual
world. The eternal modes, as direct results of the
absolute nature of "God," may be regarded as con
stituting a whole, a unit, when contrasted with the
system of transient things that result from the in
direct causality. It is not without propriety, then,
that he speaks of a separation or distinction which
takes place at the moment when a particular thing
becomes a member of the actual world. The ex
pression, "so far as they are contained in the at
tributes of God," cannot mean, 'so far as they are
contained in the absolute nature of God,' but 'so far
as through the direct causality they are members of
the system of changeless and eternal consequences of
the absolute nature of God.' In fact, the expres
sions "in God," "in an attribute of God," etc., are
constantly employed by Spinoza to signify nothing
more than 'conceived through the idea of God or of
an attribute.'1 In this sense, a body is 'in God,' or
in an attribute of God, in so far as it involves the

attribute of extension The 'separation of

a modification from its attribute' must mean 'separa
tion from the totality constituted by the attribute
and the system of changeless consequences flowing
from it.' The description of the essences in their
pre-actual state as showing no "particularity"2

1 Eth. I, 15, dem. I, 28, schol.; and frequently.

2 This can mean nothing else than "discrete individ
uals."

150 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

is in harmony with the character of essences as the
contents of true definitions ; for a definition expresses
the nature of a thing in sufficiently general terms
to apply to all the individuals of a class that exist
at different points of time and space, i. e., it takes no
account of particular times and places which consti
tute the only necessary differences between individ
uals. In short, a definition expresses only the
characters of the species, and does not logically im
ply plurality. Now since the essences are the last
links in the chain of direct consequences of the at
tributes, we may express Spinoza's meaning more
precisely as follows: Particular things of a given
kind become actual when the uniform essence, which
constitutes the content of the idea of the species,1 is
so affected by the indirect causality acting as causa
individuationis that it exhibits a multiplicity of rel
atively discrete individuals. Accordingly the " dis
tinction from the attributes" is, after all, only a dis-

1 Eth. I, 17, schol. p. 53 — Si unius [hominis] existen-
tia pereat, non ideo alterius perebit; sed si unius es-
sentia destrui posset, . . . destrueretur etiam alterius
essentia. Cf. Eth. I, 8, cor. 2, where the essence is made
synonymous with the definita natura of a thing, and is
put in antithesis to individuals.

Since writing the text above, I have been gratified
to find my account of Spinoza's oft-misunderstood
doctrine of essences confirmed by so careful a scholar
and clear a thinker as Prof. Fullerton. See his "Phil
osophy of Spinoza" (Modern Philosophers Series), p. 252,
where he says: "Although, as we have seen, he uses the
words essence and nature inconsistently, his fundamental
thought, and one essential to his philosophical system,
is that essences are not the result of an abstraction from
the differences of individuals, but entities of a different
class, eternal, unchangeable, independent of individuals;
not mere abstractions, but real causes; in other words
they are Platonized abstractions." It is to be hoped
that the traditional habit of referring to Spinoza as a
consistent Nominalist will soon be corrected.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 151

tinction from the last direct consequences of the at
tributes, i. e., from the uniform eternal essences. He
is seeking here to define the relation of the essences
not to the absolute substance, but to the individual
things of the actual world, and to describe the
essences as they eternally exist in the Natura
Naturata. That he is thinking about the Natura
Naturata and not about the absolute nature of
* ' God, ' ' appears also from the circumstance that Idea
in the first citation and Dei infinita idea in the second
can not be the absoluta cogitatio, but only the lutel-
lectus Infinitus,1 i. e., the sum of the ideas of all
things and hence the thought side of the Natura
Naturata.2

This account of the matter leaves a place for that
which Spinoza has expressly and repeatedly declared,
namely, that the eternal modes, just because they
are modes and are conceived through something
else, are different from the absolute nature of "God,"
indeed are to a certain degree antithetical to it,
that they stand at unequal removes from it,3
and that the essences of particular things are

1 See below under "Idea Dei," p. 186.

2 That the eternal essences are something more general
than particular things, appears also from the distinction
which the Korte Verhandeling makes between the
Natura Naturata Generalis and the Natura Naturata
Particulars. VI, Cap 8. It appears likewise from the
fact that individual things are called 'particular' in
distinction from the essences.

3 Eth. I, Appendix, p. 68 — Nam, ut ex propositionibus,
21, 22, et 23, constat, ille effectus perfectissimus
est, quia Deo immediate producitur, et quo aliquid
pluribus causis intermediis indiget; ut producatur, eo
imperfectius est. — In the cited propositions 21, 22, and
23 not the indirect but the direct causality is under
consideration; for the question is of distinctions among
the eternal modes.

152 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

mediated by the other eternal modes. To allow
this definite distinction between the eternal modes,
and to separate in a certain way substance from
its products, is not forbidden, as might be suspected,
by his doctrine of immanent cause ; for his imma
nent cause when strained becomes, as we have seen,
only a cause that is in some way connected with the
effect.1 And it should be observed that the eternal
modes constitute a connected system, and, although
distinct, they must not be conceived as spatially re
mote from one another. In interpreting Spinoza we
may not take account of any world beyond the im
mediate one, and hence we are bound, I suppose, to
conceive these modes as in a state of mixture, so to
speak, though not in a state of solution.

He sometimes uses the word essentia in the sense
of a qualitative content, and, owing to the neces
sity of recognizing the existence of transient indi
viduals, he is constrained to apply it also to the
nature of any individual thing actually existing,2
an essence then involving the actuality and indi
viduality of the thing. Consistently these essences
cannot, as material existences, be eternal, but must
pass away with the things themselves whose natures
they constitute. As logical conceptions, though
essences, they might be regarded as sharing the time
less character of all logical relations, and, therefore,
as eternal.3 When employing the word "essences"

1Eth. I, 28, schol.

»Eth. Ill, 57.

8 But in so regarding them, one ignores, of course, the
change which, in harmony with the principle of parallel
ism, must take place in the thought attribute, and which
Spinoza has been at such pains to explain in the passages
just discussed. He confounds habitually idea as logical
content and idea as psychical fact.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 163

as applying to the natures of individuals actually ex
isting, he is logically compelled to regard the in
adequate ideas along with the adequate as belonging
to the essence of the human mind. But this also in
volves an inconsistency; for the inadequate ideas,
as we saw, belong to the mind only in so far as it is
in a passive relation i. e., only in so far as its proper
nature (essence) is suppressed by the interference
of other finite existences. These inconsistencies
in Spinoza's account of essences are quite intel
ligible, however, forming as they do, only a part of
the mass of contradictions occasioned by the im
possibility of uniting in his system the eternal and
the temporal, the changeless and the changing. It
ought to be observed also that the shifting meaning
of the word frequently conceals from the uncritical
reader and from Spinoza himself fallacies of far-
reaching consequences.

Our discussion of his doctrine of causality would
be incomplete for our purpose, if we did not add
something more definite in regard to necessity.
According to Spinoza all being and all happening re
sult with mathematical necessity from the nature of
substance. "In the nature of things there is nothing
contingent, but all things are determined by the
necessity of the divine nature to a certain mode of
existing and of acting."1 Anything is said to be
contingent for no other reason than that we do not
know its cause.2 Accordingly the freedom of the
will, in the sense of indeterminism, is an illu-

»Eth. I, 29.

aEth. I, 33, sch. 1.

154 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

sion.1 "Men think they are free" because they are
conscious of their actions and are ignorant of the
causes by which they are determined."2 The only
freedom that exists is a kind of necessity; for "that
thing may be called free which exists by the necessity
alone of its nature, and by itself alone is deter
mined to action; but necessary, or rather compelled,
that which is determined by another thing to exist
and to act in a definite way."3 "God" is in this
sense a free cause, but in this sense only. Any other
being cannot, strictly speaking, be free even in this
sense.4 Nevertheless a freedom similar to that of
the Absolute is inconsistently attributed to man in
so far as he is determined by his own nature alone,
and not by outward causes.

The free activity of "God," however, we should
erroneously conceive if we thought of it as in any
way conditioned by thinking. The principle of par
allelism excludes such a view: for the attribute of
thought cannot contain anything ideally ('objec-

1 Saisset's assumption (Oeuvres de Spinoza, Introduc
tion) that Spinoza in the 43rd letter, where he seeks to
vindicate himself from the charge of godlessness, (insin
cerely) repudiates the doctrine of determinism, which
he contends for everywhere else, is based upon a mis
understanding. The passage runs as follows: Quare
ad ejus conclusionem transeo; ubi ait, mihi nullum
superesse argumentum quo probem, Mahumetum non
fuisse Prophetam verum. Quod quidem ipse ex meis
sententiis conatur ostendere; cum tamen ex iisdem clare
sequatur, eundem impostorem fuisse: quandoquidem
libertatem illam, quam Religio Catholica, lumine natural!
et Prophetico revelata, concedit, quamque omnino concedi
debere ostendi, ipse prorsus adimit. "Libertatem" here
refers to freedom of thought, not to the doctrine of
free will.

2Eth. II, 35, schol.

8Eth. I, Def. 7.

* Eth. I, 17, Cor. 2. — solum Deum esse causam liberam.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 155

tive') before that thing exists formaliter (as objec
tive reality). "Hence it follows that the real being
(esse formale) of things which are not modes of
thought does not result from the divine nature be
cause he previously knew it. ' '* Accordingly ' ' God 's ' '
thinking has so little to do with his creative activity
that material things have a certain primacy. Indeed
we may here remark, what has generally been over
looked in studies of Spinoza, that in his system,
matter always takes logical precedence to thought
wherever ontological and cosmological questions
come into the foreground. An illustration of this fact
we have just seen in the way in which the relation
between thought essences and the real essences is
described. For purpose in the activity of the Ab
solute there can of course be no place. "Mathe
matics, which has nothing to do with ends, but only
with the essences and properties of figures, has shown
men another norm of truth."1 It would not be a
difficult task to show "that Nature has no pre
determined end, and that all final causes are only
human figments."2

After the foregoing examination of the relation
between the infinite and the finite in Spinoza's
system, we are in a position to consider the dis
tinction already referred to between Natura
Naturans and Natura Naturata. In this we have
another case of the accommodation of familiar tra
ditional conceptions to his own system. Of both he
gives the following explanation: "By Natura Na
turans, is to be understood by us that which is in it-

* Eth. II, 6, Cor. Cf. Eth. I, 32, Cor. 2.

1 Eth. I, Appendix, p. 68.

2 Pbid.

156 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

self and is conceived through itself, or such at
tributes of substance as express an eternal and in
finite essence, that is God so far as he is considered
as a free cause. But by Natura Naturata I under
stand all that which results from the necessity of
the divine nature, or of any one of the attributes of
God, that is all modes of the attributes of God so
far as they are considered as things which are in God
and can neither be nor be conceived without
God. ' n Natura Naturans, it is clear, is the name ap
plied to substance, or, in other words, to the sum of
the attributes. The meaning of Natura Naturata
is not so clear. In the "Short Treatise" he had sub
divided it into Natura Naturata Generalis and Na
tura Naturata Particularis, the former being the sys
tem of eternal modes resulting from the absolute
nature of "God," and the latter the system of par
ticular actual things. The logical grounds for the
distinction still exist in the "Ethics," though the
distinction is not expressed. It has been assumed2
that the definition above quoted identifies the Natura
Naturata with Natura Naturata Generalis of the
earlier work, to the exclusion of the Natura Naturata
Particularis. If he described it as comprehending
only the modes which result "immediately"3 from
the divine nature or result from the "absolute"4
nature of God, there could be no doubt as to
the correctness of this assumption; for this is
the language employed exclusively to distinguish
the system of modes produced by the direct

xEth. I, 29, sch.

2 Johann E. Erdmann in his ''History of Philosophy."

sEth. I, 28, schol.

4Eth. I, 21-28.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 157

causality from that produced by the indirect.
But it will be observed that Spinoza says nothing
of the kind. What he says is that Natura Natu-
rata embraces "all that results from the neces
sity of the divine nature, " i.e., "All modes of
the attributes of God so far as they are considered
as things which are in God and can neither be nor
be conceived without God." But this is language
which Spinoza constantly employs in regard to all
modes without distinction, whether eternal or tran
sient. "All things are determined by the neces
sity of the divine nature to exist and to act in a cer
tain way."1 In Eth. I 28, scholium, where he is
speaking in particular of the relation of both eternal
and temporal modes to the Absolute, he expressly
says in reference to "particular things:" "But all
things that are, are in God, and so depend on God,
that without him they can neither be nor be con
ceived. ' >2 From others the eternal modes differ only
in that they are "immediately" produced by God,
i. e., result necessarily from his "absolute" nature.
Moreover, it would be difficult to discover any oc
casion for excluding the system of particular things
from Natura Naturata. It must be a part of nature ;

xEth. I, 29.

2 If it be objected, therefore, that quatenus ("so far
as") in Eth. I, 29, schol. quoted above, implies a dis
tinction between the modes here mentioned and other
modes which are considered as things which are not in
God and can be conceived without God, it may be replied
that no such modes exist for Spinoza. In this passage
he is making a distinction between causal nature, the
unconditioned, and caused nature, the conditioned, and
is not concerned in anyway with a distinction between
one part or aspect of the conditioned and another part
or aspect of the same. Quatenus could in fact be as well
translated by "inasmuch as" as by "so far as."

158 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

and, if it does not belong to Natura Naturata, where
does it belong? Certainly not to Natura Naturans.
To ignore it entirely, would have been to fall into
an "Acosmism" which no one will seriously attri
bute to him. The circumstance that the connection
between the eternals and the temporals is not logic
ally established, does not deter him from asserting
the connection all the same. In fact, the defective
logical connection between the two systems was prob
ably the reason for obliterating a distinction that
only made the chasm more noticeable and obtrusive.
We should naturally suppose, in the absence of con
clusive evidence to the contrary, that, when in the
"Ethics" he omits the adjectives generalis and par-
ticularis, the logical extension of the noun Natura
Naturata remains unchanged, covering what before
were two subdivisions.

It deserves to be plainly pointed out that, owing to
the distinction between the absolute nature of God
and the rest of reality, which is "in God," Spinoza
is led to apply the word "God" to two different
objects. Sometimes "God" means total reality1 — •
substance with its modes, especially with modes in
so far as they result from the direct causality. The
ens absolute infinitum, when thought according
to logical extension and taken strictly, could not
but embrace everything that exists. Viewed in one
way, modes (the conditioned) are the antitheses of
substance (the unconditioned) ; viewed in another
way, however, the antithesis disappears, for they
are after all only modified substance. At will, there-

1 Eth. I, 28 — . . . Deo, vel aliquo ejus attribute sequi,
quatenus eft'ectum est modificatione, etc. Eth. II, 7,
Cor. — sequitur in Deo, etc.

SUBSTANCE AND MODES 159

fore, he can regard everything as a part of "God."
This becomes all the more easy, as the expressions,
"conceived through the idea of God" and "in God"
are treated as synonymous. But at other times,
"God" means only unmodified substance, the un
conditioned, the Absolute, that which is conceived
through itself alone.1 This is the meaning that has
been embodied in his definition of God, and is the
one which corresponds to the designation causa
prima. Since the Absolute only can be regarded as
God in the proper sense of the term, it is with Spi
noza's view of the Absolute that we have to do,
when endeavoring to determine the religious sig
nificance of his system. His application of the term
"God" to two quite different objects has led to
serious misinterpretations.

From the preceding exposition of the relation of
cause and effect in Spinoza's cosmology, it has ap
peared that, in his attempt to deduce the finite and
transient from the infinite and eternal, the assumed
causa immanens becomes in fact a sort of causa
transiens; for the Absolute produces that which is
essentially different from itself. Natura Naturans
and Natura Naturata are assumed of course, as the
common word of the two expressions implies, to be
the same thing in two different aspects. They are
nevertheless to a certain extent antitheses. Spino
za's pantheism does not go so far as to deny the
existence of the finite and temporal, although this
would be, as we saw, the logical consequence of
certain presuppositions. Time is related to the im
agination, to be sure, and the transient is only in-

1 Eth. I, definition 6; Epis. 2; Epis. 4; Epis. 50; Eth.
I, 17, schol.

160 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

adequately known; but change is nevertheless real.
The connection between the finite and the infinite
is a loose one, and, for Spinoza, must remain a loose
one so long as they possess opposite characters.
All reality can of course be classified as substance
and modes of substance; but the modes are so far
removed from original substance that they possess
scarcely anything in common with it. The assump
tion that "the thing caused differs from its cause
precisely in that which it has from the cause," and
consequently that "a thing which causes both the
essence and the existence of another thing, differs
from this both in respect of essence and in respect
of existence,"1 is of no less significance for Spinoza's
world-view than is the other oft-quoted and appar
ently irreconcilable proposition that "things which
have nothing in common cannot be the cause one
of another."2

It will next be our task to examine more closely
the two known attributes and to determine, if pos
sible, the exact meaning of the familiar terms " ex
tension ?> and "thought," when they are applied
to the Absolute.

'Eth. I, 17, schol.

2 Eth. I, 3. — The two expressions are reconciled be
low. See page 214.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONTENT OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF
EXTENSION.

When the conception of attribute was under con
sideration, it appeared that to every attribute of
substance must belong the formal character of in
finity, i. e. it must be infinite in its kind, and hence
indeterminate, uniform, simple, etc. The common
space idea indisputably possessed these characters,
with the exception of simplicity. If a spatial
quality was to be attributed to the attribute, there
fore, it was necessary to repudiate the traditional
doctrine of the divisibility of space, and to establish
its simplicity. Hence his statement that "exten
sion is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
thing "* is coupled with arguments calculated to
show that, although bodies are divisible, extended
substance is not.2 If it could be divided, it would
not be infinite ; since from the division several finite
substances would result. In his "Metaphysical
Thoughts " he had admitted, to be sure, that extension
can be divided ;3 but in this work, as is well known,
he did not frankly express all his own convictions.
Elsewhere extension is always unequivocally rep
resented as in its ultimate nature indivisible. Only
as it exists in the imagination can it be otherwise
regarded. When we consider it as it is in intel-

1 Eth. II, 2.

"Eth. I, 13, schol.; I, 15, schol.

8 Cor. Met. I, Cap II.

162 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

lectu, — quod difficillime fit, — we are able to reach
the insight that It is simple. His ground for the
indivisibility of extension seems to be the circum
stance that space, as we have it in our thought, is
a continuum, and cannot be so divided into parts
that there will be no space intervening between the
parts.1 Space which is in this sense indivisible rep
resents the character of extension as an attribute of
substance. Extended substance, then, must so exist
that no empty space is possible.2

In its qualitative character the attribute of ex
tension, or extended substance, is not to be thought
of as like any of the various things perceived by the
senses. It is only an inference from the modes of
extension, which are alone objects of immediate
knowledge. But in spite of the fact that it is de
clared to differ from particular bodies in being in
divisible, it is spoken of as substantia corporea^ and
as "stuff."4 It is therefore to be conceived as in
determinate matter posited as the original material,
pre-condition and cause of particular bodies. Bodies
themselves are not substance, but "express" the
nature of substance "in a certain and determinate
way. ' '5 The most that can be said about its qualita
tive character is that it is so constituted as to be
the ground and cause of the material universe. As
it is "infinite" it is, for Spinoza, also "perfect."

1 Eth. I, 15, schol.

2Cf. Cog. Met. II, Cap X, p. 223.

3 Eth. I, 15, schol.

4Korte Verhandeling, 1, 9. Dutch, "Stoffe."

6 Eth. II, Def. I.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONTENT OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF
THOUGHT.

The often misunderstood, but after all by no
means uncertain, conception of absoluta, cogitatio,
we will do well to approach by considering in ad
vance two things that are liable to be confounded
with it. The first is the

1. Intellectus Infinitus.

This was a traditional conception which had origin
ated in the speculations of Plato and Aristotle. It
had played an important role in both Jewish and
Christian thinking through the middle ages down to
the beginning of the modern period. Spinoza simply
adapted it to his own system.

Occasionally, by a sort of accommodation to tra
ditional terminology, the expressions Intellectus
Dei and the like are employed by him to designate
absolute thought. This is the case in Eth. I. 15,
schol., for example, which we shall have occasion
to explain in another connection. It appears indis
putably clear, however, from a number of passages,
that Intellectus Infinitus properly denotes not ab
solute thought, but a certain definite mode of
thought. "By intellect we do not mean absolute
thought, but only a certain mode of thought,"1 he

xEth. I, 31, dem.

164 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

says in the " Ethics. " A letter to Simon De Vries de
clares still more emphatically, if possible, the same
thing: "I think I have demonstrated clearly
enough, that intellect, although infinite, belongs to
Natura Naturata, not properly to Natura Naturans, ' '
that is, according to Spinoza's distinction1 between
Natura Naturata and Natura Naturans, not to the
Absolute.

When we seek to determine how this mode is more
precisely to be conceived, we find that it is in
volved not only in the inconsistencies resulting from
Spinoza's unclear use of "idea," but also in those
which characterize his reconciliation of the infinite
and the finite. Moreover, we here move on the outer
limits, so to speak, of his sphere of thought, where
details have to be deduced from scattered and frag
mentary expositions. We may conveniently begin
with Eth. II. 11 :

" Prop. — The first thing that constitutes the actual
being (essc) of the human mind is nothing else than
the idea of some particular thing actually existing
[existing in time].2

"Dem. — The essence of man is constituted of cer
tain modes of attributes of God; namely [among
others] of modes of thinking, of all which idea is by
nature the most primary [prior] ; and, when this is
given, the other modes (namely, those to which
"idea" is prior by nature) must be in the same indi
vidual. And so an idea is the first [most fundamen
tal] thing constituting the human mind. But not an
idea of a thing non-existent [in time]. For in that
case (by cor. prop. 8) the idea itself could not be

'See p. 156.

a Of. Korte Verhand., Anhang.

ATTRIBUTE OP THOUGHT 165

said to exist; therefore it will be an idea of a thing
actually existing. But not of an infinite thing; for
an infinite thing must necessarily always exist; but
this is absurd. Therefore the first thing that con
stitutes the actual being of the human mind, is an
idea of a particular thing actually existing.

"Cor. — Hence it follows that the human mind is a
part of the infinite intellect of God;1 and accordingly
when we say the human mind perceives this or that,
we say nothing else than that God,2 not so far as
he is infinite, but so far as he is expressed by the
nature of the human mind, or so far as he constitutes
the essence of the human mind, has this or that
idea. And when we say God has this or that idea
not merely in so far as he constitutes the nature of
the human mind, but in so far as at the same time
with the human mind he has also the idea of another
thing, then we say the human mind perceives a
thing ex parte, or inadequately. * '

The expression "essence of the human mind*' is
equivalent, of course, to "nature of the human
mind," and means the qualitative content of the
mind as a part of reality. As he is here thinking of
individual minds as ideas of particular actual bod
ies, the "essence" becomes in fact the nature of the

1 The Italics are ours.

2 Here we have a good example of the accommodated
use of the word "God" to which we have referred (p. 158).
It is employed in the sense of the sum of all modes.
"God, not so far as he is infinite, but, etc.," means a
single mode. The qualitative uniformity of reality makes
it possible for Spinoza at one time to conceive of an
"absolute" extension and thought, calling it "God," and
at another time to speak of the sum of the modes, or of
any one mode, as "God," inasmuch as every mode is,
so to speak, a piece, though a modified piece, of the same
stuff.

166 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

actual mind as including both adequate and inade
quate ideas. The meaning of the rest of the corollary
is at first not quite obvious. Strictly speaking,
"God" cannot be taken to mean either the Absolute
or total reality; for, in either sense, the expression
"in so far as at the same time with the human mind
he has also the idea of another thing," would have
no meaning, since "God" in either sense, if he had
any ideas at all, would always have ideas of other
things at the same time that he would have that
constituting the human mind. But the language
could be made intelligible, if we should qualify
"God" by "within the limits of the human mind,"
thus bringing the expression into harmony with his
frequent use of "God" for any part of reality; and
if we should then recall Spinoza 's doctrine of inade
quate ideas. These, as we saw, are, from one stand
point, to be regarded as "confused;" they report
something of the nature of the human body and also
something of the nature of the bodies by which the
human body is affected, but the two elements are an
indistinguishable mixture. The expression "God
has the idea of something else at the same time that
he has that constituting the human mind" would
accordingly mean, "reality within the limits of the
human mind" (i. e., simply the human mind) has
the idea of something else at the same time that it
has the idea of its own body; or, in other words,
it has an inadequate idea. This explanation would
be in complete accord wth Spinoza's account of
sense perception.

The fatal objection to it is, that it views the in
adequate ideas from an altogether different stand
point from that from which Spinoza is here regard-

ATTRIBUTE OP THOUGHT 167

ing them. The last clause of the corollary shows
that he is thinking of them, not as confused, but as
incomplete, mutilated, as ex parte knowledge. We
should seek to interpret the passage in harmony
with this fact. This becomes possible by paraphras
ing it as follows: When we say that the human
mind apprehends this or that, we say nothing else
than that God, not so far as he is infinite, but so far
as he (reality) is included within the limits of that
mode called the human mind, has this or that idea.
And this we may say, whether the idea in question
is adequate or inadequate; for, if the idea is in
adequate (incomplete) as it appears in the human
mind, it is complete when referred to God (totality).
The fragment lying within the circumference of the
human mind belongs to him, as well as does its com
plement which lies beyond that circumference. In
such a case, therefore, it may be said that God
possesses the idea, not merely in so far as he con
stitutes the human mind (has the idea of the human
body), but in so far as he constitutes some other
mind (has the idea of something else) within the
area of which falls the complementary part of the
inadequate idea. With reference to the human
mind, the idea may appropriately be called ex parte
knowledge.

That which particularly concerns us at present
is the circumstance that the inadequate ideas are
here attributed to God in such a way as to indicate
that the human mind in its whole circumference
is a part of the Intellectus Infinitus. Quite in
harmony with this fact, the Intellectus Infinitus is
evidently conceived as the sum of individual minds
regarded as the ideas of changing, perishable ob-

168 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

jects. The " hence " which connects the corollary
with the preceding demonstration excludes the
possibility of any other interpretation.

In Ethics V. prop. 40, scholium, we have the
Intellectus Infinitus referred to again: "Our mind,
in so far as it understands (intelligit), is an eternal
mode of thinking, which is determined by another
eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another,
and so on in infinitum, so that all together constitute
the eternal and infinite intellect of God." The
expression "our mind in so far as it understands,"
means the mind in so far as it is intellect in dis
tinction from imagination and feeling; in so far,
therefore, as it is an aggregate, or a system, of
adequate ideas only. "Determined" cannot mean
anything else than conditioned or limited, for in
the case of "eternal" modes there can be no question
of producing in temporal succession. Accordingly
the Intellectus Infinitus would be the sum of all
adequate ideas in the entire realm of reality in so
far as these are eternal, i. e., changeless thought
counterparts to eternal and changeless "real"
modes.

"We seem thus to come upon an account of the
Intellectus Infinitus that is inconsistent with what
we have just learned from Eth. II. 11. There it
was conceived as composed of individual minds
taken in their whole circumference; here it seems
to embrace human minds only in so far as they are
"intellect." There a constituent mind was the
idea of a body "actually [temporally] existing,"
and not of anything that "must necessarily always
exist," as this would be "absurd;" here each con
stituent mind is an "eternal" mode. The two ac-

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 169

counts cannot be wholly reconciled; but, in so far
as the difference is real, it can be explained as a
natural consequence of the indeterminate meaning
for Spinoza of the word "idea. "

In the first place, Spinoza does not always dis
tinguish between ideas as they exist for logic (ideas
as content, meaning) and ideas as they exist for
psychology (ideas as events). Because from the
standpoint of logic they are relatively fixed, he
regards them, as often as he has occasion to do so,
as permanent possessions of the mind. In reality,
of course, no idea exists for any mind except while
it is being thought. No mind contains ideas as a
permanent possession in any other sense than that
it can re-think, re-create, them, or, to speak more
exactly, think new ideas with the same logical con
tent as that of ideas previously thought. Spinoza
does not clearly see this, and hence, as often as it
serves his purpose, regards logical conceptions as
permanent facts. Especially if they are true, is this
the case; for, on account of the circumstance that
they cannot then be altered by subsequent correc
tion, and can never become invalid, they are con
sidered as even "eternal." Again, as a result of
his assumption that all things are animata, the
"idea" of a given body may mean either its soul or
the idea of that body formed by any knowing
subject. Spinoza, as we have seen, habitually con
founds the two.

With these peculiarities of Spinoza's thinking in
mind, it is possible to understand the differences
between the two passages cited above. We have
seen that the eternal "essence" of the human mind
(which must be distinguished from its actual being.

170 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

esse actuate referred to in Eth. II, II)1 is something
more general than particular individuals, that it ia
common to them all, that it is derived by the direct
causality from the attributes, and constitutes the
immediate background on which individuals,
created by the indirect causality, appear as transient
particularizations at different points of time and
space. It is described as existing only so far as it
is "comprehended in the infinite idea of God,"2
i. e., only so far as it is qualitatively derivable from
cogitatio, and partakes of existence in general,3 but
not cum relatione ad tempus et locum-* and is said
further to be contained uniformly or evenly
(gelijkmatig) in the whole,5 individuals in their pre-
actual state not being a reliquis distinctae.Q

Now if we will conceive this essence of human
minds as not merely a concrete entity, but, in
harmony with Spinoza's psychological intellectual-
ism, as also "clear thought," "truth," "intellect,"
rationality; the individual minds, in so far as they
are constituted of adequate ideas, are in content
co-incident with the common essence of all minds,
which is, as we have seen, an eternal mode; and we
can understand how Spinoza, mistaking this coinci-

1 But what is called esse actuale in Eth. II, 11 is also
called essentia in Eth. Ill, 3 and 9. The esse actuale
is not the eternal essence, but the temporal essence.
Cf. Eth. II, 8.

2 Eth. II, 8, Cor.

8 Eth. V, 30, dem. — Res igitur sub specie aeternitatis
concipere, est res concipere, quatenus per Dei essentiam
involvunt existentiam. "Ut entia realia" means in so far
as things have a qualitative content. On the meaning
of existentia here, see Eth. II, 45, scholium.

4 Eth. V, 29, Scholium.

6 Korte Verhandeling, Opera III, 102.

6 Eth. II, 8 and 9.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 171

dence for identity, would regard the adequate ideas
possessed by a particular mind, though transient,
as a part of the eternal Intellectus Infinitus. But
in this view what becomes of the inadequate ideas,
which were treated in Eth. II. 11 as also parts,
though mutilated parts, of the Intellectus Infinitus?
As we shall see further on, they are frequently said
to perish with the body. But this may be so under
stood as to appear compatible for Spinoza both
with the assertion that only adequate ideas are parts
of the Intellectus Infinitus and with the assumption
that inadequate ideas are also parts, fragmentary
parts, of the same ; for he could say that these muti
lated ideas which result from individualization,
perish only in the sense that when the individual
perishes the mutilation vanishes, this having existed
in fact for the individual only. Viewed in connec
tion with the totality of thought, mutilated ideas are
whole, adequate, true, eternal. We shall therefore
always regard the Intellectus Infinitus as the system
of adequate and eternal ideas.

As the human mind is the idea of a highly com
posite object, its eternal essence would consistently
be a complex idea,1 i. e., a system of ideas, each
of which has for its object one of the constituents
of the human body.2 As all human bodies are com
posed of essentially the same constituents, all human

1 Eth. II, 15. Idea, quae esse formale humanae mentis
constituit, non est simplex, sed ex plurimis ideis com-
posita.

2 As the essence of any body is a certain ratio of motion
and rest, the essence of the composite human body ought
to be represented by a very complex formula, the vari
ous elements of which represent its constituent parts.
In the "Short Treatise" (Deel II, Voorreeden, notes
12-14) where he suggests that the nature of the human

172 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

minds would, in their fundamental and eternal
nature, be composed of the same ideas, namely the
adequate ideas1 of these constituents.2 Upon the
dissolution of an individual body, the associated
mind would also lose its individuality, the single
constituent ideas persisting in connection with the
different substances that had composed the body.
The mosaic of adequate ideas (if we may resort to
spatial imagery) would remain intact; the frag
ments which had appeared in the vanished individual
mind as inadequate ideas, would be completed by
their complementary parts, while the adequate ideas
of the same would remain unchanged (in content).
No change has taken place except the discontin
uance of the ex parte appearance in the particular
mind. But the same ideas re-appear, some ade
quately and some inadequately, in new individuals,

body might be expressed by the formula 1:3, either he
did not think of the matter very precisely, or else he
meant this for a general formula which in detail could
be resolved into more complex relations.

1 But they are not necessarily ideas of the objects in
the sense that they have those objects for their content.
Spinoza's unclear use of the word "idea" must be borne
in mind, on account of which they are, or are not, ideas
in this sense, according to the connection in which they
are thought.

2 Spinoza seems to conceive the contents of conscious
ness sometimes as "ideas" of physiological changes and
sometimes as "ideas" of the components of the body.
When their psychological character is prominent to his
mind, they tend to become "ideas" of physiological
changes; when their logical character is thought of, they
tend to become "ideas" of the physical constituents.
Eth. II, props, 11-17. In the "Short Treatise" (Deel II,
Voorreeden, note 13) the physiological change appears in
consciousness as "feeling." Analogous to this is his
application of Eth. II, prop. 7, "Ordo et connexio idearum
idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum," both in the tem
poral and in the logical sense.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 173

which in turn are replaced by others, and so on in
aeternum. The only things that are alike at all times
and in all minds are the ideas in so far as they
adequately present themselves. As ex parte ap
pearances, they will exhibit a great variety of
differences.

The question now arises whether Spinoza con
ceives the ideas constituting a human mind as self-
conscious after the dissolution of the body. The
word "idea" performs so peculiar a function in
Spinoza's thinking that it does not necessarily im
ply consciousness. When we reckon with his appli
cation of the word to the souls of all bodies, whether
organic or inorganic, we are not warranted in
supposing that it necessarily means more than a
"real" object's psychical counterpart, which is not
of the nature of a volition or of a feeling, but of
a presentation, i. e., an exact reflection in some sense
of the object. But as the ideas (souls) of inorganic
bodies have their place in the thought system, we
must conceive them also as in their eternal relation
components of the Intellectus Infinitus. This view
might seem to be excluded by the fact that in Eth.
V. 40 Spinoza makes only the rational part of the
human mind an element of the Intellectus Infinitus,
and apparently assumes that sub-human minds do
not partake of rationality. But if we remember
that these minds also have their "eternal essences,"
which are necessarily "adequate ideas" in one sense
at least, i. e., are exact counterparts of the bodily
essences, the difficulty disappears. Now what
grounds have we for assuming that these ideas,
which are presumably unconscious in their temporal
relation, are conscious in their timeless relation?

174 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Spinoza uses no language that requires us to con
ceive of them in this way. The application of the
word "idea" to the surviving elements of the mind
after the dissolution of the body, therefore, would
not be a conclusive reason for supposing them to
be conscious. The view which presents the least
difficulties seems to be this: After the dissolution
of the individual body, the adequate ideas which
composed its associated mind will survive as
elements of consciousness only in the sense that
their content will be repeated in successive indi
viduals.1 Of this, we shall have to speak more at
length in another connection.2

In a previous chapter3 we found that there exists
a series of eternal modes. The question arises,
therefore, where in this series does the Intellectus
Infinitus belong? The question is answered in a
letter to C. H. Schuller. The young friend had
asked for examples of modes immediately produced
by God and of modes produced mediately through
these.4 Spinoza replied: "Examples ... of the first
kind are in Thought Intellectus absolute Infinitus;
in Extension, Motus et Quies; but of the second

1 The Intellectus Infinitus must therefore be considered
as conscious in so far as it is coincident with actually
existing minds, but this does not imply unity of conscious
ness. Whether it is conscious also in so far as it tran
scends the sum of individuals, or whether it does tran
scend the sum of individuals, is a question to be an
swered, if at all, by inference.

The Intellectus Infinitus may be represented to the
imagination as analogous to a sea with a many-colored
surface when the wind (indirect causality) strikes it
into a multitude of choppy waves. The waves represent
the individuals, in which some colors appear entire (ade
quately) and some in part (inadequately).

2 See the chap, on Immortality.

3 See p. 139.
4Epist. 63 (olim 65),

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 175

kind, Facies Totius Universi, which, although it
varies in infinite ways, remains always the • same ;
concerning which see schol. 7 of the lemma before
proposition 14, Part 2."1 The Intellectus Infinitus
is then an infinite mode of the first order. The same
thing is affirmed also, by the "Short Treatise." As
to Intellectus in the thinking being, it is .... also
a Son, a Creature, or immediate product of God."2
To find the essence of the human mind and other
ultimate eternal modes related without intermediate
modes directly to the Intellectus Infinitus, an eternal
and infinite mode of the first order, is not what we
should expect. This apparent inconsistency has its
analogue in another of which we must now speak.
The letter just cited names only one mode of the
second order, Facies Totius Universi. It has been
inferred that this is a modification, not of extension
alone, but of nature as a unit, a modification there
fore which partakes of the qualities of both (or of
all) attributes. But that this is not the case, is
clear from Eth. II. lem. 7, schol., to which Spinoza
refers his pupil for further light.3 The expression
tota natura found there is evidently synonymous
with fades totius naturae occurring in the same
connection, and relates only to extension. It requires
therefore a counterpart on the side of thought, which
is not given either here or elsewhere.4 It would
seem that, in regard to the eternal modes in general,

1Epist. 64 (olim 66).

2 Korte Verhandeling, Cap. 9, Deel I.

8Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile con-
cipimus, totam Naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus
partes, hoc est omnia corpora, infinitis modis variant,
absque ulla totius Individui mutatione.

* Kuno Fischer's Diagram (Geschichte d. neueren Phil
osophic, II, 414, fourth edition) is therefore mistaken.

176 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Spinoza never worked out the details of his thought
into -consistency. From the point of view of
parallelism it would have been consistent for Spi
noza to posit a special Intellectus Infinitus (an
intellect relatively infinite) comprehending all
particular minds actually existing and all particular
ideas as psychological events. It would have had
its counterpart in the fades totius universi of the
"Ethics," which "varies in infinite ways" without
altering its total value, and in the Natura Naturata
Particularis (Extensa) of the "Short Treatise;"
while the Intellectus Infinitus in another sense, em
bracing all eternal modes of thought, would have
reflected the Natura Naturata Generalis. That he
mentions no such special Intellectus Infinitus is
probably due to the same motive that caused him to
suppress the original distinction between Natura
Naturata Generalis and Natura Naturata Particu
laris, — it would have emphasized the chasm (already
too obtrusive) between the system of eternal modes
and the system of particular things, a chasm that was
especially inconvenient in the thought-realm, inas
much as Spinoza was interested in putting actual
human minds in close relation with the realm of
eternal and changeless realities. His failure to dis
tinguish clearly between ideas as logical content
and ideas as psychological facts served him well at
this point, permitting him conveniently to do, in
the thought-realm, what he could not easily do in
the extension-realm, namely, to unite the changing
and the changeless worlds. By treating the ideas of
actually existing minds as logical content only, he
was enabled to obliterate the distinction between the
two.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT

177

The relation of the Intellectus Infinitus, so far as
we have now determined it, may be represented by
the following simple diagram.
Substantia

Cogitatio

I

Intellectus Infinitus

Extensio
Motus et Quies

I

Facies Totius Universi

Slngulae Ideae (Mentes) Singula Corpora

For the sake of simplicity we have thus far ignored
the infinite number of unknown attributes. When
we take these into account, we must make important
changes in our diagram. We must then regard the
counterpart of the Intellectus Infinitus as " ex
pressed" not only under the attribute of extension,
but under an infinite number of other attributes.
Accordingly its relation to remaining reality may
be provisionally represented as follows:
Substantia: Infinita Attributa

Cogitatio

Intellectus Absolute Infi
nitus.

Singulae Ideae (Mentes)
corresponding to modifi
cations of all kinds.

Extensio and numberlegs
unknown attributes.

lies;

Motus et Quies; and num
berless other analogous
modifications under the
unknown Attributes.

Totiu

Facies Totius Universi
(extensi); and number
less analogous modifica
tions under the unknown
attributes.

I

Singula Corpora; and
numberless analogous
modifications under the
unknown attributes.

178 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

It will be seen not only that the asserted equilib
rium between extension and thought is destroyed,
in that thought acquires an infinite preponderance,
but also that consistently the human mind ought to
be acquainted with the unknown attributes. For
the mind is the expression of substance under the at
tribute of thought, and the modifications of all
other attributes, not merely those of extension, are
analogous " expressions" of the same substance.
This obvious inconsistency was pointed out to
Spinoza himself by his young correspondent Tschirn-
haus:

"Whence it is seen to follow," he writes, "that that
modification which constitutes my body, although one and
the same modification, is expressed in infinite ways; in
one way through thought, in another through extension,
in a third way through an attribute of God unknown to
me, and so on to infinity; because there exists an infinite
number of attributes of God, and the order and connec
tion of modifications seems to be the same in all. Hence
the question now arises, why the mind, which represents
a certain modification and which same modification is ex
pressed not only in extension, but in an infinite number of
other ways; — why, I say, it perceives only that modifica
tion which is expressed through extension, that is, the hu
man body, and no other expression through the other
attributes."1

The difficult position in which Spinoza found him
self before this question was one more consequence
of the unclearness, lying on the threshold of his sys
tem, in regard to the relation that obtains between
the attributes and substance. Tschirnhaus 's objec
tion was valid ; but, on account of the actual lim-

1Epis. 65 (olim 67).

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 179

itations of our knowledge, Spinoza was bound at any
cost to hold fast his conception of the mind as
idea corporis. Accordingly in his reply, he simply
ignores the consequences which his friend draws
from the unity of substance, and defends himself by
reminding him of the heterogeneity of the attributes:

"But in reply to your objection, I say that, although
each thing is expressed in an infinite number of ways
in the infinite intellect of God, yet those infinitely num
erous ideas with which it is expressed are unable to con
stitute one and the same mind (mens) of a particular
thing, but an infinite number; although each of these
infinitely numerous ideas have no connexion with one
another."1

The statement that the ideas which represent
things as they are "expressed" in the unknown at
tributes constitute countless minds of particular
things, admits of but one explanation. If we con
ceive " thing" as a modification of the one substance,
in the way Spinoza does here, we must attribute to
every individual thing an infinite number of separate
minds which reflect the countless coordinate " ex
pressions" of the infinitely numerous heterogeneous
attributes. Everything has therefore, not simply the
one mind described as idea corporis, but an infinite
number of others. On account of the novelty of
the thought, one may perhaps be inclined to seek
some other interpretation; but no other is possible.
If we limit the word mens to idea corporis, and at
tempt to distribute the countless ideas of a given
thing among different minds of this sort, we contra
dict Spinoza's fundamental assumption that idea

1Epis. 66 (olim 68).

180 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

corporis can only know extension and thought.
Moreover, this letter, written two years before his
death, harmonizes completely with the differently
expressed representations of the " Short Treatise"
composed in his youth, where he speaks of the nature
of souls: "I say [the idea] of an object actually
existing, etc., without further qualification, in order
to include thereunder not only the modifications
of extension, but also the modifications of all the in
finite attributes, which just as well as those of ex
tension have [each] asoul. "x

As the ideas of the modifications of the different
attributes have no relation (nullam connexionem)
to one another, there exists corresponding to each
attribute a separate Intellectus Infinitus. We must
assume, therefore, an infinite number of relatively
infinite intellects, which, taken together, constitute
the Intellectus Absolute Infinitus. This suggests
Spinoza's definition of God; and in fact it corre
sponds in a way to that "ens absolute infinitum
hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis."
But it would be a mistake to suppose that it is the
thought counterpart of the unmodified attributes. It
represents only modifications of the attributes, and
belongs to Natura Naturata. Its place in the system
of reality is shown in the following diagram :

JKorte Verhandeling, pp. 101-2. — Ik zeg van een voor-
werp dat dadelijk wesentlijk is, enz. zonder meer be-
zonderheid, om dan hieronder te begrijpen niet alleen
de wijzingen van de uytgebreidheid, maar ook de wijzin-
gen van alle de oneyndige eygenschappen, de welke mede,
zo wel als de uytgebreidheid, een ziele hebben. — All this
Is a further confirmation of the assumption that souls
and not literal ideas are the constituents of the Intellectus
Infinitus.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT

181

Substantia: Infinita Attributa

Cogitatio

Intellectus Absolute Infi-
nitus; i. e., aggregate of
countless separate, rela
tively infinite intellects.

Individual groups of souls
(ideae, mentes), i. e.,
ideae corporum, and ideae
of the countless analogues
under the unknown attri
butes.

Extensio, etc., etc., ad in-
finitum.

Motus et Quies; and
countless analogues under
the unknown attributes.

I

Facies Totius Universi ;
and countless analogues
under the unknown attri
butes.

Individual things
(bodies); and countless
analogues under the un
known attributes.

The kind of unity possessed by this mode is espe
cially to be remarked. As Intellectus Absolute In-
finitus it falls, as we have seen, into an infinite num
ber of absolutely separate Intellecti Infiniti, of
which it is expressly said that they have no connec-
ion with one another. Still they are regarded as
constituting one mode. The unity can be only that
which may be predicated of an aggregate of units
having a common root. The infinite parts are all
derived from absoluta cogitatio, to be sure, but they
have no direct relation to one another. But what
unity may be ascribed to the separate Intellecti In
finiti ? It ought to be that which obtains among the
modes of any one attribute, and would be analog
ous therefore to that existing among different bodies.
Here again the unity is only a community of origin.
There is this difference, however, that in the case of
the separate Intellecti Infiniti there exists a special
homogeneity of qualitative content which he sup-

182 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

posed could not obtain between the thought modes
corresponding to several heterogeneous attributes.
The attribute of thought, which constitutes the ul
timate ground of all thought-modes, is the unity to
which they may be traced back. This, in which all
single ideas, or mentes, mediately or immediately
are rooted, establishes a union among them; some
what as the trunk of a tree, if we may express our
selves in physical imagery, constitutes a union
among the several leaves. This assumption is
the only one, as we shall see, that can be harmonized
with what Spinoza has to say about cogitatio ab-
soluta.

We must next determine what he means by the ex
pression Idea Dei.

2. Idea Dei.

In order to explain the relation of the eternal es
sences of things to the Absolute, we have already
had occasion to take some notice of this conception.
There it appeared that Spinoza's account of it was
probably influenced not only by Neo-Platonic ideas,
but also by scholastic speculations.

From this, however, it ought not to be hastily in
ferred that scholastic expressions employed by
Spinoza retain their scholastic meaning. The
scholastic discussions about the idea Dei, idea in Deo,
etc., are to be understood in the light of the Aris
totelian doctrine of form and stuff (or matter). Ac
cording to this the form (eT8o«, idea) of a thing is
at the same time its pattern and the goal of its de
velopment, and therefore also the measure of its
reality. Stuff (vXiy), on the other hand, is con
ceived as potentiality (8wa/u«, potentia). When

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 183

now the scholastics applied these conceptions to
God, they had to say that in God, the absolutely
perfect being, there is no potentiality, but only com
plete realization of form (idea}. He is actus purus;
in him potentiality is swallowed up in reality.
Hence the scholastic proposition: Idea in Deo est

ejus essentia, "form" in God is his essence. The

question suggested by this proposition, whether we
may then consistently assume a plurality of ideas in
God, is answered by Thomas Aquinas by distin
guishing the two senses in which the word idea is
employed. If it is taken in the Aristotelian sense
of form, idea must be regarded as only one in God;
if it is taken to mean a presentation, then we must
assert that the divine intellect contains as many
ideas as there are different things. Thomas says,
therefore : necesse est ponere plures ideas [in
Deo],1 — it is necessary to assume a plurality of ideas
in God. Spinoza, in his "Metaphysical Thoughts,"
also takes notice of this scholastic question, answering
it according to the requirements of his own system;

1 Freudenthal, in his original and excellent essay on
Spinoza and Scholasticism published in "Philosophische
Aufsatze, Ed. Zeller gewidmet," §135, seems to assume
that not only the scholastic phraseology, but also the
scholastic conceptions have here passed over into Spi
noza's philosophy. A proof of this he finds in Eth. II,
4, and refers to Thomas, "who, reasons like Spinoza (S.
t,h. I, qu. 15, art. 2) : Videtur quod non sint plures ideae
[in Deo]. Idea enim in Deo est ejus essentia. Sed es
sentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo idea est una." In
fact these expressions do not represent Thomas' own
thoughts, but are only a fallacious argumentation which
Thomas gives in order to refute it. He himself expresses
the opposite opinion immediately afterward: "Respon-
deo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere plures ideae [in
Deo]."

184 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

and, although his answer, like that just quoted,1 is
not determined by the Aristotelian doctrine of form,
it is quite the opposite of that given by Thomas.
Spinoza says there is but one idea in God. Hence
Spinoza's language has quite a different meaning
from what it would have if used by Thomas. In the
mouth of Thomas it would mean, in God there is
but one '"form" of himself and that "form" is him
self; while in this passage from Spinoza it means, in
God there is but one idea, namely the idea of His
unmodified essence, idea in a sense, however, which,
in view of Spinoza's peculiar uses of the term, re
quires to be more closely determined.2

It has generally been assumed that the expression
idea Dei is a proper name applied by Spinoza to a
single object. But upon careful scrutiny this as
sumption is found to be mistaken. In fact the ex
pression is employed in several senses, as we shall
show.

We consider first some passages from the "Short
Treatise." At the time when this work was com
posed, Spinoza held to a division of Natura Naturata

1 Of course the Aristotelian doctrine is involved in all
these scholastic discussions, more or less. God's ideas
of things are conceived at the same time as being in a
way the "forms" of the things. In relation to the crea
tion and primarily, they are ideas; in relation to the
created things, they are "forms."

2 Cog. Met. II, Cap. VII, p. 218. — "Ad hanc [quaestio-
nem] respondeo, quod idea Dei, per quam omniscius
vocatur, unica et simplicissima est. Nam revera Deus
nulla alia ratione vocatur omniscius, nisi quia habet
ideam sui ipsius; quae idea sive cognitio simul semper
cum Deo exstitit nihil enim est praeter ejus essentiam."
In a letter to a friend Spinoza declares that in this work
he has veiled his real convictions. We can see, however,
from the words "simplicissima" and "ejus essentiam"
that he is here describing alsoluta cogltatio.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 185

into two parts, the Natura Naturata Generalis and
the Natura Naturata Particularis. "The General
consists of all those modes which depend immediate
ly on God . . . ; the Particular consists of all the
particular things which are produced by the general
modes."1 Now it appears that a certain "Idea"
mentioned in this work is the thought-counterpart of
the Natura Naturata Generalis, and therefore corre
sponds to the Intellectus Infinitus. It is described
as an "Idea" that mirrors the whole of nature as
a sum of essences, but without "knowing" the
particular things that come and go in time.2 In the
Appendix this "Idea" is described more fully:
"In the ninth chapter of Part I, I have called this
Idea a creature immediately produced by God, since
without increasing or decreasing it contains in
thought form the real essences of all things. ' ' In the
same connection he says that "in the Idea there is
no particularity," i. e., there are no individual
things such as occur at dfferent points of time and

1 Korte Verhandeling I, Cap. 8. — Incidentally, it should
be remarked that this nomenclature confirms the view
we have taken of the eternal "essences." As belonging
to the products of the direct causality, they would be
members of the Natura Naturata Generalia, and there
fore something more general than particular things, —
something like the hypostatized species. And it is to be
noted that, although nothing is said in the Ethics about
a Natura Naturata Particularis, there still exists the
same distinction between general modes and particular
things that appears in the Korte Verhandeling.

2 Korte Verhandeling, Deel II, Preface, note 5 — "Wy
zeggen wezentlijk zijnde, omdat wy hier niet spreeken
van een kennisse, Idea, etc., die geheel de natuur van alle
wezen geschakeld in haar wezen kend, zonder haar be-
zondere wezentlijkheid, maar alleen van de kennisse,
Idea, etc., van de bezondere dingen, die telkens komen te
existeren.

186 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

space.1 Now in the chapter to which Spinoza here
refers the word employed is Verstaan, or, if we re
place the Dutch word with the Latin one that doubt
less stood in the original text, Intellectus; which is
called an eternal and immediate creature of God.
It is clear, therefore, that we have here to do with the
Intellectus Infinitus, and that Idea in the above ci
tation is but another name for it.

In the "Ethics" the expression Idea Dei is general
ly, but not always, used as a name for the Intellectus
Infinitus. In the demonstration to proposition 21,
Part I, for example, where he seeks to prove that all
the consequences (products) of the absolute nature
of God are infinite and eternal by reducing the con
trary assumption to an absurdity, he takes the Idea
Dei as an example of an eternal mode of the first
order: "Conceive, if you can . . . , in some attri
bute of God something to result from his absolute
nature, that is finite and has a determinate exist
ence or duration, e. g., Idea Dei in the realm of
thought." Idea Dei, therefore, designates here as
in the "Short Treatise" an infinite mode of the first
order, and so answers to the description of the In
tellectus Infinitus. In discussing proposition 8,
Part II, in another connection, we observed that
Dei infinita idea can there also be nothing else than
the Intellectus Infinitus.2

In other passages of the "Ethics" where the ex
pression Idea Dei occurs, it certainly designates
absoluta cogitatio. For example, in the corollary
to the ever recurring proposition, "The order and
connection of ideas is the same as the order and

1 Korte Verhandeling, Aanhangsel, p. 102.

2 See p. 151.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 187

connection of things," idea Dei and natura Dei
are put on the same plane : "God's power of thinking
[of producing thought-modes] is equal to his real
power of acting [of producing real things]. That is,
whatever objective reality results from the infinite
nature of God, results ex Dei idea in the same order
and connection in God (in the totality) after the
manner of thought."1 It is sufficiently evident
without comment, that idea Dei here represents
primary, underived thought, the absoluta cogitatio.
To regard it as a mode is out of the question.

We shall now be able to understand propositions
3 and 4, Part II., which have so often been either ig
nored or misunderstood.

"Prop. 3. — In God there is necessarily an idea as well
of his essence as of all things that necessarily result
from his essence.

"Dem. — For God is able to think (cogitare) infinite
things in infinite modes, or to form the idea of his essence
and of all things which necessarily result from it. But
all that which lies in God's power is necessarily existent;
therefore there necessarily exists such an idea, and (by
prop. 15, Part I) nowhere else than in God."

One might be inclined to suppose that here we
have a description of a single idea which has as its
comprehensive object God's essence and everything
that results therefrom.

The use of the singular of idea, especially in the
demonstration, seems at first to confirm this inter
pretation. If so understood, it could be taken as
the Intellectus Infinitus again, though not without
some violence.1 But when we recognize the parallel

1 Eth. II, 7, Cor.

2 The idea of God's essence would then be an idea in
some finite mind, as the Intellectus Infinitus is, as we
have seen, but the sum of thought-modes. But in this
case there would be involved the inconsistency of sup-

188 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

between this proposition and proposition 16, Part I.
("From the necessity of the divine nature infinite
things in infinite modes must result"), and when we
note the form of expression employed at the begin
ning of the demonstration cited above ("God is able
to think infinite things in infinite modes") ; we see
that Spinoza is speaking not of a single idea, but of
an infinite number of ideas. The expression "in
God" means here, as in many other passages, nothing
more than "logically implying the Absolute," and
may therefore be paraphrased as "somewhere in
total reality;" for proposition 15, Part I., cited in
proof of the existence of the ideas in God, says
there is nothing that is not in God: Quidquid est
in Deo est. The sense of the proposition in question,
therefore, may be more fully expressed as follows;
In the infinite universe there exists an idea (thought-
counterpart) of the unmodified "real" essence of God
and also an infinite number of thought-modes corre
sponding to as many modifications of his real es
sence.1 (Cogitare is here used as we shall soon find,
simply as a convenient term for psychic causation.)

Proposition 4, Part II. confirms the interpretation
given to proposition 3, and furnishes another case
of Spinoza's use of Idea Dei in the sense of absoluta
cogitatio: "Idea Dei from which result infinite
[thought] things in infinite modes, can be but one."
He thus expresses only a consequence of the single
ness of substance. In formulating this and the pre
ceding proposition, Spinoza had in mind the scholas-

posing this element of the Intellectus Infinitus to be sub
jective instead of objective.

1 That this is the correct interpretation of the propo
sition is shown also by the way the proposition is cited
in dem. to cor. Prop. IX, Part II.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 189

tic discussions above mentioned concerning plurality
of ideas in God, and accommodates their language
to the requirements of his own system in such a way
that he is able to say, as Thomas did; in one sense,
there is but a single idea in Deo,1 and in another
sense there are an infinite number. Probably he
never uses the word idea for absoluta cogitatio, ex
cept for the purpose of assimilating his terminology
to that of the scholastics, and of thus presenting his
thoughts in the least offensive form.2

1 It would be a mistake to assume that the word "idea"
In this expression is to be understood as an idea in the
ordinary sense of the term. In a letter written when a
part of the Ethics was already in the hands of his friends,
he contends that God may not be conceived sub idea.
Ep. 9 (olim 27) p. 224.

2 Viewed from the standpoint of mistaken assumptions,
the demonstration to proposition 4, Part II, has been
found unintelligible: "Intellectus inflnitus nihil praeter
Dei attributa et ejusque affectiones comprehendit. Atqui
Deus est unicus. Ergo idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis
modis sequentur, unica tantum esse potest." The sig
nificance of the expression "intellectus infinitus" here will
be understood, if we turn again to proposition 16, Part
I: "Ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis
(hoc est omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere
possunt) sequi debent." The words in parentheses (all
things that would come within the range of an infinite in
tellect) are but Spinoza's expression for "all possible
reality." In the demonstration to proposition 4, Part II,
he uses "intellectus infinitus" in precisely the same way
as here and evidently with reference to his use of it here.
The demonstration may therefore be paraphrased as
follows: There is no reality beyond God's attributes and
modes. But there is but one God. Hence all real things
have a single common origin, i. e., the real essence of God
(Dei essentia formalis). Now all thought-things, being
parallel to the real things, must also go back to a single
common origin, namely to absoluta cogitatio, the thought
part of God's absolute essence, that may be called idea
Dei, from which infinite thought-things in infinite modes
result. This proposition must not be taken as teaching
anything new. It simply says, what was already evident,
that absoluta cogitatio is one and not many. The lan
guage employed must be regarded as an attempt to ex
press his thought in terms of scholasticism.

190 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

We have now made clear that Spinoza borrowed
the expression Idea Dei from the scholastics, and ac
commodated it to his system; that in the "Short
Treatise ' ' he uses it only as a name for the Intellectus
Infinitus ; and that in the Ethics he employs it in two
senses, first, for Intellectus Infinitus, and secondly,
for absoluta cogitatio. The Intellectus Infinitus we
have already explained. We come finally, therefore,
to the absoluta cogitatio. From our study of this
conception must issue the definitive answer to the
question, whether Spinoza's system has a place for
an all-embracing consciousness. The answer can be
affirmative only in case the absoluta cogitatio can
be conceived in one of two ways. It must be a kind
of thought that either embraces all objects by con
sciously making the Intellectus Infinitus its own, i. e.,
by consciously thinking the single ideas of the In
tellectus Infinitus ; or attains in some other way, en
tirely independent of this, to an all-embracing knowl
edge. The latter alternative, however, may be ig
nored, as it is too fanciful to have been suggested
by anyone. For the Intellectus Infinitus is the im
mediate product of absolute thought, and, if absolute
thought thinks in the real sense of the term, it
must have the Intellectus Infinitus as the content of
consciousness.

3. Absoluta Cogitatio.

It has been assumed that with Spinoza, as with
Descartes, consciousness belongs to the very essence
of cogitatio. But as Spinoza has not defined1 cog-

1 Spinoza has not denned coyitatio for the reason that
from his point of view definition was impossible. The
most that he could say of absolute thought is that it is
that which is presupposed by the finite modes of thought
known to us in experience.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 191

itatio and has characterized it only negatively, we
are not warranted in making such an assumption
in advance of careful investigation. We have noted
a use of this and of kindred words such as idea, cog-
nitio, etc., that would naturally lead to an extension
of the meaning of the term. The doctrine that all
bodies, inorganic as well as organic, are "in different
degrees" endowed with souls, would consistently
have this consequence. So would also the tendency,
growing out of his psychological intellectualism, to
conceive these thought-counterparts as only the hy-
postatized intelligibility of the objects. But it would
be perilous to argue from any single element of
Spinoza 's system to its ultimate consequences, and to
say that these consequences were therefore held by
Spinoza. This method of procedure is chiefly re
sponsible for the prevalence of so many inaccurate,
and even erroneous, statements of his doctrines.
In order to prove that Spinoza intended to teach any
particular view, it is not enough to point out assump
tions of his from which the view could be deduced,
but it is necessary to show in addition that the
logical consequences of these assumptions have not
been inhibited by the consequences of other assump
tions which were for him more fundamental and im
portant, and to cite language from him in which the
given view is expressly accepted. Spinoza's system,
as we have remarked in another place, is so far from
being the chain of iron logic for which it often passes,
that it is in fact a tangle of conflicting tendencies,
many of which could not be granted full development
and final recognition. If we should skillfully se
lect our premises, though we stated them in
Spinoza's own language, we could, by ignoring the

192 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

rest of his utterances, conclude to opposite doctrines
in different cases. In seeking to determine the
meaning of absoluta cogitatio, for example, we could
select Spinoza's conception of idea ideae,1 by which
he explains human self-consciousness, and could say
that just as the human mind, idea cor ports, must be
reflected in another idea, thus giving rise to idea
ideae, or self-consciousness, in the same manner not
only every thought-mode but even the thought
attribute must be reflected in its corresponding idea
and give rise to self-consciousness; and, as the at
tribute of thought contains in the form of logical
implications all its consequences, a clear and ade
quate idea ideae in the Absolute would obviously
be an omniscient self-consciousness. Thus, in the
simplest manner possible, we could prove that
Spinoza ascribes to the Absolute an all-embracing
consciousness, — provided that, after arbitrarily
choosing our starting point, we closed our eyes to
everything else. The hypothesis seems to need no
elaborate defense; the mere statement of it consti
tutes its proof. On the other hand, if we start
from another and more fundamental assumption of
Spinoza's, omnis determinate est negatio, we can with
equal or greater facility arrive at the opposite con
clusion. We can say, in Spinoza's own language, that,
as a consequence of this principle, God must be ens
absolute indeterminatum,2 on the thought side abso
lutely indeterminate thought. But in absolutely
indeterminate thought there can be no determinate,

1 See page 74.

- Epis. 36, (olim 41). — Deus est ens, quod non certo
duntaxat respectu, sed absolute in essentia indetermina-
tum et omnipotens (infinite) est.

ATTRIBUTE OP THOUGHT 193

definite thoughts, no knowledge of anything in
particular, hence no knowledge at all.1 We can say.
moreover, that this conclusion is in harmony with
Spinoza 's assumptions in regard to causation. We
saw that in the attempt to discover the first cause of
the immediate material world on the one hand, and
of the immediate psychical world on the other, he
constantly pre-supposes that the cause of a thing
is that without which the thing cannot be thought.
It is in accordance with this that in his cosmology
the general is conceived as the cause of the particu
lar. The absolutely first cause, therefore, he was
compelled to find in the "ens absolute indetermina-
toi;" — on the side of extension, in something more
general and indeterminate than any material stuff of
the sense-world, in an absolutely indeterminate stuff ;
on the side of thought, in something more general
and indeterminate than any known kind of psychi
cal reality, in something more indeterminate there
fore than even the psychical doubles of the simplest
bodies, for these along with all other thought-modes
"must be conceived through absolute thought."
For mind (mens), therefore, for intellect (intel-
lectus), for will (voluntas), and for real thoughts
(ideae) in the Absolute, there can consistently be
no place. All these terms must apply only to the
thought-counterparts of particular bodies. Accord
ingly, mind properly so-called and absoluta cogitatio
must represent opposite poles of psychical being.

1 Kuno Fischer, accepting this conclusion, states it as
follows: "Daher muss der Gott Spinoza's, wenn er als
ein vollkommen unendliches und unbestimmtes Wesen
gefasst ist, notwendig auch als ein selbstloses und darum
unpersonliches Wesen begriffen werden" (Geschichte
d. neuern Phil., Bd. I, 2ter Theil, S. 343).

194 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

And it is to be observed that, after all, this view
may, in a way, be harmonized with Spinoza's
doctrine of idea ideae, for, if it be inherent in
the nature of an idea that it reflect itself in
another idea, the reflection must be only in that
degree of definiteness that characterizes the original
idea. It is quite consistent, therefore, to declare
that the idea which corresponds to the most com
plex and definitely individualized object, the
human body, becomes in its self-reflection distinct
self-consciousness; and, at the same time, to assume
that less definite ideas, or " minds," are less dis
tinctly self-conscious, that, in fact, minds of the
lowest order are not self-conscious at all. The same
would be true of an ens indeterminatum (the Ab
solute) ; self-consciousness would vanish in its own
indefiniteness. It is to be remarked further that
Spinoza is here occupied only with the human mind
and its peculiarities, and does not consider the re
moter consequences of his statements for his system
as a whole. So true is this that he overlooks entirely
the circumstance that his "idea ideae," if followed
out, quite destroys the assumed parallelism between
thought and extension, giving an infinite pre
ponderance to the thought series.

The second view is, therefore, decidedly the better
founded ; but, stated thus as a mere inference without
the support of citations from Spinoza expressly ac
cepting it, it would not pass unchallenged. The
question is not to be settled by inference and specu
lation, but by exegesis. We shall therefore under
take to show not what he might have taught, but
what he actually did teach, and this by citing his own
language and, where its meaning is not self-evident,

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 195

by explaining it in the light of Spinoza's own usage.
It will be found that he has expressly affirmed, in
language that can not be mistaken, what the more
fundamental assumptions of the system would lead us
to expect, namely that conscious knowledge may not
be predicated of the Absolute. In fact, nothing but
the association of usual meanings with terms em
ployed by Spinoza in a sense of his own, has ever
given an air of plausibility, on exegetical grounds, to
any other view.

It is worthy of remark that no systematic investi
gation of the specific question whether Spinoza's
Absolute is to be regarded as intelligent or not, has
appeared since the two important essays on the sub
ject published in Germany half a century ago,
which took no account of the ' * Short Treatise, ' ' one
by J. H. Loewe1 and the other by Trendelenburg.2
Both undertook to establish the view that Spinoza
conceives his Absolute on the thought side as an all-
embracing intelligence ; and they founded a tradition.
Their conclusions are still accepted as plausible, and
even as satisfactory,3 and we must examine the
principal grounds upon which they are based.

1 Die Philosophic Fichtes. Mit einem Anhange: Ueber
den Gottesbegriff Spinozas und dessen Schicksale. Stutt
gart 1862.

2Historische Beitrage zur Philosophic, 1846-67.

3 Recently by Joachim in "A Study of the Ethics of
Spinoza," p. 72. — "God, in His being as a 'res cogitans'
is thus aware of Himself and all that follows from Him
self; and since all consciousness involves self-conscious
ness, since in thinking or knowing we necessarily know
that we know, God is aware of His own thinking." As
he here cites Loewe in a foot-note, we may suppose that
he has followed him without a careful independent in
vestigation of this point.

196 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Loewe's presentation of the case is the most ample,
and, though more definite in its description of the
absolute thinking, agrees essentially with all others
and is based on similar grounds. It may therefore be
taken as representative. He assumes a three-fold
thinking in the Absolute: "(1) The Intellectus In-
finitus in so far as it is God's absolute consciousness
of himself as absolute, i. e., his absolute self-knowl
edge as God; (2) The Intellectus Infinitus as that
absolute divine thinking by means of which he com
prehends the infinite totality of all finite things and
their relations: (3) The intellectus infinitus, the
single finite modifications of the divine thought-
nature, — the finite mind and its thought-activities."1
These now are supposed to be so related to one an
other that all different thoughts are consciously re
ferred to a single subject, the Absolute mind. Ac
cordingly, he further explains: "Every idea is not
merely a real product, but, as the mode of an infinite
real activity, namely of the thought attribute, it is
also a real agent, although finite; consequently not
simply something thought, but also something think
ing, — a finite mind. When therefore God as in
finite thought modifies himself to the determination
A, and thereby the thought-thing A constitutes
the finite mind, then we have to recognize in A some
thing which God thinks and which it (the finite
mind) at the same time is, in that God thinks it."2

It will be observed that this statement, by apply
ing the word "intellect" to the absolute thought,
entirely ignores Spinoza's warning, clearly expressed
and frequently repeated even in the "Ethics," that

1 Die Philosophic Fichte's, Anhang, S. 299.
3 Die Philosophie Fichte's Anhang, S. 294.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 197

"intellect" is a mode and cannot be predicated of the
Absolute. These passages and the attempts to ex
plain them away will be more conveniently con
sidered in another place.1 Spinoza might, no doubt,
have constructed a system in which the relation of
the Absolute to finite thoughts had been something
like that described by Loewe; but that he did not,
we hope to make quite clear, even if the "Ethics"
alone be consulted.

His view was founded, as all similar ones have
been, chiefly upon peculiar phraseology of which
Eth. II. 3 may be taken as representative. Here it
is said :

"In God there is necessarily an idea both of His es
sence and of all things that necessarily result from His
essence.

Dem. — For God (by prop. 1 of this part) is able to
think infinite things2 in infinite modes, or (what is the
same, by prop. 16, Part I) to form the idea of His es
sence and of all things which necessarily follow from it.
But all that is in God's power necessarily exists (by prop.
35, Part I); therefore, there -is necessarily such an idea,
and (by prop. 15, Part I) nowhere except in God. — Q.
E. D.

1 See page 207.

2 The Latin word which we have translated by "in
finite things" is inftnita. It does not here mean ma
terial things, of course, but psychical doubles of these.
The sense of inftnita is generally not precisely determined
with Spinoza. It may mean infinitely numerous things,
or things that are severally infinite in their kind. Some
times one meaning is intended, sometimes the other; and
not infrequently the word is used indeterminately. Here
the sense is, "to think an infinite number of qualitatively
different attributes each in an infinite number of different
modes;" but, as the attributes are each infinite in its kind,
it may be that Spinoza here uses the word inftnita in the
indeterminate way to designate them not only as infinite
in number, but also as severally infinite in kind.

198 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Scholium — The multitude understands by the power of
God, God's free will and His authority over all things
that exist, which are therefore regarded as contingent.
For they say that God has power to destroy all things
and to reduce them to nothing. Moreover, they very
often compare God's power with the power of kings.
But this we have refuted in Cors. 1 and 2 of prop. 32,
Part I, and have shown in prop. 16, Part I, that God acts
by the same necessity by which He thinks (inteUigit)
Himself; i. e., just as from the necessity of the divine
nature follows (as all agree) that God thinks Himself,
by the same necessity follows that God produces (or
does, agit) infinite things in infinite modes. Then we
have shown in prop. 34, Part I, that God's power is
nothing but God's dynamic (active) essence [actuosa
essential ; and so it is as impossible to conceive of God's
not acting as of God's not existing. Moreover, if it were
permitted to pursue these matters further, I could here
show also that that power which the multitude attributes
to God is not only human (which shows that God is con
ceived by the multitude as a man, or as similar to a man),
but even involves impotence. But I am unwilling to
discourse of the same thing so often. Only I ask the
reader again and again to ponder repeatedly what has
been said concerning this matter from prop. 16 to the
end [of Part I].1 For no one will be able rightly to
grasp what I mean, unless he takes care not to confound
the power of God with the power and authority of kings."

We have already had occasion to show2 that in this
proposition we have to do not with one all-embracing
idea, but with the ''idea" of God's simple essence,
along with an infinite number of other ideas which
are its products (or consequences), that "idea of
God's essence, " being the original, underived
psychical, must be the attribute of thought, absoluta

1 In the Part referred to, he expounds and defends his
doctrine of necessity.
* See above, p. 187.

ATTRIBUTE OP THOUGHT 199

cogitatio, and hence that the word " idea " is thus used
as an accommodation to scholastic language. We
have now only to inquire whether the words cogi-
tare, intelligere, etc., were rightly taken by Loewe
and others as proof of divine omniscience. So long
as one remains under the influence of the letter,
certain individual phrases in this passage seem to
support Loewe 's hypothesis. As a matter of fact,
however, cogitare and intelligere in Spinoza's vocab
ulary do not always mean "to think." On account of
the parallelism of his system, these words are often
conveniently employed to describe psychical causa
tion as distinguished from material causation, which
is designated by agere; and they do not necessarily
imply that psychical causation is conscious thinking.
Here the causal process on the side of cogitatio is
represented as an analogue of the causal process on
the side of extension and both processes are, as we
have seen, a conditioning or a producing in which,
by a law of necessity, modes result successively one
from another in a series ending in the most highly
determinate. The Absolute, therefore, can "cogitare
infinita infinitis modis" in the sense that from sub-
stantia cogitans result psychical modes infinite in
number and kind, one corresponding to every mode
produced by substantia extensa, and to every mode
produced by each of the unknown attributes; but
that the Absolute thinks in any other sense does not
appear. Nor does it appear when we consult Eth.
II. 1, to which reference is made in the demonstra
tion:

Prop. 1. — Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God,
or God is a thinking being (res cogitans).

200 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Dem. — Particular thoughts, or this and that thought,
are modes which express God's nature in a certain and
determinate way. Therefore to God belongs an attri
bute the conception of which all particular thoughts in
volve, and through which they are conceived.

According to this language, God would be the
cause of particular thoughts, not in the sense that he
literally thinks them, but only in the sense that inde
terminate thought is the presupposition of deter
minate thoughts, or, in other words of Spinoza's,
that individual psychical entities and phenomena
"express in a particular, determinate way" the gen
eral, indeterminate nature of God.

To understand cogitare here in the literal sense
of conscious thinking is forbidden by the fact that
such interpretation would, as we shall see, make this
passage contradict what Spinoza has expressly af
firmed in other passages of the "Ethics" which
Loewe has tried in vain to explain away.

In regard to the expression "God thinks himself"
(seipsum intelligit), it is to be observed that, if
taken literally, it stands in express and glaring con
tradiction to the numerous unequivocal assertions,
soon to be examined, that intellect us does not belong
to God; for intettigere and intellectus are cognate
words, and if God the Absolute literally intelligit
he must also possess the literal intellectus. But in
fact we have here no logical contradiction ; it is only
one of those verbal ones into which Spinoza has been
betrayed by too frequently putting the new wine of
his thought into the old bottles of traditional phrase
ology. The apparent contradiction disappears the
moment we recognize in what sense the word "God"
is employed. "In God" in the proposition quoted

ATTRIBUTE OP THOUGHT 201

does not mean in the Absolute, but somewhere in
total reality. Proposition 15, Part L, cited in the
demonstration to prove that God has an idea of
everything, says simply, Quidquid est, in Deo est, —
whatever is, is in God. The expression, therefore,
means no more than that the ideas in question are
somewhere. Deus seipsum intelligit is a scholastic
sentence, which Spinoza fits into his own system by
taking ' ' God ' ' in the sense of the universe. God the
Absolute has no intellect, and does not think ; but God
the sum of reality possesses intellect, and does think,
because the individual modes think. Or we can ex
press it differently, and say that, in a certain sense,
even the Absolute thinks. As substance is the
ultimate cause, even though it is not the immediate
cause, of everything that happens, it may be said to
do everything that is done, and in this sense to think ;
but by this it is not meant after all that intellect and
thinking pertain to anything but the consequences of
substance.

Occasionally accommodation of language is car
ried so far that intelligere is applied to the Absolute
properly so-called, but never without accompanying
explanations that make clear in what sense the word
is to be understood. The following citation from the
"Theologico-Political Treatise," where he uses Dei
intellectus for absoluta cogitatio as he sometimes does
also in the "Ethics," for the reason that the Scho
lastics used the expression for the divine mind, will
serve as an example:

"The will and intellect of God are in fact one and the
same, nor can they be distinguished except in respect to
our thoughts which we form concerning God's intellect.
For example, when we direct our attention only to this

202 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

fact that the nature of a triangle is contained in tlie di
vine nature as an eternal verity from everlasting to ever
lasting, then we say God has the idea of a triangle or
that he understands the nature of a triangle."1

From this we see quite clearly that, if Spinoza
speaks of the Absolute 's having an idea, or of the Ab
solute 's understanding anything, he means only that
of all psychical phenomena as well as of all material
things substance is the ultimate ground, from which
they may be logically deduced.

The other grounds upon which Loewe's view was
based will be noticed incidentally as we proceed ;
and it will .be seen that they were much less sure than
those we have just noticed.

A passage of the "Short Treatise" which settles
the question for the point of time when this work was
composed is found in the seventh chapter of the First
Part, where he discusses "the attributes that do not
belong to God. ' ' He says :

"We shall not take much notice of the ideas which
men commonly have of God, but we shall briefly examine
what philosophers have to say to us about Him. These
have described God to be a self-existent being, cause of
all things, omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, simple, infi
nite, the highest good, infinitely merciful, etc."

After mentioning some general assumptions of
these philosophers which are tantamount to a con
fession of ignorance of God, and pointing out that
the "attributes" named rather describe properties
which in their view belong to God than tell "what
He is," he continues:

"It is now time that we consider the things which they
ascribe to God, but which do not belong to Him, as that

1 Tract. Theol.-Polit. Cap. IV, Opera II, p. 5. The italics
are ours

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 203

He is omniscient, merciful, wise, etc.;1 which things,
because they are certain modes of the thought reality
and in no way can exist or be conceived without the sub
stances of which they are modes, cannot be attributed
to that which is a self-existent being."2

Here we find that Spinoza declares in the clearest
possible language that to the Absolute omniscience
and wisdom may not be ascribed. How could he
have said more plainly that the Absolute is not in
telligent ? If we were disposed to cavil, we could say
perhaps that the word 'wise' implies the adaptation
of means to ends, and that when Spinoza objects to
our applying it to the Absolute, he only repudiates
an anthropomorphic conception of divine activity,
without wishing to deny divine intelligence as such.
But how shall we contrive to explain away the word
* omniscient'? We cannot suppose that he meant
to say that God knows some things, but does not
know all things, for he is not speaking of the extent,
but of modes of the divine activity and existence.
He is employing the category of quality and not of
quantity. If he had meant simply to limit the ex
tent of divine knowledge, which he had no occasion
to do, he would certainly have said so, not only
here, but in other places. The fact is, we find be
fore us a plain declaration that the world-ground is

1 Cf. Trac. Theologico-Polit. (Opera II, 8). "And with
out doubt it is on account of human weakness that he
[Paul] attributes to God, mercy, grace, wrath, etc., ac
commodating his words to the mind of the people, or, as
he himself says (I Cor. Ill, 1, 2) to the mind of carnal
men."

2 In the light of this language, I am at a loss to under
stand Mr. Pollock's assertion (Spinoza; His Life and
Philos.) that Spinoza has nowhere denied that God is
conscious. Does he mean that to Spinoza's mind there
remained a divine consciousness after the divine omnis
cience was gone? Or has he overlooked this passage?

204 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

not a knowing subject. And it is clearly the duty of
sane interpretatation to explain any uncertain ex
pressions in harmony with this unequivocal one.

The same thought is repeated in different language
in Chapter 24, Part II. of the same work: "But we
have already said that no ways of thinking can be
attributed to God except those which are in the
creatures; therefore it cannot be said that God
loves men, much less that he should love them be
cause they love him, or hate [them] because they hate
him." That is to say, if we name the totality God,
God may be said to think, love, etc., inasmuch as
individual creatures think, love, etc. ; but of God the
Absolute these things can not be predicated. Com
menting on this passage Christoph Sigwart, one of
the first to study carefully the newly discovered
work, admits that it "speaks decisively for pure
pantheistic consistency," but adds, "only so much
may be definitely asserted: If Spinoza has gone be
yond naturalistic pantheism in the 'Ethics,' and has
taught that God as infinite is self-conscious, this
was not founded in his original way of thinking."1

The question arises therefore, Did Spinoza, after
writing the "Short Treatise," change his mind in re
gard to this matter? We should naturally expect
that his thoughts, in this particular as in others,
would develop in the direction of further consist
ency; and, if the logic of pantheism had already in
the "Short Treatise" eliminated a self-conscious God
from his system, nothing but the clearest proof of
a subsequent change of view would warrant us in
supposing that it occurred. A careful examination
of the passages of the "Ethics" which treat of

1 Spinoza's Neuentdeckter Traktat, p. 94.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 205

"God" will show that every character denied the
Absolute in the earlier work is also denied him in
the later one.

In the first place the Absolute, according to the
"Ethics," has no will. God is, to be sure, a "free
cause," indeed the only free cause ;* but this does not
mean that he is free in the sense of indeterminism,
or even in the sense that his activity is conditioned
by intelligence, but only that he is not subject to
any external compulsion. All His effects result with
absolute necessity from his nature, in the same way
as from the nature of the triangle results eternally
that its three angles are equal to two right angles. ' n
All material things result with necessity from the at
tribute of extension, and all psychical reality with
equal necessity from the attribute of thought; and
the two categories of being remain causally inde
pendent of each other. Any purposeful activity is
therefore inconceivable. God can not help doing
everything that lies in his power.2 "Nature has
no predetermined end, and all final causes are
nothing but human fictions."3 From this it is
clear at least that to attribute to Spinoza a theistic
conception of the world, as has sometimes been
done,4 is absurd. The thought attribute is no more
than the passive spectator of all that exists and hap-

* Eth. I, 17, Cor. 2. — Sequitur II, solum Deum esse
causam liberam.

xEth. I, 17, schol., p. 52.

8 Ibid.

3 Eth. I, Appendix, p. 68. — Ut jam autem ostendam,
Naturam finem nullum sibi praefixum habere, et omnes
causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus
est multis.

*Voigtlander in "Theologische Studien und Kritiken"
(1814). Heft 3.

*
206 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

pens outside itself; and in no way affects the rest
of reality or is affected by it.

Other expressions of the "Ethics'' show that the
attribute of thought can not even be called a spec
tator, except in a figurative sense ; as it is devoid of
conscious knowledge. This is the real purport of
Eth. II. prop 9, Cor:

"Cor. — Whatever happens in the object of each idea, of
this there is knowledge in God so far only as He has the
idea of that object.

Dem. — Whatever happens in the object of each idea, of
this there is an idea in God (by prop. 3 of this Part) not
in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is considered
as affected by another idea of a particular thing (by the
preceding prop.); but (by prop. 7 of this Part) the order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and con
nection of things; therefore of that which happens in
any individual object there will be knowledge in God in
so far only as He has the idea of that object. — Q. E. D."1

This formidable language is found, when under
stood, to mean only that in my mind there is an 'idea'
corresponding to every event in my body, and that
this idea belongs to me and not to the Absolute.
Proposition 3, referred to in the demonstration, says
there is in God an idea of his own essence as well as
of everything that results from his essence. "In
God" in this connection means, as it did in a passage
noticed above, only 'logically implying the Absolute/
or 'a part of total reality.' The phrase "God, not
so far as he is infinite, but so far as he is consid
ered as affected by a particular thing," is a fre
quently recurring expression of Spinoza's, by which
he designates perishable modes, or individual things.
(It will be recalled that every particular thing is
caused by another particular thing, and so on ad

1 The italics are ours.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 207

infinitum). Spinoza's thought then is this: As
there must be an idea (or soul) paired with every
thing that exists, there must be in God (total reality)
an idea (or soul) of every particular corporeal
thing (for whatever is, is "in God" in this sense) ;
and in every such soul there is a knowledge (or cor
responding psychical event) of everything that hap
pens in the body associated with it. God in the
sense of the infinite and absolute (quatenus infinitus
est) has no such knowledge ; it is only the particular
piece of total reality known as the idea (or soul)
of a particular body that has knowledge of what
occurs in that body.1 This passage from the "Eth
ics" turns out to be exactly equivalent to "Short
Treatise" II, 24, above cited, which asserts that no
ways of thinking can be attributed to God except
those in the creatures, and which was admitted by
Sigwart to be alone sufficient to decide for that point
of time the question whether self-consciousness may
be predicated of Spinoza's Absolute. The citation
from the "Ethics" ought, therefore, to be decisive
for its time.

In entire harmony with this a number of pas
sages, both in the Ethics and in Spinoza's corre
spondence, declare without qualification that "in
tellect" does not pertain to God. We cite first one
from the "Ethics."

"Prop. 31 — Real intellect,* whether it be finite or in
finite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to
Natura Naturata, but not to Natura Naturans.

1 Cf. Martineau, Study of Spinoza, pp. 216-17.

2 Intellectus actu. Stern has not inappropriately
translated the two words into German as follows: 'Der
wirkliche Verstand (die wirkliche Erkenntnis).' ' — Rek-
lam's Bibliothek.

208 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Dem. — For by intellect we do not of course under
stand absoluta cogitatio, but only a certain mode of think
ing, which mode differs from others such as desire, love,
etc., and so (by definition 5) must be conceived through
absoluta cogitatio', that is to say, (by prop. 15 and defi
nition 6) through some attribute of God, which expresses
the eternal and infinite essence of thought, it must be so
conceived that without the same it can neither be nor
be conceived; and on this account (by schol. prop. 29)
it must be referred to Natura Naturata, but not to Natura
Naturans, as also the other modes of thought. — Q. B. D."1

The same language is reiterated in Epistle 9: "I
think I have demonstrated clearly enough, that in
tellect, even though infinite, belongs to Natura Na
turata and not to Natura Naturans." Natura Na
turans, it will be remembered, is but another name
for the Absolute. These expressions, therefore,
plainly declare that no intellect can be predicated of
God. It is only a variation of the same thought
when he says in Cor. 2 of prop. 32: "It follows in
the second place that will and intellect are related to
the nature of God just as motion and rest, and ab
solutely as all natural things that must be deter
mined by God to exist and act in a certain way."

Attempts have been made so to explain the word
"intellect" as employed here that the Absolute
would not be robbed of intelligence and omnis
cience after all. But as the same word occurs in
similar expressions in the "Short Treatise,"2 and
as these expressions there were but one way of say
ing, that * * omniscience ' ' cannot be attributed to God,
it ought to be sufficiently clear, in the absence of any
express qualification of the sense in the "Ethics/'

1 Eth. I, prop. 31.

2 Korte Verhand. Deel I, Cap. 9,

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 209

that the meaning in the " Short Treatise" was the
permanent one for Spinoza's thought. Those, of
course, who have overlooked this fact and have not
distinctly recognized the extent to which Spinoza in
the affirmative expression of his thought has em
ployed traditional language in an accommodated
sense, have frequently assumed that these negative
expressions which seem to contradict the others,
are not to be understood in their prima facie mean
ing. They have suggested that Spinoza intended not
to deprive the Absolute of understanding, but to
assert only that the divine intelligence is not to be
conceived " after the manner of the investigating
deliberating human understanding, which does not
impart reality to its conceptions, but only takes up
into itself that which is already given. ' n But let it
be observed that against this anthropomorphic way
of thinking Spinoza had no occasion to assume a
polemical attitude. Christian theology had always
expressly repudiated it, making between the divine
and human thinking just the distinction which
Loewe would attribute to Spinoza. The distinction
is an obvious implication of the doctrine of an om
niscient first cause. If Spinoza had desired to deny
to the Absolute nothing else than an " investigating,
deliberating human understanding," he would have
been repeating commonplaces. He would have had
before him no opponents, and his lively conscious
ness of being engaged in a fight against current
modes of thought would be quite unintelligible.
According to Trendelenburg,2 Spinoza must have in
tended to reject only the scholastic representations

1 J. H. Loewe, op. cit, p. 301.

2 Historische Beitrage zur Philos., p. 55.

210 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

which make the divine thinking a factor in free
creature activity. But if this was the extent of
Spinoza's purpose, the rejection of "intellect" in
God was quite gratuitous, for he had already done
away with the scholastic doctrine of creation when
he denied the existence of divine will.1

In proof of his assumption, Loewe cites Eth. I, 17,
schol., the meaning of which he has mistaken, as is
quite obvious when the whole passage is considered.
The proposition, which affirms that God's activity is
determined solely by the laws of his own nature, is
followed by the corollaries. The first asserts that
there is no cause which, extrinsically or intrinsically,
moves God to act, except the "perfection" (com
pleteness) of his own nature; the second, that God
is the only free cause, since God alone exists solely
by the necessity of his own nature and acts solely by
the necessity of his own nature. Then, in order to
demolish the whole edifice of traditional creationism
by destroying its foundations, he subjoins a lengthy
scholium, most of which is devoted to showing * * with
out the help of the foregoing proposition that neither
intellect nor will belongs to the nature of God."
This part reads as follows:

"Further, to say something here also concerning in
tellect and will, which we commonly attribute to God; if
intellect and will belong to the eternal essence of God,
something else certainly is to be understood by each of
these attributes than what men usually understand there
by. For the intellect and will that would constitute the

1 When it is said without further specification, that by
the language in question Spinoza was combating anthro
pomorphism, we are no wiser than before. That he was
doing this, no one will dispute. The only question is as
to the extent of his repudiation of anthropomorphism,
whether he rejected it in part or in its entirety. If in

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 211

essence of God would have to differ from our intellect
and will by as much as one pole of heaven is distant
from the other, and could agree in nothing but in name;
i. e., not otherwise than do the Dog-star in the sky and
the barking animal. This I will prove as follows. If
intellect (knowledge) belongs to the divine nature, it
cannot be by nature after the things thought (as ours is
generally held to be),1 nor simultaneous with them, since
God is causally prior to all things (by cor. 1, prop. 16);
but on the contrary the truth and real essence of things
is what it is because it so exists as thought in the intel
lect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, so far as
it is conceived as constituting the essence of God, is in
deed the cause of things, both of their essence and of
their existence; which seems to have been perceived by
those who have asserted that the intellect, will, and power
of God are one and the same thing. Since therefore the
intellect of God is the sole cause of things, and evidently
(as we have shown) both of their essence and of their
existence, it itself must necessarily differ from the same

its entirety, then he repudiated intelligence as an attri
bute of the Absolute; for an intelligent being is in that
far an anthropomorphic being. To this assertion the re
ligionist who understands himself will object just as little
as will the anti-religionist. What we undertake to show
is, that Spinoza rejected anthropomorphism in its en
tirety.

1 "Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non
poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque pla
cet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectus." Among
other mistakes, Loewe seems to have taken the phrase "ut
plerisque placet" in a wrong relation and to have under
stood this language as meaning: "If intellect belongs to
the divine nature, it cannot be by nature after (as it is
generally held to be) the things thought, etc." The mere
order of the words would not positively exclude this
meaning, but its own absurdity would. Such a concep
tion of divine cognition was so far from being generally
held that it was not held at all. Some theologians who
have been unable to reconcile creature free will with the
divine foreknowledge have allowed, to be sure, that in
the case of free acts God's knowledge is after the event,
but even they have had no objection to the doctrine of
divine foreknowledge in general.

212 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

both in essence and in existence. For that which is
caused differs from its cause precisely in that which it
has from its cause. For example, a man is the cause of
the existence, but not of the essence of another man; for
the latter is an eternal truth; and so they may be ab
solutely the same in essence, but must differ in existence;
and accordingly, if the existence of one perish, that of the
other will not on that account perish; but if the essence
of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence
of the other would be destroyed also. Consequently the
thing which is the cause of the essence and of the exist
ence of some effect, must differ from such effect both in
essence and in existence. But the intellect of God is
the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our
intellect; therefore the intellect of God so far as it is con
ceived as constituting the DIVINE ESSENCE, differs from
our intellect both as regards essence and as regards ex
istence, nor can be like it in anything except in name."1

Reading this passage attentively from the begin
ning, it is at once evident that Spinoza is basing his
argument in part upon the premises of his oppo
nents — what is not an uncommon thing. For the
sake of the argument, he employs the word "intel
lect" for absolute, cogitatio, and grants even (what of
course he himself did not hold, for in his system the
thought attribute is not the cause of anything but
thought-modes) that the divine intellect in this sense
is "the sole cause of things." And from this he
argues that the absolute thought, which is (in his
view also) the ultimate cause of our intellect, can
only improperly be called intellect, it being in fact
nothing of the kind. Loewe makes the strange mis
take of understanding the theistic expressions here
found as indicating Spinoza's own views.

1 We have italicized the expressions to which special
attention is invited.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 213

That by this language Spinoza desired to exclude
from the Absolute not the cognitive consciousness as
such, but only an intelligence conceived "after the
manner of the investigating, deliberating human un
derstanding" that does not create its own objects
but simply recognizes those that are given, is seen
to be even absurd, when we note that Spinoza starts
from this assumption as one of his premises. ''If
intellect belongs to the divine nature," says he, "it
(its knowledge) can not be by nature after the things
thought (as our own is generally held to be), or
simultaneous with them, since God is causally prior
to all things, (pro Cor. 1, prop. 16 )."1 In laying this
premise Spinoza expresses a view that no one dis
puted, and the reference to a preceding corollary is
only to show its relation to his own thought also.
Now it would be strange indeed if the conclusion
he draws did not go beyond the explicit declaration
of one of his premises !2

The second premise in Spinoza's argument, namely,
"The thing caused differs from its cause pre
cisely in that which it receives from its cause," and
therefore that * ' a thing which is the cause both of the
essence and of the existence of any effect, must differ
from such effect both as regards essence and as re
gards existence/' we have briefly noticed in another
connection. It ought now to be more fully explained,
in order to make clear its significance for the

1 An incidental, but convincing, proof that intellectus
must be taken in its prima facie meaning as cognitive con
sciousness, lies in the circumstance that here we have to
translate the word by 'knowledge,' in order to make sense.

s Loewe's treatment of this scholium can be accounted
for only by his mistaking the meaning of ut plerisque
placet, to which we have referred in a previous note.

214 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

specific question under consideration. The asser
tion looks like an express contradiction of Spinoza's
fundamental and constant assumption that ''that
which has nothing in common with another thing
cannot be the cause of its existence;"1 that "those
things which have nothing in common can not be the
cause one of another;"2 that "of things which have
nothing in common, one can not be the cause of the
other."3 It has therefore been regarded as quite
unintelligible, an enigma. Hence expounders of
Spinoza have generally ignored it altogether, and
have proceeded to interpret his system as if this pas
sage had never been written. But it can not be ig
nored with impunity. For it is not a mere acci
dental remark, nor a disingenuous assumption made
only for a moment, in order to confound an oppo
nent ; it constitutes a constant factor in his thinking,
and is carefully re-affirmed in another place.4 It is
so far from being unimportant that, so long as it re
mains unintelligible, one is liable to misunderstand
Spinoza's conception of absoluta coyitatio.

In order to get at the meaning of this language,
we must recur to Spinoza's definition of essence.
He defines it as "that without which the thing can
neither be nor be conceived, and vice versa that
which without the thing can neither be nor be con
ceived ;5 i. e., as consisting of the peculiarities which

1 Korte Verhand, Aanhangsel, ax. 5.

»Eth. I, prop. 3.

"Epist 4, p. 202.

«Epis. 64 (olim 66).

5 Eth. II, Def. 2. — Ad essentiam alicujus rei id perti-
nere dico, quo dato res necessario ponitur, et quo sub-
lato res necessario tollitur; vel id, sine quo res et vice
versa quod sine re, nee esse nee concipi potest.

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 215

constitute the thing's separate being. For example:
extensio is the cause of particular bodies, but, ac
cording to the definition of essence, it constitutes the
essence of none. If the essence of a body were ex
tensio, essence would have to be defined merely as
that without which a thing cannot be conceived, and
not also as that which cannot be conceived without
the thing; for, as a matter of fact, extensio can be
conceived without positing this or that body. The
essence of a given body then consists, as we saw, in
that peculiar modification of extensio which con
stitutes it as a distinct thing. It is conceived as the
thing's modality, as it were, which would be ex
pressed in an ideal definition. We can understand,
accordingly, Spinoza's assertion that a thing (the
essential thing) must differ from its cause precisely
in that which it receives from the cause, i. e., in its
peculiar nature. The expression 'differs in exist
ence' means, of course, 'has a separate existence.'
He is able, therefore, to declare that what is the
cause both of the essence and of the existence of a
thing differs from it in both respects, and at the same
time allow some community between cause and effect,
though this, in the case of substance and ultimate
modes, is so attenuated that it is described as only a
community of name. In addition to its 'essence'
(which is conceived so as hardly to be distinguish
able from what in logic we call the specific differ
ence) and 'existence,' a generic quality representing
the cause belongs to each thing. Intellect and ab-
soluta cogitatio, therefore, though different in es
sence and separate in existence, have something, a
certain qualitative character, in common; they both
fall in the same general category of cogitatio. They

216 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

are opposite poles of the psychical; just as animal
bodies and absolute extension are opposite poles
under the attribute of extension. Conscious think
ing is at the extreme of determinateness, absoluta
cogitatio is at the extreme of indeterminateness —
the ens absolute indeterminatum. And so, in spite
of their common substance, it is scarcely an hyper
bole to say that they are as unlike as the Dog-
star in the sky and the barking animal, which re
semble each other only in name. — The principle,
Causatum differt a sua causa practise in eo, quod a
causa liabet, is quite in harmony with the general
method of Spinoza's system, and only verbally con
flicts with the more frequently repeated maxim that
cause and effect must have something in common.

If anyone still doubts that by excluding 'intellect*
from the Absolute, Spinoza meant to exclude con
scious intelligence, let him consider just what intel-
lectus means in Spinoza's vocabulary. It is the term
employed to denote not merely the ordinary mental
processes, but particularly true knowledge as distin
guished from the unreliable and the untrue, the
knowledge that is often conceived as out of time re
lations. It is the word applied to the scientia intui-
tiva, the knowledge that is above process. Even this
kind of knowledge, or rather this kind of knowledge
especially, is by Spinoza's language excluded from
the Absolute. If he had wished to ascribe to the Ab
solute conscious knowledge of any kind, he could not
have found in his vocabulary a more suitable word
than intellectus, intellectus in the sense of pure intui
tion that contemplates the divine essence and all the
divine activities and products in the eternal, change
less light of truth. But this conception was expressly

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 217

rejected by Spinoza as often as he said, ''Intellect
does not belong to God." And in order not to be
misunderstood, he circumstantially explains in one
passage that it is the cognitive consciousness as such
that has no place in the Absolute: "But because I
desire to avoid all confusion, I will speak only of the
thing that is perceived by us in the clearest manner,
i. e., of cognition (intellectio), than which nothing
is more clearly perceived by us. For we can
cognize (intelligere) nothing which does not lead
to a more perfect knowledge of cognition."1 That
the term intellectio is here correctly translated into
English by 'cognition,' will not, I think, be ques
tioned. That it stands for the cognitive conscious
ness as such, appears from Spinoza's description of
it as that which is present in every act of knowledge ;
and further from the obvious fact that it is in reality
the only element that is present in every act of
knowledge. A consciousness of process does not
accompany all cognitive states — least of all for
Spinoza. He can refer, therefore, only to the cog
nitive consciousness as such.

The weakness of the position (even before the dis
covery of the "Short Treatise," containing varia
tions of language which more clearly explain expres
sions in the "Ethics"), that by excluding "intellect"
from "God" Spinoza meant to exclude only the an
thropomorphic conception quoted above, will appear
still more plainly, if we will ask ourselves: What
language could Spinoza have employed, in order to
express himself clearly, granting that he had desired
to affirm a psychical principle as an attribute of the
Absolute, and at the same time to negative conscious

lEth. I, 31, schol.

218 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

intelligence ? He could not have negatived cogitatio,
for in that case he would have had no word left
with which to affirm the original psychical principle.
The word cognitio would have served him no better
than intellectio; for anyone who were disposed to
limit cognitio so as to make it apply to the human
processes of knowledge only, could do so just as
plausibly as one has limited the meaning of intel
lectio and of iniellectus. We should still have been
told that Spinoza intended to repudiate as an attri
bute of the Absolute only a crude anthropomorphic
conception of cognition and not cognition as such.
"What language, then, could he have employed? It
must be recognized that, in fact, he could have found
in his whole vocabulary no more appropriate words
with which to exclude conscious intelligence from the
Absolute, than Ad Dei naturam neque intellectum
neque voluntatem pertinere. When he expressed
himself affirmatively, he was constrained, partly by
the limitations of language and partly by the desire
to give his system some flavor of piety, to use tra
ditional terms such as cogitare, intelligere, etc. ; and
this circumstance explains why his meaning has been
so persistently misunderstood, notwithstanding that
both the language in which he negatively defines his
thought, and the conceptions in connection with
which such terms are used, warn us that we may not
take them in their traditional sense.

The same meaning that is contained in the words,
"Intellect does not belong to God," is expressed in
another form, when Spinoza says that God does not
have ideas, or that he is not to be conceived sub
ideis. In a letter to Spinoza written when the ' ' Eth
ics" was well under way, Simon de Vries refers

ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT 219

to an oral explanation previously given by Spinoza
of the distinction between thought considered as
constans ideis and as sub cogitatione, and says that
the matter still remains unclear to his mind.1 He
does not see that, if ideas were removed from
thought, there would be anything left. If ideas van
ish, all cogitatio must vanish with them. Spinoza
replies that his pupil has identified cogitatio as such
with ideas because he has had in his eye only his
own human cogitatio. Human consciousness, being a
mode, of course consists of ideas, and so when he had
abstracted from all ideas in his own thought, he
naturally found nothing left of that particular cogi
tatio which he had in mind. With this explanation
and a reference to the already demonstrated propo
sition that in any case intellectus belongs to Natura
Naturata, he treats the difficulty as solved.2 His
thought, which he found difficult to express, seems
to have been this: Absoluta cogitatio is not to be
conceived after the manner of anything immediately
known to us in consciousness, but is something more
fundamental to which we may conclude from the
contents of consciousness ; it is a psychical something
which must be postulated as the back-ground and
ultimate cause of everything psychical, but cannot
be more closely determined. In any case, it is suf-

'Epis. 8, (olim 26), p. 221.

2Epis. 9, (olim 27), p. 224. — Quod autem dicitis, vos
non concipere cogitationem nisi sub ideis, quia remotis
ideis cogitationem destruitis, credo id vobis contingere
propterea, quod dum vos, res scilicet cogitantes, id
facitis, omnes vestras cogitationes et conceptus seponitis.
Quare non mirum est, quod, ubi omnes vestras cogita
tiones seposuistis, nihil postea vobis cogitandum maneat.
Quod autem ad rem attinet, puto me satis clare et evi-
denter demonstrasse, intellectum, quamvis infinitum, ad
Naturam Naturatam, non vere ad naturantem pertinere. —

220 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

ficiently clear that, according to Spinoza, ideas may
not be predicated of the Absolute. This is equiva
lent on the one hand to the assertion that intellect
can not be predicated of God, and on the other to
Spinoza's definition of God as ens absolute indetermi-
idtum. In indeterminate thought there can be no
definite, specific thoughts, and therefore no * ideas,'
iio knowledge.1

1 After this somewhat protracted discussion of absoluta
cogitatio and related conceptions, it is scarcely necessary
to add anything here concerning the conception idea
idcae to what we have remarked elsewhere (pp. 192-4).
We saw how Spinoza uses this conception to explain self-
consciousness in man, and that it seemed to imply that
consciousness is a necessary character of "idea." Those
who, on account of Spinoza's doctrine of human self-
consciousness, have scrupled to ascribe no conscious in
telligence to his Absolute, have hestitated only because:
(1) they have mistaken the meaning of passages in
which 'God' is used not in the sense of the Absolute,
but in the sense of total reality; and because (2) they
have not taken into account the multiple application of
the word 'idea,' which would forbid our basing any con
clusions on the fact that the word is sometimes applied
to God — unless the meaning in these cases were clearly
determined by the context; and because (3) they have
entirely overlooked Spinoza's assertion that God may not
be conceived sub ideis. Granting even, what can not be
made out, that Spinoza conceived of thought as neces
sarily self-conscious, we should still be as far as ever from
a self-conscious Absolute; for the absolutely indetermi
nate thought that would characterize the ens absolute in-
determinatum could be nothing but the limit of con
sciousness. Real consciousness would vanish in its in-
deflniteness.

CHAPTER VII.

HOW SPINOZA'S CONCEPTION OF THE ABSO
LUTE IS RELATED TO THE RELIGIOUS
CONSCIOUSNESS.1

1. Analysis of the Religious Consciousness.

Whether or not religion has any rational grounds,
and whether or not there are, in any case, other
forms of human life which may well be substituted for
it, are questions that do not concern us here. Our
purpose is simply to show what we conceive religion
to be, and then to determine whether it is compat
ible with Spinoza's conception of "God." We mean,
of course, religion regarded as an experience of the
individual, and, in this aspect, not as it appears
within the limits of Christianity merely, but as a
universal phenomenon.

On account of the variety of religious phenomena
brought to our knowledge by the investigations of
recent years, and on account of the apparent con
fusion of tongues in this field of discussion, some seem
to question the propriety of attempting as yet a uni
versally valid definition. It is thought that the only
thing practicable is for each individual to define
what he himself means by the term, without presum
ing to ask universal assent to his particular concep
tion.2 This we will not admit. The universal char-

1 A part of this chapter appeared as an article in "The
Reformed Church Review," Jan., 1904.

2 William James, "The Varieties of Religious Ex
perience," pp. 26-31.

222 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

acters of religion are as definite as those of most
other objects of knowledge, and can be specifically
enumerated and described. A definition of religion,
therefore, presents no peculiar difficulties. If what
we seek is a formula that will express the deepest
mysteries both of human nature and of the Godhead,
— what seems to be demanded and attempted by
some writers — then, of course, definition is not only
difficult, but impossible. Or, if we require that a
definition shall accurately express the significance of
the religious interest for man's normal life, we shall
not find it an easy task to formulate one that will
escape plausible criticism. Ours is a less ambitious
aim. It is simply to slate those general characters
of religion which distinguish it from other phe
nomena. Nothing more can reasonably be required.
A definition as such must be regarded as adequate
when it serves the practical purpose of separating
for our thought the object defined from all other
objects. When we say religion has as definite char
acters as most objects of our knowledge, we mean
religion as the term is employed by intelligent, but
unsophisticated, persons when they aim to speak
with logical accuracy. In discussion no one has the
right to use the term in any other sense. Loose
usage for rhetorical purposes, as frequently illus
trated in practical life and in literature, is to be en
tirely ignored. Moreover, the current meaning,
when defined, is not to be expressed, or rather com
pressed, in the terms of some particular system of
philosophy, but to be stated in language of universal
significance.

If writers on religion do not entirely agree in re
gard to the meaning of the term ; this fact is due, not

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 223

so much to the difficulty of the conception, as to dif
ferent philosophical presuppositions ; to the weakness
of some writers for high-sounding, but vague, termi
nology; and to the attempts of others to pass some
thing else than religion under the name of religion.

What men have always and everywhere concurred
in calling religion has three aspects, answering to the
threefold life of man: (1) a doctrinal aspect, in
which it appears as a body of beliefs, and is related
to man's intellectual life; (2) an emotional aspect,
in which it may be described in terms of feeling ; and
(3) a practical aspect, in which it presents itself as
an expression of man's volitional life. An adequate
definition must take into account all three of these
aspects. The diversity among traditional and cur
rent definitions is in great part due to the fact that
most of them seize some one aspect of religion, while
few recognize all three aspects at once. For some
writers religion is a "belief," a belief in God, in
gods, in spirits, or in something else ; for others it is
a "sentiment," variously described as " veneration, "
a "feeling of dependence," etc.; for still others it is
"practices" of some kind, such as rites and cere
monies, morality, or something else that implies a
relation to man's active powers only. Defining it
in its completeness, we would say: Religion is the
emotions and activities determined by belief in a
higher personal power, or in higher personal powers,
with whom man is assumed to sustain relations. In
this statement all three of the elements of religion
are given due recognition. Moreover, it will be
found sufficiently comprehensive to include fetichism
and Christianity, demonolatry and the worship of
the Heavenly Father, polytheism and monotheism;

224 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

and at the same time sufficiently limited by the words
" higher" and "personal" to exclude merely human
relationships on the one hand and atheistic phenom
ena on the other.

In the concrete religious phenomena of the world
the three elements are of course variously empha
sized. Even in the same cult the peculiar constitu
tion of different individuals will occasion that in some
cases the doctrinal element appear the most promi
nent, in other cases the emotional element, and in
others the volitional element ; but in no case will any
one element exist entirely alone. Religious beliefs
wholly apart from religious emotions and activities,
religious emotions wholly apart from religious beliefs
and activities, and religious activities wholly apart
from religious emotions and beliefs, are mere abstrac
tions that have no existence in the concrete world
of fact. Religious emotions in particular are fre
quently spoken of as though they could exist out
of all relation to beliefs. As a matter of fact, how
ever, religious emotions are only ordinary emotions
(love, joy, fear, admiration, etc.) as conditioned by
a religious object. Hence religious emotions without
religious beliefs, or assumptions, cannot exist. Of
religious practices the same is true. Practices of
any sort which have no ground in beliefs or assump
tions are insane. The only question that can arise3
therefore, is as to what beliefs are essential to reli
gion, i. e., what beliefs are the necessary condition of
religious emotions and practices; and it is to this
question in particular that we must invite attention.

In the definition proposed we have assumed that
the beliefs which condition religious emotions and
practices must include a belief in a higher personal

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 225

power, or in higher personal powers, assumed to sus
tain relations with men. The word "personal" is
important, and expresses the truth which we desire
especially to emphasize. It is a point which, in phil
osophical discussions of religion, is often either left
in vague uncertainty, or at most only implied. But
as "personal," when applied to the ultimate reality,
is a word which some profess not to understand, we
will explain, without attempting here an accurate
definition of a term so often employed in a vague
sense, that by personality we do not mean, of course,
spatial form and "local habitation," but only the
sum of those qualities which constitute a free intelli
gence, or, to describe it in the lowest possible terms,
the cognitive and volitional consciousness. The word
" self -consciousness, " as ordinarily used, expresses
our meaning with sufficient precision. This much at
least, we contend, is required of its object by reli
gion. The typical religious consciousness requires
much more, such as various interests, sensibilities,
moral qualities, etc. If it be said that this is gross
anthropomorphism, that the "higher power" of re
ligion is according to us only a human being with
some of his limitations removed, we can only reply
that, whether anthropomorphism or not, it is what
has always and everywhere been essential to religion.
It is not necessary, of course, that the object wor
shiped be expressly defined as "personal," or that
any personal attributes be expressly mentioned ; it is
not necessary even that the name "God" appear, for
the thing may be present in the absence of the name.
It is quite sufficient that such attributes be assumed,
and the evidence that they are assumed may con
ceivably be only the behavior of the votaries. But

226 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

no forms of human experience can with propriety be
called religion, unless they ascribe, explicitly or im
plicitly, personal qualities to a higher power or to
higher powers.

The fact that the recognition of personality is
sometimes only implicit, has occasioned some very
extraordinary and contradictory assertions concern
ing both particular religions and religion in general.
A typical example of these occurs in Daniel G. Brin-
ton's " Religions of Primitive Peoples." In one
place he affirms that " There is no one belief or set
of beliefs which constitutes religion. We are apt to
suppose that every creed must teach a belief in a
God or gods, in an immortal soul, and in a divine
government of the world. The Parliament of Re
ligions, which lately met at Chicago, announced, in
its preliminary call, these elements as essential to
the idea of religion. No mistake could be greater."1
From this it would seem that there can be religion
without a God, or gods, or anything of the kind. But
elsewhere in the same volume it is said, quite incon
sistently with this, that "It makes no difference
whether we analyze the superstitions of the rudest
savages, or the lofty utterances of John the Evan
gelist, or of Spinoza the 'god-intoxicated philoso
pher' we shall find one and the same postulate to
the faith of all."2 "This universal postulate, the
psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recogni
tion, or, if you please, the assumption, that conscious
volition is the ultimate source of all Force. It is the

1 Religions of Primitive Peoples (American Lectures on
the History of Religions) p. 28.

3 How erroneous is the assumption that Spinoza re
gards "conscious volition" as me ultimate source of all
force, the reader of the foresoiiig pages need not be told.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 227

belief that behind the sensuous, phenomenal world,
distinct from it, giving it form, existence, and activ
ity, lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power
of Mind, of conscious Will, or Intelligence, analogous
in some way to our own ; and — mark this essential
corollary — that man is in communication tcith it."
With the exception of the reference to Spinoza, we
would not dissent from this statement; but we are
unable to reconcile it with the one first quoted. For
the assumption of " conscious volition," of "mind,"
of "intelligence," as "the ultimate source of all
force" is only another way of saying "a belief in God
or gods ' ' and " in a divine government of the world. ' '
Buddhism is often referred to as an "atheistic"
religion; but, if we are consistent, we must regard
the expression as a contradicton in terms. By such
language we confound things that are not only es
sentially different, but quite opposite in character.
As a matter of fact, wherever we find temples, cere
monies, prayers, or worship of any kind, we have the
implicit assumption of a higher power or of higher
powers to which personal attributes are ascribed.
Purely ethical, humanitarian, or political societies
may take on some of the aspects of religious or
ganizations, but if they involve the recognition of
no higher personal power, they cannot properly be
called religious. To class them as such is to put to
gether things that are essentially different, and to
use misleading language. If any organization of
this kind is commonly known as "religious," it is
because it is commonly supposed to imply in its forms
and activities a reference to some higher power or
powers with personal attributes. It may even occur
that an ethico-philosophical system which is atheistic

228 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

at the beginning develops later into a religion; or
that the same system is atheism for the philosophic
ally initiated and is theism or polytheism for the mul
titude. In Buddhism we seem to have an illustration
of both of these cases. The circumstance that the
Buddhism of the people is religion, despite the fact
that the Buddhism of Gautama and of philosophers
now in different varieties of the cult is said to
be atheism, accounts for the frequent paradoxical
reference to the system as an ''atheistic religion.*'
Such language is sometimes convenient for purposes
of characterization, and possesses a certain rhetorical
value, but should never be taken for exact scientific
statement. The fact is that Buddhism is an anomaly,
the name covering two things that logically exclude
each other — atheism and religion; and, if we are to
use exact language, we ought to separate it into
these two elements and call each by its right name,
For convenience we may, if we choose, loosely call
the aggregate of phenomena known as Buddhism
either atheism or religion, or even "atheistic reli
gion"; but in this case we should distinctly recognize
that we are not speaking with logical precision. The
anomalous and inconsistent character of Buddhism
does not warrant us in extending the term religion
so as to obliterate the distinction between religion
and atheism.

What has been said may seem to class among
those who are in no sense religious the pious agnos
tics of our day, i. e., those who have no definite con
ceptions in regard to the supersensible world, and
yet, by conforming to the requirements of religious
organizations and even by relishing some kinds of
religious exercises, appear to possess a genuine re-

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 229

ligious interest. In such persons we have, in fact,
something like a case of double personality ; and they
are to be classed as religious and non-religious by
turns. When they put on the scientific frame of
mind and distinctly recognize the invalidity (for
them) of all theological and mythological forms of
thought, they are non-religious (atheists, if you
will) ; but when they surrender themselves to a sys
tem of religious conceptions as if these were true,
and are emotionally and volitionally affected there
by, they are religious. Few men, perhaps none, are
absolutely consistent in any respect, and it should
not seem strange if many are inconsistent in the
matter of religion. It is even possible for a con
stantly and devoutly religious man to hold a theo
retical system of implicit atheism (implicit, I say,
but not explicit) ; and indeed the history of thought
exhibits not a few such cases. In fact, systems of
Christian theology have sometimes contained ele
ments of undeveloped atheism. But on this account
to identify religion and atheism would be absurd.
In the world of fact there is no broad line of sepa
ration between religious experiences and non-reli
gious experiences, or between religious systems and
non-religious systems; religion shades off by imper
ceptible degrees into non-religion. On this account a
given system, because of either its indefinite or its
mixed character, may be difficult to classify. The
same is true of some objects in every department of
knowledge. In the world of natural things, classes
shade off gradually into one another, and many in
dividuals do not possess very definite marks of any
class; and many others possess some marks of two
classes. Naturalists meet some specimens of life in re-

230 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

gard to which it is difficult to say whether they are
plants or animals; and others clearly belonging to
the animal kingdom in regard to which it can hardly
be said that they are vertebrates, or that they are
non- vertebrates. Nevertheless "animal life," "plant
life,'' "vertebrate," etc., are very definite con
ceptions; and the difficulty of classifying some
concrete phenomena does not render them either
less definite or less valid. Neither does the
difficulty of classifying some human experiences and
systems with reference to religion affect in any way
the definte logical content of the concept "religion."
Nor does it prevent us from easily classifying almost
all experiences and systems.

The distinctive character of religion appears more
clearly when we observe wherein it differs from mo
rality on the one hand and from metaphysics on the
other. Morality is simply conformity to the recog
nized standards of conduct, and does not necessa
rily imply a reference to anything beoynd the indi
vidual's immediate relations. It is not necessarily re
ligious. In fact many moral men are irreligious and
some systems of morality are atheistic. In Christian
ity we have a religion that includes an ideal morality,
but the purely ethical content even of Christianity,
if taken alone, does not constitute religion. Moral
ity becomes religion only when norms of life are
recognized not merely as human ideals, but as ex
pressions of a divine will. Accordingly Kant has
defined religion, i. e., rational religion, as "the recog
nition of all our duties as divine commands. ' n This

1 "Die Religion innerhalt d. Grenzen d. blossen Ver-
nunft," Viertes Stuck, Erster Theil: "Religion ist (sub-
jectiv betrachtet) das Erkenntniss aller unserer Pflichten
als gottlicher Gebote."

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 231

would no doubt be accepted by many as a sufficiently
accurate definition of essential Christianity. The
important truth expressed is that duties alone are
not sufficient to constitute religion. In order to
become religion, duties must be regarded as sanc
tioned by a divine person.

The circumstance that monotheistic religion (on
its intellectual side) and metaphysics have to do with
the same object, namely the ultimate reality, often
occasions an oversight of the specific difference be
tween religion and metaphysics. Every kind of
monism assumes a unitary world-ground, and often
calls the ultimate reality "God"; but every kind of
monism is not therefore monotheism, or in some sense
a religious conception of the world. Whether it is
or not, depends on the attributes with which the
world-ground is clothed. If monism ascribes per
sonal qualities of any sort to its absolute, it becomes
monotheism, a religion; otherwise not. It may de
scribe the ultimate reality as "infinite," "absolute,"
"immutable," "eternal," etc.; but none of these
predicates constitutes the ultimate reality a reli
gious object. "Infinite" mechanism, for example,
would not be able to excite "reverence," "venera
tion," "respect," "love," or any other emotions
characteristically religious. Certainly nothing bet
ter could be said of "immutable" coexistence and
sequence, or of "eternal" dirt. At most such things
could excite mere wonder. Some elements of ideal
ity, at least, must be present in an object that condi
tions "reverence," "love," and similar emotions;
and ideality implies in that far personality. Modern
Transcendental Idealism, as represented by Emerson,
may be regarded, therefore, as still within, though

232 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

barely within, the pale of religion; for, although its
God tends theoretically to ''evaporate" into an ab
straction, practically the evaporation never becomes
quite complete. In different degrees the Emerson-
ians personify the world. As to the "feeling of de
pendence," which has sometimes been regarded as
the very soul of religion, let it be observed that not
every feeling of dependence is meant, but the feeling
of dependence on the "Infinite," and, by tacit as
sumption, on the "Infinite" conceived as clothed in
personal attributes. Dependence on infinite force,
on infinite gravitation for example, is not what is
meant, and would still not be, if in addition to "in
finite" we bestowed other imposing titles such as
"absolute," "immutable," and "eternal." Neither
have distinctively religious practices ever been de
termined by metaphysical attributes alone. Men
have never been quite stupid enough to perform re
ligious rites before impersonal mechanism, even if
conceived as immeasurably big, or to offer sacrifices
and prayers to a system of mathematical relations,
though regarded as "eternal." Such acts, when
closely examined, are found to be always attended
by a recognition of the personality of the religious
object. Toward objects like those just mentioned
men have never even assumed the corresponding
mental attitudes which, in the more refined religious
exercises, sometimes take the place of outward acts
of worship. Mere infinity, mere eternity, mere ab
soluteness, and mere causality, have no value what
ever for the religious consciousness. Professor
James is entirely right when, of a God constituted of
metaphysical attributes alone, he says: "From the
point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 233

monster which they offer to our worship is an
absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly
mind."1

Mere ontology is not theology, and the adjust
ment of oneself to an assumed ultimate reality is not
necessarily religion. Whether it is or not, depends
on the kind of ultimate reality assumed. The funda
mental weakness in Edward Caird's treatment of
religion, as of most writers whose conception of re
ligion is intellectualistic, consists in his tendency to
confound religion and metaphysics. He says, for
example, "The religious like the scientific conscious
ness seeks to find the reason or principle of the
particular in the universal; and it differs from sci
ence mainly in this, that it cannot rest except in the
infinite unity which underlies all the differences of
the finite."2 This recognizes both a certain agree
ment and a certain difference between the religious
interest and the scientific. The difference noticed is
in fact that which obtains not between the scientific
and religious interests, but between the scientific
interest (as manifested in the particular sciences) and
the philosophic (metaphysical) interest, which can
not rest except in a unitary conception of the world ;
and the difference is only one of degree, the scien
tific interest culminating in the philosophical. It is
therefore only the scientific interest in its highest
development that Caird here calls the religious con-

1 "The Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 447. — Cf.
H. Sidgwick. "Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations,"
p. 39; also Peuerbach's quite true assertion; "Dieses
[metaphysische] Wesen hat fur die Religion nicht mehr
Bedeutung, als fur eine besondere Wissenschaft ein
allgemeiner Grundsatz von welchem sie anhebt."

8 "Evolution of Religion," Vol. I, p. 112.

234 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

sciousness. The truth is that religion seeks primar
ily not "reason and principle," "unity," "the uni
versal," etc. as such, but help, protection, security,
peace, fellowship, and other practical goods. "Infi
nite unity" as such is of absolutely no significance
for the distinctively religious consciousness. It is
not surprising that elsewhere the same author,
though taking some account of the practical aspect
of religion, defines it in a way to remove all grounds
for the distinction between irreligion and religion.
"A man's religion," he says, "is the expression of
his ultimate attitude to the Universe, the summed-up
meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of
things."1 If, as this language implies, any kind of
ultimate attitude is religion, then irreligion and ag
gressive atheism are particular varieties of religion.
The point of view is intelligible, of course; but it
is evident that, if we adopted Caird 's conception, we
should be compelled to invent a new term with which
to distinguish religion from irreligion. The confu
sion results from the failure to attribute to religion
a peculiar object, — an object that differs from a
merely metaphysical one in that it possesses personal
qualities.

Even some thinkers of strong religious interest,
it must be admitted, have hesitated, on account of
particular philosophical presuppositions, to accept
theoretically the personality of the absolute; but
they have in that far been inconsistent. Schleier-
macher, for example, who in his earlier works hardly
employs the word "God," using instead impersonal

"Evolution of Religion," Vol. I., p. 30. It is only fair
to say that this is not meant to be his final statement of
the matter. It is sufficient, however, to characterize his
standpoint.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 235

expressions such as "the infinite," "the universe,"
"the whole," etc., is constrained later not only to
adopt fully the word "God," and to make a distinc
tion between God and the universe, but to clothe
"the infinite," for practical religion, in the attri
butes of the definite personal God of traditional
theology.1 It could not be otherwise. It was im
possible for him, as it has been for all other thinkers,
to constitute actual, concrete religion without a God
of personal attributes.

It is to be regretted that Prof. James, in his recent
work on "The Varieties of Religious Experience,"
fails to recognize explicitly the truth that religion
requires a personal object. As a consequence of this
failure, he seems to have fallen into certain incon
sistencies. He defines religion, considered subjec
tively, as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of in
dividual men in their solitude, so far as they appre
hend themselves to stand in relation to whatever
they may consider divine."2 But in his remarks on
what is to be understood by * * divine, ' ' he says there
are religions which do not positively assume a God,
and cites Buddhism as an example. He seems to
think that the divineness of the universe for the
religious consciousness may conceivably be "a mere
quality like the eye's brilliancy or the skin's soft
ness" and not "a self-conscious life."3 That such
a view is based on an imperfect analysis of the re
ligious consciousness, we have tried to show above.
We would here point out only that, in other parts of

1 Compare the "Reden tiber die Religion" and "Der
christliche Glaube."
•P. 31.
8 P. 33.

236 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

his work, Professor James employs expressions which
can not be reconciled with the breadth of his defini
tion. Toward the end of his volume he says, for
example, " Prayer in this wide sense," "as meaning
every kind of inward communion or conversation
with the power recognized as divine," "is the very
soul and essence of religion."1 By prayer, as he
further explains, he understands "no vain exercise
of words, no mere repetition of certain sacred form
ulae, but the very movement itself of the soul, put
ting itself in a personal relation of contact with the
mysterious power of which it feels the presence."
Concerning this language it is to be observed that
when the expressions "communion," "conversa
tion," "personal relation," etc., are employed, the
personality of the religious object is tacitly as
sumed. Now if prayer requires a personal object,
and if prayer "is the very soul and essence of re
ligion," we ought to conclude that religion requires
a personal object. In fact, the word "power," as
employed here, has quite a different value from the
unequivocally impersonal "force," and seems to
imply intelligence and will.

The foregoing discussion is calculated perhaps to
create the impression that there prevails great di
versity of opinion as to the nature of religion. A
survey of the definitions of other philosophers and
scholars than those cited would at first deepen this
impression. A careful analysis, however, would
show that opinions, though by no means exhibiting
unanimity, are not so various as the language em
ployed in different definitions seems to indicate.
Many of the so-called definitions were never intended

1 P. 464.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 237

to be scientific statements. Such, for example, is
Matthew Arnold's characterization of religion as
"morality touched with emotion." Others state
merely what a writer accepts in place of religion,
and are not seriously meant to describe " religion "
at all; as Kenan's profession of faith: "My religion
is now as ever the progress of reason, in other words
the progress of science." Still others are attempts
to define religion, or some aspect of it, in terms of
a particular system of philosophy, and do not nec
essarily imply a repudiation of all other formulated
statements. In this sense we are to take Hegel's
language, when he says that religion is "The knowl
edge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as
absolute mind." It would evidently be a mistake
to suppose that every variation in the phraseology
employed when speaking of religion represents a
fundamental difference of conception.

Since historical, comparative, and psychological
studies in religion were begun in a scientific spirit,
there has been in fact very notable progress toward
substantial agreement as to what it is that we are
to call religion. In his book on "The Study of Re
ligion," Professor Jastrow has taken pains to trace
carefully the historical development of thought on
this subject, and finds that, while there is no una
nimity as to the origin of religion, there is now gen
eral agreement on the following points: (1) There is
a connection of some kind between religion and life ;
(2) One element of religion is the feeling of de
pendence upon a Power or Powers beyond man's
control; (3) The votaries of religion attempt to
establish proper relations between themselves and
the higher Power or Powers; and (4) Religion mani-

238 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

fests a tendency toward organization. It will be
observed that the word " Powers " is here employed,
and that, as we remarked above, it ought to imply
personal qualities. If " Powers, " when used in con
nection with this subject, does not mean personal
Powers, it does not mean anything.

Kant's words are as true now as they were when
first written: "The conception 'God' is generally
understood to mean, not merely a blindly-operating
eternal nature, as the root of things, but a supreme
being that is regarded as the originator of things
by virtue of intelligence and freedom; and more-
over this conception is the only one that can interest
us'n No one will suspect the late Mr. Sidgwick
of viewing this matter from any other than a purely
rational standpoint. We may be permitted to quote
his well chosen words: "God as the object of re
ligious thought and worship," — he is evidently
thinking of highly developed monotheistic religions,
and of Christianity in particular as the final
products of the religious consciousness, — ' ' is thought
of as having a Righteous will, the content of which,
so far as it relates to man, is partially apprehended
by man under the form of rules of duty; He is
thought of as standing to human beings in a relation
fitly symbolized by the relation of a father to his
children; He is thought of as source of aid and
strength in the never-ending struggle with sin, which

1Kritik d. r. V., Elementarlehre, 7, Abschnitt. — "Da
man unter dem Begriffe von Gott nicht etwa bloss eine
blindwirkende ewige Natur, als die Wurzel der Dinge,
sondern ein hochstes Wesen, das durch Verstand und
Freiheit der Urheber der Dinge sein soil, zu verstehen
gewohnt ist, und auch dieser Begrifl allein uns interessirt,
so konnte man, nach der Strenge, dem Deisten alien Glau-
ben an Gott absprechen ..."

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 239

forms an essential element of the higher moral life;
finally He is thought of as centre and sovereign of
a spiritual kingdom of which human beings are or
may be members."1 Indeed it must be admitted,
whether we accept his general philosophical stand
point or not, that Romanes expresses no more than
the truth, when he says: "To speak of the Religion
of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Re
ligion of Humanity, and so forth, where the per
sonality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as
unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a
triangle, or the rationality of the equator."2

2. The Religious Consciousness and Spinoza's
Conception of God.

If religion necessarily postulates (explicitly or
implicitly) a personal object, Spinoza's system is not
difficult to classify. Our investigations have shown
that his "God" is in no sense a personal being. The
metaphysical attributes of his absolute are the
same, to be sure, as those ascribed by traditional
theology to the God of religion. It is self-existent,
eternal, infinite, unchangeable, the first cause. But
these characters can be predicated with perfect pro
priety of the ultimate reality as conceived in avow
edly anti-religious systems, even of the "matter"
of old-time materialism. In addition to the attri
butes just named, Spinoza mentions, it is true, one
other, which sounds quite religious; he says his sub
stance possesses "perfection." But by this term,
as we have found, he means only infinitude. These
purely metaphysical attributes, singly or collectively,

1 "Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations," p. 39.
3 Thoughts on Religion, p. 41.

240 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

have in themselves no significance whatever for the
religious consciousness. In order to constitute a re
ligious object, they would have to be associated
with personal qualities. But all such Spinoza ex
pressly repudiates when he deprives the Absolute
of purpose, volition, and knowledge. There is no
escape from calling his system atheism. The name
will be thought a compliment by some, a reproach by
others. We employ the term with no desire to imply
either praise or blame, but only for the sake of clear
ness. Whether Spinoza's atheism is practically
inferior or superior to religion, and whether it is
theoretically less true or more true, are questions
which we are not called upon to decide; but that it
is not religion, is sufficiently clear. So far from
being the religious philosopher par excellence, which
he is often supposed to be, he represents the dia
metrically opposite spirit and world-view.

It should not be overlooked that his conception
of the world is not even compatible with that
modern pseudo-religion called "the worship of Na
ture.'7 The doctrine of evolution, so dominant in
the thought of the present generation, which views
the world in all its aspects as in process of develop
ment toward higher forms and better conditions,
contains two elements that are agreeable to the
healthy religious consciousness. One element is its
teleology and the other its optimism, — both implying
a certain kind and degree of personification. Evo
lutionism, when looked at in this way, is well calcu
lated to kindle in some minds a devotion to nature
which becomes a sort of substitute for religion. But
Spinoza's system contains neither teleology nor opti
mism. The universe is not regarded as moving to-

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 241

ward any goal, much less toward a higher and
better one. For him it is simply actual. Not only
are the predicates "high" and "low," "good" and
"bad," inapplicable to his cosmos, but the idea of
development is foreign to his thought. He is not an
evolutionist ; he is not an optimist ; he is not a pes
simist ; he is an actualist. It is proper to observe at
this place that, although frequently charged with
being an atheist, Spinoza never really denied the
charge. He was embarrassed, provoked, and
alarmed by it, to be sure ; for, — be it said to the re
proach of the age in which he lived, — he was fully
aware of the trouble which a reputation for athe
ism would bring upon him. Accordingly, he earnestly
protested against the name; but, as his language
clearly indicates, it was to the opprobrious impli
cations of the word as then used, to its Beigeschmack,
that he objected, and not to its real meaning. When
Velthuysen examined the " Theologico-Political
Treatise," and pronounced its author an atheist,
Spinoza answered the critic in a letter to Oosten
by saying: "Atheists are accustomed excessively
to seek honors and riches, which I have always
despised, as all who are acquainted with me know."1

It is clear that he here refutes not the charge of
atheism, but the charge of sordid ambition and ava
rice. His critic had said that "in order to shun the
fault of superstition, he seems to me to have cast off
all religion." Replying to this, Spinoza says: "What
he means by religion and by superstition, I know not.
But I ask, Does that one cast off all religion who
maintains that God is to be recognized as the highest
good, and as such is to be loved with a free mind?

'Epis. 43, (olim 49), p. 347.

242 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

And that in this alone consists our supreme happiness
and freedom ? And further that the reward of virtue
is virtue itself, but the punishment of folly and
weakness is folly itself? And then that everyone
should love his neighbor and obey the commands of
the constituted authorities?"1 With the exception of
the words with which he refers to "God," these in
dignant questions are irrelevant; for it was not as
serted that he taught immorality, but that he was
an atheist.2 And even the language with which he
refers to "God" is relevant only in so far as the
word is understood in its theistic sense, and is
not thought with the content put into it by Spinoza.
In calling him an atheist, — if he used the term in its
real sense as implying simply an anti-religious theory
of the world, with no reflections on personal
character, — Velthuysen gave Spinoza a title to
which, in a less intolerant age, he himself would not
have objected. Of the title "God-intoxicated phi
losopher," he would certainly have been ashamed.

To those who have never had occasion to study
Spinoza at first hand, and are accustomed to hear
him referred to as a religious mystic, the result
which we have reached will seem strange indeed.
The mistaken conception of the man and of his phil-

1 Epis. 43, Opera II, 348.

2 One of Velthuysen's sentences does seem to insinuate
that the author (whom apparently he does not know) of
the Theologico-Political Treatise is probably immoral:
"Cujus gentis ille sit, aut quod vitae institutum sequatur,
me fugit, etiam nihil interest id scire." (Epis. 42).
This, with the prevalent assumption that atheistic doctrine
is necessarily immoral, justifies, of course, Spinoza's
reference to his own life and his vindication of the moral
character of his teaching; but this vindication of the
practical soundness of his views does not constitute a
repudiation of theoretical atheism.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 243

osophy, which is as common as it is remarkable, is
due not simply to his misleading use of language,
but to several other circumstances, one of which is
the patent fact that formally his system has much in
common with the most intensely religious concep
tions of the world. According to him the ulitmate
reality is an immanent cause,1 in a certain sense
therefore, omnipresent. It needed only to be mis
taken for a living self-consciousness, in order to be
come a religious object of the most perfect kind.
It is quite intelligible, therefore, that in the Eight
eenth Century, when Deism had effected an artificial
separation between God and the world, and had
created a shallow religious consciousness, Spinoza's
philosophy seemed to some essentially religious.
The reaction against the irreligious world-view of
Deism prepared an enthusiastic reception for the
newly-discovered antithetical one presented by Spi
noza, although in its real meaning this was irreligious
also. I say newly-discovered, for Spinoza's phil
osophy, which on account of its atheism had been
neglected for a hundred years and, if read at all,
had been read in the closet and had never been men
tioned except sotto voce, burst on the intellect of the
waning Eighteenth Century like a new revelation.
By interpreting it in the sense of their own needs,
men like Herder, who were dominated by religious
and aesthetic interests, found in it everything which
they missed in the current philosophy. In Spinoza's
doctrine they thought they met again the God "in
whom we live and move and have our being. ' ' Even
Jakobi, who was clear-headed enough to recognize

1 Although his doctrine of immanence is not entirely
consistent, as we have seen.

244 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

unqualifiedly Spinoza's atheism, once permitted
himself to say, notwithstanding his strong religious
bias, that it would be stupidity to prefer certain
"theistic" systems to ''the infinitely more religious
atheism of a Spinoza."1

Another circumstance that prevented the system
from being universally recognized in its true char
acter as atheism in an age when atheist was an
abusive epithet implying moral turpitude, is the
philosopher's freedom from sordid passions, and the
coincidence of many of his practical doctrines with
those of Christianity. He inculcates the love of
men (in his own sense), and censures ambition, in
temperance, love of money, etc., as earnestly as do
the Christian Scriptures. But his teaching has quite
other grounds. For him the vices named are follies
and vanities, partly because they are clearly seen
to be the cause of more injury than advantage to
the individual, and partly because they do not appeal
to one whose only interest is knowledge, — for the
pursuit of knowledge is for him the highest activity
of man. In Spinoza's view, therefore, these things
are follies and vanities only; for religion (Chris
tianity) they are not only follies and vanities, but
sins; they contradict the will and character of a
postulated divine person.

While his practical maxims have thus their points
of contact with religious ethics, they present also
many points of contrast, — a fact not generally recog
nized outside of philosophical circles, and that be
cause the only words of his commonly quoted are
those which, in their prima facie value, seem to ex
press Christian ideas. One fundamental and all-

1 Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, pp. 86-87.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 245

pervading difference between Spinoza's ethics and
religious ethics lies in the fact that in Spinoza's
teaching emotional elements are quite supplanted
by rational insight. For the question before us,
it is a matter of little consequence that Spinoza's
practical maxims are often identical with those of
Christianity. All systems of morality substantially
agree in regard to what we should do and leave
undone in practical life ; they notably differ only in
regard to the ultimate grounds which they offer for
moral conduct. Schopenhauer has well said: "To
preach morality is easy; to ground morality is dif
ficult," and "In all times much and good morality
has been preached; but its rational grounding has
always been in a bad plight." For the sake of
showing more clearly the relation of Spinoza's
ethics to the ethics of religion, and for the sake of
verifying the conclusion to which we have been
compelled by a study of Spinoza's idea of "God,"
we now turn to a critical examination of those con
ceptions which have often been mistaken for ex
pressions of religious mysticism.

PART II.

PARTICULAR DOCTRINES

AND EXPRESSIONS SUPPOSED TO

IMPLY RELIGIOUS VIEWS

AND INTEREST

CHAPTER I.
"THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD."

The reader who has had the patience to follow us
thus far will not be surprised to learn that Spinoza 's
doctrine of the intellectual love of God, like many
other conceptions of his system, is involved in ob
scurities and contradictions. To trace all these out
in detail, would lead us into tedious digressions.1
For our purpose it will be sufficient to determine
simply what Spinoza meant. The expression itself,
as well as the language employed in deducing it,
were evidently determined by the desire to commend
to the favor of a prejudiced public a non-religious
doctrine by clothing it in language redolent of re
ligious associations. Spinoza's treatment of Amor
Dei intellectualis and of the "eternity of the soul"
presents, in fact, characteristic examples of his
practical application of the maxim commended by
him to all those who would propagate philosophical
truth r Ad captum vulgi loqui, et ilia omnia operari,
quae nihil impedimenti adferunt, quo minus nostrum
scopum attingamus. Nam non parum emolumenti
ab eo possumus acquirer e, modo ipsius captui} quan
tum fieri potest, concedamus', adde, quod tali modo
arnicas praebebunt aures ad veritatem audiendam.2

1 Anyone desiring to consult a brief account of how this
doctrine is related to the rest of Spinoza's system is re
ferred to a monograph by C. Liillman "Ueber den Begriff
Amor Dei intellectualis bei Spinoza," — Jena, 1884. On
the whole this treatise is a sufficiently clear and accurate
presentation of the subject.

2 De Intellectus Emendatione, p. 6.

250 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

This maxim, as was natural, controlled him at some
times more than at others, according to his varying
moods and the varying tone of his environment.
That the Fifth Part of the ''Ethics," which treats
chiefly of Amor Dei intellectualis, should exhibit a
maximum amount of religious language employed
in an accommodated sense, is perhaps due to the
fact that this last Part was hastily written at the
time when his " Theologico-Political Treatise" was
being assailed most violently as the work of a
dangerous atheist.1 How distressing was the pros
pect of strife may be inferred from the fact that,
when he came to face the immediate venture, he
changed his mind and deferred publication indefi
nitely.

His definition of Amor Dei intellectualis is given
in Eth. V, 32, cor.: ''From the third kind of knowl
edge arises necessarily the intellectual love of God.
For from this kind of knowledge arises joy accom
panied by the idea of God as cause, that is the love
of God not as he is presented by the imagination,
but as perceived by the intellect to be eternal; and
this is what I call the intellectual love of God."

The third kind of knowledge (scientia intuitiva),
it will be remembered, is that which "proceeds from
the adequate idea of the real essence of certain attri
butes of God to the adequate knowledge of the es-
sense of things. ' '2 It is assumed to be an immediate
insight into the causal relation that obtains between
a particular thing and its ultimate ground (the at
tributes of substance), and hence to involve a knowl
edge of the constitution of the thing. In other

1 See above p. 36.

2 Eth. II, 40, sch. 2.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD 251

words, it is the vision of things in relation to their
first cause. With this kind of knowing "the intel
lectual love of God" is preeminently associated,
though Spinoza does not here, or elsewhere, assert,
what would be without logical justification, that
intuition is the only kind of knowing which condi
tions a "love of God." Indeed he generally assumes
that all adequate knowledge should be accompanied
by this result.

If, in his exposition of the intellectual love of God,
he did not quote1 the above-given definition of in
tuition, according to which it is limited to the discov
ery of the nature (or essence) of particular things;
and, if he did not in this connection emphasize this
distinctive characteristic,2 we should naturally sup
pose that here he consciously uses the term in a
wider sense as applying to the mere recognition of
all existing objects as modes of the absolute attri
butes. If we limited it to a knowledge of the essences
of particular things, we should be logically com
pelled to regard the intellectual love of God which
accompanies intuition as a fiction, or, at most, as
something conceived as merely possible. For he
confesses elsewhere that the things he himself has
learned by the third kind of cognition are "ex
tremely few" (perpauca), and we know that there
were none. But if he never gained any knowledge
by intuition, he never experienced the particular
kind or degree of intellectual love of God which he

1Eph. V, 25, dem.

3Eth. V, 36, schol. — "Quod hie notare operae pretium
duxi, ut hoc exemplo ostenderem, quam rerum singu-
larium cognitio, quam intuitivam sive tertii generis ap-
pellavi, polleat, potiorque sit cognitione universal!, quam
secui)di generis esse dixi.

252 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

associates with that kind of knowledge. It is evi
dent, therefore, that, notwithstanding his references
to the concise definition previously given of the third
kind of knowing, his thought about it here is ex
tremely vague.

Recognizing that the scientia intuitiva is not the
only condition of the intellectual love of God, but is
(or might be) its most suitable condition, this "love"
may be described as the joy experienced in an act of
cognition, provided this joy is accompanied by the
knowledge of "God" as its cause. The definition is
justified by referring to Part III, definition 6, where
love in general (amor) is defined as "joy accompa
nied by the idea of an external cause."1 It will be
observed that amor, thus defined, does not answer
to the specific meaning which usage has attached to
the English word "love." This can appropriately
be employed only with reference to a personal ob
ject. But Spinoza's definition of amor does not in
any way imply that it is an attitude toward persons,
and hence he is entirely consistent in speaking of
amor toward the impersonal aggregate of attributes
which he has seen fit to call "God." It must be
recognized, however, that with equal consistency,
and indeed with eminent propriety, he could speak
of the love of a triangle ; for, in solving a problem
in geometry, it is quite possible to experience a
mental joy accompanied by the idea of that figure
as its cause.

In order to appreciate fully the precise value of
Spinoza's expression "idea of God as cause," it is

1 The absence of the word "external" from the defini
tion of the love of God, is not without logical signifi
cance in his total account of the doctrine.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD 253

necessary to recall just what he understands by a
knowledge of God. He has already told us that
''The human mind has an adequate knowledge of
the eternal and infinite essence of God,"1 —
an assertion that is proved by referring to
preceding propositions where it has been shown that
"every idea of every body, or actually existing thing,
necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence
of God ;"2 inasmuch as every existing thing is a mode
(a particular sample) of one or both of the universal
properties extension and thought, which are attri
butes of the absolute substance and hence by defi
nition constitute "the essence of the same."3 Or,
to employ his own language, "Particular things can
not be conceived without God ; but, because they have
for their cause God in so far as he is considered
under the attribute of which the things in question
are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve the
conception of the attribute of those things, i. e., the
eternal and infinite essence of God."4 It neces
sarily follows, of course, that "the infinite essence of
God and his eternity are known to all men,"5 and
that this knowledge is as clear as that of a triangle.6
To have the idea of God as the cause of the joy ex
perienced in a given act of knowledge, therefore, is
simply to recognize the immediate object as de-
ducible from the absolute reality, i. e., when ex
pressed in ultimate terms, to recognize it as a mode
of extension or of thought.

'Eth. II, 47.

2Eth. II, 45.

3Eth. I, def. 4.

4 Eth. II, 45, dem.

5Eth. II, 47, schol.

8Epis. 56 (olim 60), p. 378.

254 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

The "particular things" that involve the idea of
God may, of course, be bodies, or thoughts, or af
fects (affecti). In regard to the last it is said that
"he who clearly and distinctly understands himself
and his affects, loves God, and by so much the more
as he more understands himself and his affects;"1
which is circumstantially demonstrated as follows:
"There is no affection of the body, of which the
mind may not form some clear and distinct concep
tion (prop. 4, Part V.) ;" but, as "whatever is, is in
God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
God (prop. 15, Part I.)," it is evident that in form
ing a clear and distinct conception of any affection,
we may relate — in fact, must relate — that affection
to "God," i. e., if conceived as a mere bodily affec
tion, to the attribute of extension, or, if conceived
as both physical and psychical, to the attributes
of extension and thought together. But in clear and
distinct knowledge the mind experiences an augmen
tation of its power and perfection, and this is what
has been defined as joy (prop. 9, schol. and prop. 53,
Part III.). Finally the joy of clear and distinct
knowledge of any affection, — being necessarily ac
companied by the idea of the attribute under which
the affection is conceived and of which it is a con
sequence, or, in other words, by the "idea of God," —
is referred ultimately to "God;" and, as joy accom
panied by the idea of a cause is what we mean by
love, this is the "love of God."2 The circumstance
that the affect may be an unworthy one and must
nevertheless, according to the logic of Spinoza's rea-

1Eth. V, 15.

2 We have supplied the contents of the references con
tained in the demonstration.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD 255

soning, be the proximate object of love, should not
disconcert us ; for any affect considered as an object
of knowledge, is a cause of joy and hence a proper
object of "intellectual" love. Elsewhere he has con
sistently observed that "the affects of hatred, anger,
envy, etc., considered in themselves, result from the
same necessity and efficacy of nature as do other
particular things; and hence are due to certain
causes through which they are understood, and pos
sess certain properties no less worthy of our knowl
edge than are the properties of any other thing, in
the mere contemplation of which we take delight."1

The "intellectual love of God," therefore, when
stripped of its religious associations and defined in
terms of its equivalents as expressly given by Spi
noza himself, turns out to be, not an affection felt for
a self-conscious and responsive being, as has some
times been naively assumed, but only the mental
joy experienced in cognitive processes, together with
such valuation of the object of knowledge condi
tioning the joy as is appropriate to that experience ;
in other words, it is nothing but delight in the in
telligible as intelligible. For him "Truth is God,
and God is truth,"2 in the sense that adequately
known reality, whatever it may be, is the only God
he recognizes. The matter of supreme value is not
the object, but adequate knowledge of it. This is
called "love" not because in his own experience, or
in the possible experience of any human being who
clearly accepts his metaphysical system, there is any-

1 Eth. Ill, Introductory paragraph. Cf. Tractatus
Politicus, p. 270. The italics are ours.

3Korte Verhandeling, II, Cap. 15. — " . . . dat God de
Waarheid, of dat de Waarheid God zelve is." Cf. II,
Cap. 5.

256 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

thing that really resembles love (which would be a
psychological impossibility), but because the word,
when conjoined with "God" brings his doctrine into
verbal harmony with religion. That it is not the ob
ject which is valued, but the experience of knowl
edge, appears from the equivalents of the intellectual
love of God; for it is in fact but one of several
titles for the summum bonum. In the "Theologico-
political Treatise," he says: "Since the better part
of us is our intellect, it is certain, if we wish truly to
seek our advantage, that we should endeavor above
all to perfect it as much as possible ; for in its per
fection must consist our summum bonum. Moreover,
since all our knowledge and the certainty that re
moves every doubt depend solely on the knowledge
of God, — in the first place, because without God [ab
solute thought and extension] nothing can be or be
conceived; in the second place, because we are able
to doubt concerning all things so long as we have no
clear and distinct idea of God [thought and exten
sion as the ground from which all nature results by
an invariable necessity], — it follows that our sum-
mum bonum and perfection depend solely on the
knowledge of God."1 Here it is the possession of
knowledge that is called our summum bonum ; and
God is to be known only because he is the key to all
other knowledge. It is but a variation of the same
thought when, in the paragraph from which we have
quoted, he identifies the knowledge of God with the
knowledge of "natural things," and adds: "And so
all our knowledge, i. e., our summum bonum, not only
depends on God, but consists altogether in the same."
In other passages the highest good is said to consist
'Chap. IV, (Opera, II, p. 3).

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OP GOD 257

in the experience of cognition, "in sola speculatione
et pura mente."* Sometimes, however, knowledge
or "the knowledge of God" (of our environment),
is regarded as a means to the ulterior end of a
righteous (genuinely prudent and advantageous)
life. As these inconsistencies are the result of view
ing the same thing, knowledge, in different relations
to our total experience, we need not take them very
seriously. It is sufficiently clear that, according to
Spinoza, man's supreme good is knowledge; which,
because it must have nature in some aspect for its
object, is brought into verbal harmony with re
ligion by the title "intellectual love of God."

We are now in a position to estimate that saying
of Spinoza's which so deeply impressed Goethe:1
"He who loves God cannot presume that God love
him in return."2 The proof of this proposition con
sists in the circumstance that God (as absolute)
"loves no one," and that he who should wish to be
loved by God would thereby wish that God were not
God, which would be an inconsistency. That the
saying should impress Goethe, or any uncritical
reader, as an expression of sublimely unselfish re
ligious devotion, is not surprising ; but when read in
the light shed upon it by Spinoza's own lamp, it is
found to be entirely devoid of religious significance.
It may justly be taken, however, as an appropriate
expression of Spinoza's passionate devotion to truth
as truth; for the one who loves God, in his sense of
the term, has no other interest than to know
reality as it is, be it good or bad, beautiful or ugly.

* Chap. IV, (Opera, II, p. 4).

1 Aus Meinem Leben, 14 Buch, (Hendel's edition, p.
541).
2Eth. V, 19 and dem.

258 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

By way of qualification of what has been said
above, it ought to be remarked that in the "Short
Treatise" stress is laid upon the quality of the ob
ject as conditioning love. "True love" says he in a
characteristic passage, "always springs from the
knowledge that the thing is glorious and good.
What else then can follow but that it cannot become
more ardent toward any one than toward the Lord
our God? For he alone is glorious and the perfect
good."1 When he says here that love requires
particular qualities in the object, he is quite correct ;
but this is a way of speaking which he abandons in
the "Ethics." In advance of careful study, this
circumstance would naturally be explained by sup
posing that, whatever may be thought of Spinoza's
final attitude, the "Short Treatise" represents a
time when he certainly possessed a genuine re
ligious interest. If we cannot accept this explana
tion, it is not because either a theist's antipathy or
an atheist's admiration impels us arbitrarily to di
vest Spinoza, even in his youth, of all appreciation
for religion; but because neither in the extant bio
graphical data, nor in the early work itself, can we
find anything that justifies the hypothesis. It seems
to us to owe its currency to nothing better than
na'ivete and prejudice in about equal parts. When
we penetrate beneath the surface of his language to
its real content, as defined by himself, we discover
that the seeming religiousness is not meaning, but
phraseology. We have seen that here more ex
plicitly, if possible, than anywhere else he has de
prived the Absolute of all personal qualities, exclud
ing even the cognitive consciousness; for among the

1 Korte Verhandeling, II, Cap. 5, ad. fin.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD 259

attributes which "do not belong to God"1 are "will,"
"intellect," ' ' omniscence. " In the "Short Treat
ise," as in the "Ethics," the object of "love" pos
sesses no properties which, psychologically speaking,
can condition love;2 and so we are compelled to re
gard the religious phraseology of the early work as
also due to a desire to commend to favor his pro
posed substitute for religion by clothing it in the
language of religious devotion. That, here more
frequently than in the "Ethics," he employs ex
pressions that are glaringly inconsistent with the
defined character of the object, is to be explained
by the circumstance that the "Short Treatise" ex
hibits his first and more awkward attempts at de
scribing a non-religious system in terms of religion.
It would be possible to suppose that his language
represents a genuine religious interest, and is seri
ously intended to express such, only on the assump
tion that his conception of the Absolute was at this
time still so unclear to himself that he tacitly read
into it the qualities of which he expressly deprived
it; but this is an impossible assumption; for, how
ever numerous the obscurities and inconsistencies of
his system in its details, there is, even in this early
work, no unclearness and uncertainty in his thought
about the general character of fundamental reality.
That while composing it he was under great con
straint to clothe his novel ideas in religious phrase
ology, we may infer from his apprehension that even

1 Kort. Verhand. I, Cap. 7.

2 The positive qualities of "God" which he specifies as
constituting Him a proper object of "love" turn out to
be only different aspects of the changeless necessity of
nature, or of the absoluteness of nature. See Kort. Ver
hand. II, Cap. 14 and I, Cap. 6.

260 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

the young friends to whom he was confidentially to
entrust the manuscript might be startled by his doc
trine, and that the public would be provoked to dis
agreeable, perhaps dangerous, opposition, if his work
were freely circulated. In the closing paragraph he
begs his friends ''not to be astonished at these
novelties," reminding them that truth does not cease
to be truth because it is accepted by few ; and adds :
"And, on account of the character of the age in
which we live, of which you are not ignorant, I will
earnestly entreat you to exercise great care in com
municating these things to others."1

We have called "the intellectual love of God"
Spinoza's substitute for religion. From this char
acterization, however, it must not be inferred
that he believed it could ever become a general pos
session. In any efficacious degree, it can be pos
sessed only by the select few, the metaphysicians,
who, being emancipated from the imagination and
the emotions, view all things in the colorless light of
reason. He did not share the hope occasionally ex
pressed in recent times, that knowledge will some
day become so widely diffused that men in general
will rise above religion and then do from rational
insight what they now do from faith. The ideas of
development in general and of social progress in
particular, which have so deeply taken hold of the
modern mind, are foreign to Spinoza's thought. He
had little faith in the "masses.'7 He assumes that
they must always remain incapable of a genuine and
efficacious intellectual love of God. His chief work
concludes with the following significant words: "If
now the way which I have shown to lead to these

1 Opera, III, p. 97.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD 261

things seems very difficult (perardua), it can never
theless be discovered. And difficult indeed must
that be which is so rarely found. For if salvation
were ready at hand and could be found without
much labor, how could it happen that it would be
neglected by almost all men? But all excellent
things are as difficult as they are rare. ' '* In the un
finished "Political Treatise," he expresses the same
thought : ' ' We have seen that the way which reason
teaches is very difficult; hence those who persuade
themselves that the multitude, or men distracted by
public business, can be induced to live solely ac
cording to the dictates of reason, are dreaming of
the poets' golden age or of a fabulous tale."1 For
Spinoza also, many are called, but few are chosen!

This subject ought not to be dismissed without a
reference to the interesting ways in which he uses the
Amor Dei intellectualis, in order to deduce from it
verbal imitations of still other religious conceptions.
He affirms that "God loves himself with an infinite
intellectual love,"2 and that the mind's intellectual
love to God is the very love of God, with which God
loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so
far as he is able to be expressed by the essence of
the human mind, considered under the form of
eternity, i. e., the mind's intellectual love to God is
a part of the infinite love with which God loves him
self."3 From this it follows as a corollary that
"God, in so far as he loves himself, loves men, and
consequently that God's love to men and the mind's

* Eth. V, 42, schol.

1 Tractatus-Politicus, Cap. I, (Opera, I, p. 271).

aEth. V, 35.

8 Eth. V, 36.

262 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

intellectual love to God, are one and the same

After having just been told, consistently with
what we have found to be Spinoza's conception of
the Absolute, that "God properly speaking loves no
one,"2 the reader naturally finds this language per
plexing. But when it is remembered that Spinoza
employs the word "God" in two distinct senses,
now for the Absolute (Natura Naturans) and now
for total reality including all modes (Natura Natu
rans and Natura Naturata — possibly sometimes also
for Natura Naturata alone), the contradiction is
seen to be only a verbal one. "God loves himself
with an infinite love," because (says the demonstra
tion) he is by definition absolutely infinite, and
hence, as reality and perfection mean the same
thing, his "nature" enjoys infinite perfection, and
that accompanied by the idea of himself; for, ac
cording to the principle of parallelism, there is in
God an idea of his essence and an idea of every
thing that results from his essence; that is to say,
God's enjoyment of infinite perfection is accom
panied by the idea of himself as cause (for he is
causa sui) • and this is what is called intellectual
love.3 This language means no more than that all
modes, which together constitute the Natura Natu
rata, have "minds,"4 and the sum of these consti
tute the Intellectus Infinitus, the sum of the in
tellectual love of separate minds being the infinite

lEth. V, 36, Cor.

'Eth. V, 17, Cor.

8 1 have paraphrased the demonstration, completing it
by writing in the content of the references contained in
It.

* See page 66.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OP GOD 263

intellectual love with which God (as Natura Natu-
rata) loves himself (as Natura Naturata and Natura
Naturans). This interpretation does not, of course,
set the proposition and demonstration free from all
difficulties and bring them into harmony with
everything else in his system, and no interpretation
can do so j1 for his ideas here are involved in the un-
clearness of his thought concerning the Intellectus
Infinitus and other conceptions ; but that this is what
he means is placed beyond doubt by his oft-repeated
declaration that God (the Absolute) cannot love and
has no intellect, and by the close connection of this
proposition with the two following.

The meaning of the second proposition, namely,
that "the mind's intellectual love to God is the very
love of God, with which God loves himself, not in so
far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is able to be
expressed by the essence of the human mind, con<
sidered under the form of eternity, etc.," is already
sufficiently evident. The expression "under the
form of eternity" simply limits the subject of in
tellectual love to the rational part of the mind as
distinguished from the imagination ; and so we have
the very obvious statement that man as a part of
God (Natura Naturata) loves God (Natura Naturata,
Natura Naturans, or both), i. e., that God loves

1 The verbal consistency of the demonstration is due to
his use of the same expressions in different senses.
After God is proved to be "absolutely infinite" by a ref
erence to the definition of God in which the word is taken
in the sense of the Absolute only, the word is then em
ployed in the sense of God as including Natura Naturata
and therewith the human mind. It is not God as causa
sui that has the idea of God as causa sui', this idea is
possessed by God in so far as He is not causa sui, i. e.,
in so far as the name may by accommodation be applied
to a definite mode, the human mind.

264 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

God. But Spinoza's demonstration is quite circum
stantial. Instead of saying, as he might have done,
that in rationally cognizing objects in general the
mind experiences joy accompanied by the idea of
God as cause, and that this "intellectual love of
God" possessed by man as a part of God (Natura
Naturata) is a part of the infinite intellectual love
with which God loves himself, he selects for the pur
poses of the demonstration that particular intellect
ual love which arises from the mind's contemplation
of itself. The mind's love, he says, must be referred
to the active functions of the mind as distinguished
from the passive, because it is an experience of joy,
the sign of proper activity,1 and because it is ade
quate knowledge, which is also a sign of activity.2
It is therefore the activity with which the mind
contemplates himself accompanied by the idea of
the contemplation of any other object under the
form of eternity, involves the idea of God (sub
stance) as the necessary ground of its existence.3
Now, as particular things — to which class of things
the human mind belongs — are only modes of the
attributes of God, and as when we say "that the
human mind perceives this or that we say nothing
else than that God, not as infinite,4 but in so far as he
is expressed by the nature of the human mind, has
this or that idea;"5 it follows that the mind's con
templation of itself is the activity with which God,
in so far as he can be expressed by the human mind,

lEth. V, 32, Cor. 2 Eth. Ill, 3.

* Eth. V, 32, dem. and cor. Cf. prop. 30, dem.

* Notice that "infinite" is here used to contrast God as
absolute with "God" as natura naturata, while in V, 35,
dem. the predicate is applied to "God" as including na
tura naturata.

'Eth. II, 11, Cor.

THE INTELLECTUAL, LOVE OP GOD 265

contemplates himself accompanied by the idea of
himself; and so this love of the mind's is a part of
the infinite love with which God loves himself.1

It will be observed that, although the subject of
the intellectual love is clearly the human mind (God
in so far, etc.), the object of it is supposed to be God
the Absolute. The double sense of the word, how
ever, enables Spinoza to assume for the purposes of
the corollary which follows, that the object also is
only the human mind.2 The corollary states "that
God, in so far as he loves himself, loves men, and
consequently that God's love to men and the mind's
intellectual love to God are one and the same thing."
This is unintelligible unless (1) we take the object
of love to be not God the Absolute, but "God in
so far," etc., i.e., the human mind; and unless
(2) we identify "men" and "the mind," thus
taking mind in the generic sense as embracing
only what is common to all minds. On this condi
tion, we are able to write the following equation:
the mind's love of itself = men's love to men = God's
love to men = God 's love to himself. When God
and man are identified, the corollary becomes simply
a tautology ; and there is no reason for doubting that
this is what it was meant to be.

1 It is not easy to see why Spinoza chose so complicated
a demonstration involving irrelevancies, for a proposition
which needs only to be explained in order to be self-
evident. His selection of the mind as the cognized object
with which to operate may be due to a desire to bring his
exposition into the greatest formal resemblance to re
ligious mysticism.

2 This circumstance causes Martineau to interpret
(mistakenly, I think) the proposition also as wishing to
say no more than that man loves man: — "Objectively, the
self which God loves is the human, considered as also
divine." Study of Spinoza, p. 273.

CHAPTER II.
IMMORTALITY.

While the doctrine of immortality is an essential
part of Christianity and is agreeable to the religious
consciousness in general, there is nothing in the na
ture of the case that renders it indispensable to re
ligion as such. There is no conclusive evidence, it
seems, that even the early Hebrews believed in a
future life. On the other hand, the doctrine is not
incompatible with atheism. Whether it is a religious
doctrine or not, depends on whether it is such as to
imply personal relations with a God. It is these re
lations that constitute religion; and a doctrine of
immortality that does not imply them is not reli
gious doctrine. The question, therefore, whether or
not Spinoza taught the immortality of the soul, is
not, strictly speaking, pertinent to our inquiry. For
considering his conception of God, it is obvious that,
if he did teach immortality, his doctrine was not a
religious one. It is well worth while, however, for
the sake of further light on his modes of thought
and expression, to examine what he has to say on the
subject.

His account of the matter underwent considerable
changes during the period between his first and last
works. In the "Metaphysical Thoughts," where he
considers the question for the first time, the im
mortality of the soul is unequivocally affirmed, as
necessarily following from the nature of the soul as
substance (created substance) : "But since from

IMMORTALITY 267

them [the laws of nature] it clearly follows that a
substance can be destroyed neither by itself nor by
another created substance, as, if I mistake not, we
have already abundantly demonstrated, we are com
pelled to conclude from the laws of nature that the
mind is immortal."1 But as he has warned2 us that
this work contains much that he himself did not be
lieve, we are at a loss to tell in how far his disquisi
tion on immortality was a mere statement of the cur
rent theological argument which he did not consider
valid, and in how far it was an expression of his own
views.

In the "Short Treatise" the immortality of the
soul is affirmed again, but on entirely different
grounds, namely, as resulting from the knowledge
and love of God, and from a consequent union with
him. It is therefore no longer natural, but condi
tional. Doubts as to Spinoza's real interest in the
matter are suggested not only by the general char
acter of this work, seeking everywhere, as it does,
to substitute by an accommodated use of religious
language non-religious for religious conceptions,3
but also by the worthlessness of his reasoning, when
regarded as an argument for individual immortality.
He argues as follows : The soul is naturally the idea
of the body, and is therefore united with the body

'Cog. Met. Cap. XII, p. 229.

2 See page 58.

3 In order to estimate at its true value the "religious
mysticism" of the "Short Treatise," it must be borne in
mind that "God," as absolute thought and extension, is
already without understanding, that Providence is identi
fied with the striving after self-preservation, that the
efficacy of prayer is rejected, that sin is non-existent,
that '"regeneration" becomes simply the awakening of
the philosophical interest, etc., etc.

268 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

in such a way as to depend on it for existence. Hence
when the body changes, the soul changes; when the
body perishes, the soul perishes. This relation be
tween the two is called indifferently the soul's union
with the body and the soul's love of the body. But
both soul and body depend on the Absolute in such a
way that they can neither be nor be conceived with
out him (or it). Now the mind that intuitively
recognizes this relation, the mind that cannot rest
in the conditioned, but by intuition traces everything
back to its ultimate ground, enters into a knowledge
and love of the Absolute which is analogous to the
ordinary union with the body. And as this object
is changeless and eternal, the soul that is "united"
with it is also eternal, and will survive the dissolu
tion of the physical organism.1

This argument consists in the two extraordinary
assumptions, (1) that the connection between the
unconditioned and the conditioned is less real for be
ing unknown, and (2) that the eternity of an ob
ject of knowledge is a proof of the eternity of the
knowing subject.2 The only kind of immortality for
which such reasoning has the semblance of validity,
would be one in which the individual mind, after the
dissolution of the body into the more general modes
of matter, is itself dissolved into the general mind;
for mind which, by virtue of "union with God," sur
vives would be mind as the "idea" of the general
constituents and laws of the universe, as distin
guished from mind as the "idea" of a particular
body.

1 Korte Verhand, II, cap. 23.

8 But similar reasoning appears in Neo-Platonism.

IMMORTALITY 269

Whether, in the "Short Treatise," he seriously
meant to advocate individual immortality or not, it
is impossible to determine with certainty.1 We may
affirm only that, if he did, it was conditional and
partial immortality — an immortality for philosophers
exclusively. His own language reads as follows:

"If we will consider carefully what the soul is, and
from what its change and duration result, we shall easily
see, whether it is mortal or immortal. We have said
that the soul is an idea originating in the res cogitam
from the existence of a thing that is present in nature.
Hence it follows, that according to the duration and
change of the thing, must be the duration and change of
the soul. At the same time, we observed that the soul
may be united either with the body, of which it is the
idea, or with God, without whom it can neither exist nor
be conceived. Wherefore it is easy to see: (1) that, if
united with the body alone, and the body perishes, it must
also perish; for, being deprived of the body, which is the
foundation of its love, it must come to naught therewith;
but (2) that, if it is united with another thing which re
mains immutable, then it will on the contrary have to
remain immutable also."2

In the last chapter of this work appears a different
argument. There it is claimed that "true under
standing" can never perish, for the reason that it
is a consequence of the Absolute, and, as the Abso
lute is changeless and eternal, its consequence must
be eternal also.3 Of this reasoning the same may be
said as of that quoted above, — it is valid for "true
understanding" (adequate ideas) conceived either
as general mind-stuff or as logical content (or con-

1 Sigwart thinks it doubtful whether Spinoza had any
real interest in the subject. Janet concludes that Spi
noza intended to teach personal immortality.

2Korte Verhand. II, Cap. 23.

"Korte Verhand. II, Cap. 26, p. 95.

270 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

fusedly as both at once) ; but is not valid for true
ideas psychologically considered, i. e., as events in
consciousness. Whether by this language Spinoza
meant to assert anything more than the eternity of
truth, is uncertain.

In the ''Ethics" his account of immortality under
goes another modification. It is still the result of a
knowledge of "God," and especially, though not ex
clusively, of an intuitive knowledge. But his ex
press and consistent admission in this work that all
men in some degree have an adequate knowledge
of God (inasmuch as they have an immediate knowl
edge of extension and thought),1 requires that im
mortality be no longer limited to the philosophers,
but extended to all men, though in varying degrees,
according to the proportion of adequate knowledge.
All souls, in so far as they are imagination, perish;
in so far as they are intellect, survive. In the
"Ethics," immortality is partial in the sense that
it applies only to a part of each mind ; in the ' * Short
Treatise," it is partial in the further sense that it
falls to the lot of but few individuals. A significant
difference in terminology also appears ; in the ' ' Short
Treatise" the soul is "immortal," in the "Ethics"
it is never anything else than "eternal."

The passages which present the doctrine in its final
form may be considered to advantage in the order of
Spinoza 's own exposition :

"Prop. 21. — The mind can neither imagine anything
nor remember things past, except while the body lasts."3

1 Eth. II, prop. 47. — "Mens humana adsequatam habet
cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei."

2 Eth. V, prop. 22 and dem.

IMMORTALITY 271

As Spinoza employs "imagination" as a generic
term that covers sense-perception, emotions, and all
non-logical mental operations, it follows as indis
putably certain (1) that according to Spinoza the
mind can acquire no new facts after the dissolution
of the body; (2) that it is no longer the seat of
emotions, and is therefore in a state that lacks the in
terest and value which these impart to life; and (3)
that, as memory vanishes with the body, personal
identity is lost. The mind that survives does not
know that it is the mind that was. Indeed, with
memory gone, it has no means of knowing that it is
itself. We may safely credit Spinoza with sufficient
insight into psychological truths to have been fully
aware of these obvious consequences of the proposi
tion. The immortality promised by him, therefore,
is already seen to be devoid of all religious signifi
cance and of all interest for us. After recognizing
the extent of his negations, no positive determina
tions of the doctrine can be of any importance.
Whatever it may turn out to be, it can not answer to
the meaning of the word ' * immortality, ' ' and to call
it by this name is misleading. Moreover, it is to em
ploy a word which he himself, in his later writings,
studiously avoids. His term is ' ' eternity. ' '

What this eternity of the intellect is, we must learn
from the propositions immediately following:

"Prop. 22. — Yet in God [somewhere] there Is neces
sarily an idea which expresses the essence of this and that
human body under the form of eternity.

"Dem. — God is the cause not only of the existence, but
also of the essence of this and that human body; which
essence must therefore necessarily be conceived through
the very essence of God, and that by a certain eternal

272 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

necessity; but this conception must necessarily be in God
(since whatever is, is in God)."1

The language here employed means only that the
human body, like every other particular thing, has
two aspects. In one aspect it is changing, temporal,
transient; in the other, in its essence or definable
nature, it is eternal. This or that body, as a phenom
enal existence at a particular time and place, dis
appears; but as an eternal essence, i. e., as consti
tuted of certain elements and laws that have their
ground in the eternal nature of matter, or, if you
will, as participating in those general and perma
nent conditions which form the immediate back
ground of particular existences, it is eternal. In like
manner, "the idea of this or that body," i. e., this
or that mind, has two aspects, one phenomenal, and
the other eternal. In so far as it corresponds to
the essence of its body conceived sub specie aeter-
nitatis (in so far as it corresponds to the body as an
eternal essence) it is also eternal, being as perma
nent and general in its character as is that material
essence.2 It follows, therefore, that

"The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.

"Dem. — There is in God [there exists] necessarily a
conception or idea which expresses the essence of the
human body, and is therefore necessarily something that
belongs to the essence of the human mind. But to the

1 Eth. V, prop. 22 and dem.

2 We have demonstrated that the eternal essences of
particular things are universals. If the essence of "this
and that" body is taken to be individual in character, we
make Spinoza flatly contradict what he has plainly taught
elsewhere. Cf. Eth. I, 17: — "Si unius [hominis] exis-
tentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit; sed si unius
essentia destrui posset, et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam
alterius essentia." See also the way in which "definita

IMMORTALITY 273

human mind we ascribe no duration definable in time, ex
cept in so far as it expresses the body's actual existence
that is explicable by duration and is definable in time;
that is, we do not ascribe duration to the same except
while the body lasts. But since nevertheless there is
something which by a certain eternal necessity is con
ceived through the very essence of God, this something
which belongs to the essence of the mind will necessarily
be eternal.

"Schol. — This idea which expresses the essence of the
body sw& specie aeternitatis, is, as we have said, a cer
tain mode of thinking which belongs to the essence of
the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not pos
sible to remember that we have had existence before the
body, since there are no vestiges of it in the body, and
eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, and has no
relation to time. But nevertheless we apprehend (or
feel)1 and experience that we are eternal. For the mind
apprehends (sentit) no less those things which it conceives
with the understanding than those which it remembers.
For the demonstrations themselves are for the mind eyes
with which it sees and observes things. Although there
fore we do not remember to have existed before the
body, we apprehend (sentimus) nevertheless that our
mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body
sub specie aeternitatis, is eternal, and that this existence
is not definable in terms of time or explicable by dura
tion. Our mind therefore may be said to endure, and its
existence to be defined by a certain time, only in so far
as it involves the actual existence of the body; and in so
far only has it the power of determining the existence of
things in time, and of conceiving them under the cate
gory of duration."2

natura" (essentia) is placed in antithesis to individuals
in Eth. I, 8, schol. 2. It is not necessary to find in Eth.
V, 22 a contradiction to his general doctrine of eternal
essences; and if one chooses to do so, he will only multi
ply difficulties, without being able after all to make Spi
noza teach a genuine immortality.

1 "Sentimus."

2 Eth. V, prop. 23 with dem. and schol.

274 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

The eternity which Spinoza thus sets in sharp con
trast with " duration" and "time," must be under
stood as synonymous with timelessness. The ground
for assuming such a state of being seems to be the
perceived necessity and immutability of logical re
lations.* If his thought was clear, he meant by
the term nothing else than changeless existence.

It might seem that he is describing a mere qual
ity of being, implying no continuance; but I
think we must allow that he means to claim a sur
vival in some sense for a part of the human mind, —
what would seem to be already sufficiently clear from
the wording of the proposition.

The scholium implies, quite consistently, that the
eternal part of the mind existed before the origina
tion of the body in the same way as it continues to
exist after the destruction of the same.1 But in
what way this is, does not at first appear quite ob
vious. In this connection there comes into play Spi
noza's peculiar use of idea, concipere, etc. Primarily
the eternal part of the mind is simply the psychical
double of the eternal essence of the body, and is not
a presentation which has this essence for its content ;
but secondarily, on account of Spinoza's intellectual-
istic psychology, it approximates in his thought the
nature of a (complex) presentation2 in so far that
it becomes a system of truth. The eternity of the
mind which we are said to experience, must not be

* Cf. Eth. V, prop. 29, schol.

»Cf. Eth. V, prop. 31, schol.

2 Note how "concepit" is used in V, prop. 29. "Cor-
poris praesentem actualem existentiam concipit" means
only "possess an idea which is the psychical attendant of
a temporal state of the body." The idea has for its con
tent, not the body, but anything whatever.

IMMORTALITY 275

mistaken for the vague sentiment of the poet or re
ligionist : for Spinoza it is something involved in the
cognitive consciousness. It is, in fact, the percep
tion of the eternity of the content of adequate ideas ;
and this circumstance can be a ground for the sur
vival of the mind only in so far as the mind is identi
fied with adequate ideas, or rather with their logical
content, with truth; which consciously survives only
in the sense that it is re-thought by successive indi
viduals.1 So from one point of view the Intellectus
Infinitus of which the human intellect is a part, is
immutable ; but from another point of view, by rea
son of the coming and going of individual minds, it
is continually changing. In the latter aspect, as we
had occasion to remark in another connection,2 it sug
gests a correspondence with that mode of extension
which he designates as fades totius universi.

This view of Spinoza's doctrine of the "eternity"
of the soul fulfils the legitimate requirements of his
language, and is the only one, it seems, that makes
the doctrine tolerably consistent with the funda
mental postulates of his system. It is confirmed by
other expressions that speak more explicitly than
those considered above. The intellectual love of
God, which is the peculiar possession of the eternal
part of the soul, is, he says, "the most constant of
all affections, and, in so far as it is related to the
body is not able to be destroyed, except with the
body itself. ' '3 So it would seem that this love, which
is no less eternal4 than the intellect, is in some sense

1 Cf. above p. 174.
3Cf. above p. 176.
3 Eth. V, prop. 20, schol.

* Eth. V, prop. 34, cor. — Hinc sequitur, nullum amorem
praeter amorem intellectualem esse aeternum.

276 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

perishable. In what sense? "In so far as it is re
lated to the body." But what can this mean?
Nothing more nor less than, in so far as it is peculiar
to mind as associated with a particular self-identical
body, i. e., in so far as it is the possession of one and
the same individual mind.

Moreover, he expressly warns us that his doctrine
of the mind's eternity, — which has no more applica
tion to personal post-existence than to personal pre-
existence, — must not be confounded with any form
of the popular doctrine of "immortality": "If we
consider the common opinion of men, we shall see
that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of
their mind, but confound it with duration, and
ascribe it to imagination or memory, which they be
lieve remains after death."*

But in furnishing his system with a substitute for
the Christian doctrine of immortality, and in cloth
ing his substitute with rival glories, Spinoza has used
language which uncritical readers have sometimes
mistaken for a description of something far more
significant than it is. And of the competent critics
who have tried to determine his precise thought on
this point, some have argued that he teaches individ
ual self-conscious survival, not of the mind in its en
tirety indeed, but of the intellect at least. This fol
lows necessarily, it is claimed,1 from Spinoza's doc
trine of idea ideal or idea mentis,2 which makes self-
consciousness inherent in the nature of idea. For
according to this, every idea as an ontological entity
is an object which must be reflected in another idea.

* Eth. V, prop. 34, schol.

1 See Camerer, "Die Lehre Spinoza's."

3 See page 74.

IMMORTALITY 277

So long as an idea exists, therefore, it must be self-
conscious; and, if it is eternal, it must be eternally
self-conscious. The force of this reasoning depends
entirely on the mistaken assumption that the (com
plex) "idea" which survives as the eternal essence
of the mind, is individual, and that the persistence
of the eternal essence is the persistence of the indi
vidual mind. We have already discovered, however,
that the eternal essences of things are not individual,
but general.1 The essence of the human mind,
which is to be conceived both as relatively determi
nate mind-stuff and as a system of adequate ideas, is
in one view as universal as the race, and in another
as universal as truth. The eternal essence even of
"this mind" and of "that mind" is a common es
sence, in which, to be sure, they as temporal phenom
ena may participate in different degrees. It is only
as regards "existence," with the imagination, mem
ory, etc., involved therein, that minds are distinct
and separate. Accordingly there is for Spinoza a
way of regarding the adequate ideas, which consti
tute the permanent part of the mind, as eternally
conscious, without requiring the eternal continuity
of any individual mind. By having regard only to
the logical content, he may say that an adequate
idea is universal, being the same for every mind
possessing it ; and also, if he chooses, that it is eter
nally conscious, for when it ceases to be an element
in a particular consciousness it continues to be an
element in some other consciousness. The same es
sence repeats itself eternally in different existences.

It is further argued that, since the human body is
an individuum,, the eternal part of the mind as the

1 See page 150.

278 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

idea of the body sub specie aternitatis must also be
an individuum, and that as idea idece it must have
the same character.1 This argument rests on the
same mistaken assumption as does the foregoing one.
namely, that the eternal essence, whether of the
body or of the mind, is individual.2

The student of the history of philosophy will
recognize in Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of
the mind striking points of resemblance with certain
speculations of Aristotle, which, with varying for
tunes, had been borne on the stream of tradition
down to the time of our philosopher. Aristotle di
vided the reason ( vovs ) into two parts, the passive
and the active. To the latter he attributed the power

1 Camerer, "Die Lehre Spinoza's," pp. 118-122.

2 In regard to the subject here concluded I am grati
fied to be able to agree substantially with so thorough
and conscientious a student of Spinoza as James Mar-
tineau. See his "Study of Spinoza," pp. 289-301.

If any one should desire to pursue still further so
barren a subject, he may compare Sir Fred. Pollock's
"Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy;" Mr. A. E. Taylor
in "Mind," April, 1896; ....

Mr. Pollock says of Spinoza's eternity of the mind:
"It has no relation to time, and therefore is not a future
life [or continuance of personal consciousness in the
ordinary sense]. At the same time it is in some sense
individual" (p. 270); and "What Spinoza is really main
taining in an artificial form is that the necessity and
universal character of exact knowledge is not affected
either by this and that particular act of knowledge being
associated with a transitory condition of a bodily organ-
Ism, or by tne act, as a particular human act, being sub
ject to the conditions of our finite human consciousness"
(p. 280).

Mr. Taylor reduces the eternal part of the mind "to
two elements only, one cognitive and one emotional, the
cognitive element being concrete but impersonal scien
tific truth, and the emotional the calm and acquiescence
which such truth produces." "Mind" etc., p. 161. It
has "continued existence after death," though "all that
distinguishes one man from another has vanished" (p.
155).

IMMORTALITY 279

of grasping in immediate knowledge what cannot be
the object of mental processes (Spinoza's scientia
intuitiva). It represents not what is individual, but
what is common to men. It alone survives the body ;
while the passive part of the reason, together with
sense-perception, imagination, memory, reflection,
emotions, desire, and will, perish with the body.1

But Aristotle's distinction between the passive
and active parts of the mind, and the inconsisten
cies of his account of the two, gave rise later to dis
putes as to whether both, or only one, or neither of
them were perishable. Averroes, a Spanish Aristot
elian of the twelfth century, with whose thoughts
Spinoza must have been acquainted,2 became the
recognized champion of the view that it is the gen
eral human understanding which is eternal, the in
dividual being its subject during life, and surviv
ing death only in the sense that, when Socrates
and Plato die, the speculative spirit remains, philos
ophy being eternal. He contended that this doctrine
is not dangerous to morality, but, on the contrary,
is the best protection against that pseudo-virtue
which has in view only rewards and punishments.
The wise man acts without regard to such things,
prompted by the love of virtue alone.3 That Spinoza

1 Cf. Zeller, "Die Philosophie der Griechen," 3te aufl.,
2ter Theil, 2te Abtheilung, ss. 563-607.

8 If not directly, then certainly through Lev! ben Ger-
son, whom he cites in "Trac. Theologico-Polit.," note 15,
and through Maimonides, whose great work "Moreh
Nebochim" (Doctor Perplexorum) was in Spinoza's li
brary. See the list of books belonging to Spinoza's
library in Freudenthal's "Die Lebensgeschichte Spino
za's," p. 160.

8Cf. Johann Ed. Erdmann's "History of Philosophy,".
§ 187, 4-5.

280 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

was considerably influenced by these ideas can
hardly be doubted.

It may here be remarked also that, in his estimate
of religion in general, Spinoza quite agrees with
Averroes: its postulates have no validity, but it is
nevertheless of practical value for the weak and un-
reflective. If, in regard to the truth of this asser
tion, any doubts still linger in the reader's mind,
they will be dispelled by an examination of what
Spinoza has to say on the relation between Church
and State.

CHAPTEE in.
CHURCH AND STATE.

In a system that posits an impersonal and un
ethical1 Absolute, from which result by a blind neces
sity all happenings throughout the entire realm of
being, there is no place of course for divinely im
posed obligations. Apart from the conventions of
human society, right is synonymous with might.
"The natural right of every individual extends
as far as his power/'2 Spinoza does not hesitate,
therefore, to express himself as follows: "Since
it is the highest law of nature that each thing en
deavor with all its might to maintain itself as it is.
without regard to anything but itself, it follows that
every individual thing has this supreme right, that
is (as I have said) to exist and to act as it is deter
mined by its own nature. Nor do we recognize any
difference in this respect between men and other in
dividuals of nature ; nor again between men endowed
with reason and those who are ignorant of true
reason ; nor between fools, the insane, and the sound-
minded. For whatever each thing does according
to the laws of its own nature, it does by supreme
right, and for the obvious reason that it is determined
by nature, and cannot do otherwise. Wherefore
among men, so long as they are considered as living
under the dominion of nature alone, the one who is

1 Eth. I, prop. 33, schol. 2, p. 65. — C£ Kort. Verh., I,
Cap. 7, p. 33.

2Trac. Polit., Cap. 4, § 4.

282 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

not yet acquainted with reason or has not yet ac
quired the habit of virtue, exercises his supreme
right when he lives according to his desires and im
pulses alone, no less than does the rational man when
he directs his life according to the principles of rea
son. 5>1 "Hence whatever each one (regarded as
under the dominion of nature alone) considers useful
to himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled
by his passions, he has a right, according to the su
preme law of nature, to seek, and in any way, either
by violence, or by craft, or by entreaties, or by any
easier means, to obtain for himself."2 To those who
ask why God did not so create all men that they
would conform to the dictates of reason, he consist
ently replies that it is "because God did not lack
material for creating all things from the lowest to
the highest degree of perfection ; or, to speak more
properly, because the laws of nature were so ample
that they would suffice for producing all things con
ceivable by a hypothetical infinite intellect."3

The difference between Spinoza and theistic writ
ers who define rights from the standpoint of civil
society, applying the term to what is promised or
secured by government, is this: for Spinoza, who
identifies "God" with nature, the individual is not
responsible to a transcendent being; while for the
theist, who posits a transcendent being to whom the
individual is responsible, there must be, even in a

1 Tractatus Theol.-Polit. Cap. 16, pp. 121-2.

albid. p. 122.

8 Eth. I, Appendix, p. 71. — I have translated "aliquo
infinite intellectu" by "hypothetical infinite intellect."
The expression is evidence of what I have affirmed else
where that Spinoza does not have a place for a real, in
finite intellect in the sense of a unitary consciousness.

CHURCH AND STATE 283

state of nature (of anarchy), some limitations of
natural might imposed by a divinely sanctioned
morality.

Organized society exists, according to Spinoza, by
virtue of the individual's surrender (either volun
tary or compulsory) of his natural rights to a sov
ereign power. The rights of the government thus
constituted are co-extensive with its power. The
possessors of sovereign authority are now the source
of all rights and can do no wrong. They may fall
short of what is wise, but never of what is right.

When Spinoza says that all rights are dependent
on the decree of the possessors of sovereign power,
he expressly includes religious rights.1 If it be
asked: By what right, then, did the disciples of
Christ preach a new religion? he answers that they
did so by the power which they had received from
Christ to perform miracles and to cast out unclean
spirits ; and warns us not to follow their example, un
less we have been accredited in the same way.2 But
as Spinoza does not believe in miracles, this means
of course that no one can ever lay claim to the right
of propagating a new religion; although wise rulers
will, from motives of policy, allow the devotees of
strange religions to practice the same in peace, and
to build temples, provided these are small and are
situated at some distance from one another.3 But if
the possessors of sovereign power are wicked, impious
men, are they still to be the rightful interpreters of
religion? This question is answered by another:
What if ecclesiastics are wicked, or seditious ? If we

1 Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. 19, p. 156.

2 Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. 19, p. 16J..
8 Trac. Polit., Cap. 8, § 46.

284 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

are compelled to choose between the two, we may
more safely commit the spiritual authority to tem
poral rulers, whose private interests council modera
tion and regard for the welfare of the state, than to
the ministers of religion, who are too often inspired
by a lust for power, and in any case recognize an
authority above that of the state.1

This arrangement, Spinoza thinks, would be calcu
lated to secure to citizens freedom of thought. For
it is the ecclesiastics, controlling the civil authority,
who have always been responsible for the persecution
of scholars and thinkers. The civil authority as
such, having no more interest in one metaphysical
opinion than another, would have no occasion to in
terfere with the freest scientific and philosophical
investigations. Moreover, temporal rulers can more
easily be convinced that it is extremely unwise to
undertake to control the thinking of citizens, or to
forbid the expression of opinion.

Although the rights of rulers over religion are
absolute, it is assumed that the actual control in a
wise government will extend only so far as to secure
the subjection of the ecclesiastical organization and
to prevent factious controversies and religious per
secutions. No temples, in a monarchy at least, are
to be built from public funds,2 and no laws are to be
made in regard to religious opinions, however erratic
and extravagant, unless they are seditious and tend
to subvert the state.3 But large religious assemblies

1 Trac. Theol.-Polit., p. 163 et passim.

2 Trac. Polit, Cap. 6, § 40.

3 This qualification would seem to open the door to
religious persecutions again.

CHURCH AND STATE 285

should be prohibited as calculated to disturb the pub
lic peace.1

In order to understand the earnestness with which
Spinoza deals with the problem of church and state,
we must remember that he lived at a time when
European states were just emerging from the tyr
anny of ecclesiastical usurpations, that the reformed
churches often aspired to succeed in their respective
countries to the authority of the Church of Rome,
that they were engaged in intemperate controver
sies, and that the Thirty Years ' War was fresh in his
memory. In the United States of America the prob
lem has been solved by a complete separation of
church and state. But to Spinoza, a child of the
Seventeenth Century, this solution did not occur as
a possible one.

His views on this subject concern us only in so
far as they reveal his estimate of religion. Since
religion, according to him, is to be subjected abso
lutely to the government, and to be reduced to a
mere instrument of civil society,2 it possesses no ab
solute worth. Morality, of course, is of supreme im
portance to the state, but religion as such is a sort
of necessary evil, to which government must adjust
itself, — necessary because most men are incurably
ignorant and thoughtless, incapable of being guided
by reason. One cult is as good as another, provided
it teaches the masses respect for authority and other
civil virtues.

His view is further illustrated by his distinction
between philosophy and theology. Between the two

lfTrac. Polit, Cap. 8, § 46.

2Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. XIX (Opera II, 159). —
Certum est, quod pietas erga Patriam summa sit, quam
aliquis praestare potest.

286 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

"there is no intercourse or affinity."1 "The aim of
philosophy is nothing except truth ; but that of faith
is nothing except obedience [to the laws of society]
and piety [social virtues]."2 "Faith (theology, re
ligion) does not require that dogmas be true, but
that they be pious, i. e., such as move the soul to
obedience, although among them there be very many
which have not the shadow of truth."3

What the dogmas are which the average man
needs to believe in order to be obedient, and which
therefore are to be taught by the established religion,
Spinoza has very clearly defined. They are none
other than those about whose biblical authenticity
and practical utility there is and can be no contro
versy. As the aim of biblical writers is only to in
culcate morality, we must rigidly exclude from the
realm of dogma all statements "as to what God may
be, whether fire or spirit, or light, or thought, etc."4
Such questions have no significance for practical
life. To religion belong properly only those doc
trines, "without a knowledge of which obedience
[for the masses] is absolutely impossible."5 They
may be enumerated as follows:

(1) "That God, i. e., a supreme being exists, in
the highest degree just and merciful, the exemplar
of the true life ; for whoever does not know or does

irTrac. Theolog.-Polit., Cap. XIV, p. 112.— "—inter
Fidem sive Theologiam, et Philosophiam nullum esse
commercium nullamve affinitatem."

3 Ibid. Cf. Cap. XIX, . . . ."illos Dei verbi ministros
esse, qui populum ex authoritate summarum potestatum
piatatem decent, prout ipsa ex earum decreto publicae
utilitati accommodata est."

3 Op. cit. p. 109.

4Trac. Theol.-Polit., p. 111.

5 Op. cit., p. 110.

CHURCH AND STATE 287

not believe that God exists is unable to obey Him,
and cannot recognize Him as judge."*

(2) "That he is one; for nobody can doubt that
this also is absolutely required in order to produce
supreme devotion, admiration, and love to God."1

(3) "That he is everywhere present, or that all
things are open to his view. ' '2

(4) "That he has supreme right and authority
over all things, and does nothing under compulsion. "
"For all are bound to obey him, but he is bound to
obey no one."3

(5) "That the worship of God consists in justice
and charity alone, or in love to one's neighbor."4

(6) "That all those, and those alone, who obey
God by living this manner of life, are saved ; but the
rest of mankind, who live under the dominion of
their desires, are lost."5

(7) "Finally, that God forgives the sins of peni
tents."6

That Spinoza here states a more wholesome and
efficacious system of religious doctrine than is often
promulgated under the seal of ecclesiastical au
thority, will be claimed even by many religionists.
That it is also sufficiently complete, containing all
that is strictly essential to Christianity, if not more,
would doubtless be maintained by not a few Chris
tian writers of our day. But this circumstance
should not cause us to mistake the position of Spi-

* Trac. Theol.-Polit, p. 110.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

•Op. cit., p. 111.
4 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

288 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

noza. The ideas formulated above represent, not
Spinoza's own views, but what he finds to be the sub
stance of biblical doctrine. He himself, as we have
abundantly shown, rejects absolutely this entire
point of view, and that not in form merely, but in
substance. For him, of course, as well as for the
theologian, the foregoing scheme consists of essential
postulates of religion. The difference between the
two is that the theologian regards them as truth,
while Spinoza regards them as fiction, — fiction that
is salutary, of course, for those who do not know the
truth, but fiction nevertheless.

Nor should Spinoza's position be confounded with
that of those religious teachers who claim for much
Christian theology nothing more than approximate
or symbolical truth. For these writers theology
represents, in a certain, way and to a certain degree,
objective reality, which eludes exact definition; for
Spinoza, who thinks he has very definite knowledge
of reality, theological conceptions are neither ap
proximations to the truth nor symbols of it, but the
utterly mistaken products of the "imagination."

In connection with Spinoza's views of religion in
its relation to the state, it is proper to notice what he
has to say about oaths. In his opinion, men "will
much more beware of committing prejury, if they
are commanded to swear by the safety and liberty
of the country, and by the supreme council, than if
they are commanded to swear by God."1
Trac. Polit., Cap. 8, § 48.

CHAPTER IV.

HIS TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOUS
CONCEPTIONS.

1. Miracles.

Spinoza's view of miracles may be inferred from
the general characteristics of his philosophy, and, if
it were not for certain enigmatical expressions yet
to be noticed, it would scarcely be necessary to cite
the language in which he specifically deals with the
subject. "As nature preserves a fixed and immu
table order," he says, "it most clearly follows that
the word miracle is not intelligible except as rela
tive to the opinions of men, and does not signify
anything else than an operation, the natural cause of
which we are not able to explain by the example
of something else that is familiar."1 "The masses
call the unusual operations of nature miracles or
works of God, and, partly from piety and partly
from a desire to oppose the devotees of natural
science, wish to know nothing of natural causes, and
to hear only those things of which they are most
ignorant and at which therefore they most wonder."2
"A miracle, whether understood as against nature or
as above nature, is a mere absurdity."3

2. Revelation.

The outline of Spinoza's views on this subject in
cidentally given in the previous chapter requires to

1 Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. VI (Opera II, p. 25).

2 Opus cit., Cap. VI (Opera II, p. 23).

3 Opus cit., Cap. VI (Opera II, p. 28).

290 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

be filled out with further details. The chief source
from which we must learn these is the "Theologico-
Political Treatise." This work, as we have seen,
possesses certain peculiarities which must be con
stantly borne in mind. Its fundamental aim is to
provide a modus vivendi for religion and philosophy ;
and that chiefly by means of a critical examination
of the Scriptures. On the whole, it is written in a
conciliatory spirit, and, while thoroughly uncompro
mising as regards essentials, shows a disposition to
adopt, as often as possible, the Scripture or theolog
ical point of view. In fact, he professes to draw his
conclusions from biblical data alone.1 But as this
irksome and impractical limitation is as often trans
gressed as it is observed, the work represents dif
ferent standpoints by turns, often passing abruptly
from one to the other, or even blending the two at
once. When denned from his own point of view, a
given conception will be treated as false ; when from
that of the Scripture writers, as true. This circum
stance, together with Spinoza's general propensity
to accommodation, has occasioned the most extraordi
nary misunderstanding of his fundamental attitude
toward religion, especially on the part of those who,
without mastering his philosophy, have been satis
fied to base their judgments on isolated passages
from the " Theologico-Political Treatise. "

" Revelation or Prophecy'' he defines as "sure
knowledge of anything revealed by God to man";
and a prophet as "one who interprets the revela
tions of God to those who are unable to have a siire
knowledge of the things revealed and therefore can

'Praefatio (Opera I, 353).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 291

only apprehend them by simple faith."1 Revela
tion then is made to the prophet, and he explains it
to his less favored fellows, who receive it on his bare
authority. The definition of revelation, taken in
its broadest sense, would include, as Spinoza ob
serves, all scientific truth, inasmuch as all knowl
edge, like everything else, is from "God." Con
sistently the definition of prophet also would in
clude those learned persons who explain to the un
learned the results of scientific studies, though
Spinoza does not expressly draw this inference.2 He
is concerned, of course, with revelation and prophets
in the theological sense only. The terms are applied
to the writings and writers of both Testaments, al
though his illustrations are generally taken from the
Jewish Scriptures.

The substance of his thoughts the prophet may
acquire by reading the law of Moses or the
utterances of other prophets,3 and, it would
seem, in any way whatever, except by exact thinking.
Except by exact thinking, we say ; for, if the prophet
attained his knowledge in this way, he would no
longer be a prophet, but a philosopher. In the man
ner of acquiring his knowledge, therefore, the pro
phet does not enjoy any advantage over men in gen
eral. He may be better and more intelligent than
most of his fellows (in fact this much of preeminence
we are compelled to ascribe to those prophets whose
writings have been included in the canon) ; but he
has no peculiar source or means of knowledge.

1 Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 357).
8 In a note he even rejects this inference. Cf. Op. cit.,
note 2.

3 Opera cit. (Opera II, p. 373).

292 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Spinoza says, to be sure, that such scriptural lan
guage as "the Spirit of the Lord was upon him"
etc. means that the prophets " possessed a singular
and extraordinary power (virtutem)," as well as
piety; and "that they perceived the mind and
thought of God." But it is to be observed that he
is here interpreting Scripture by Scripture, and that
what he gives is the assumption of Scripture and not
his own opinion. Moreover, he is careful to explain
in a note that, even according to Scripture, this ex
traordinary power was not superhuman, i. e., not
anything beyond man's ordinary faculties. His own
view, here as generally, may be found by translating
the language in which he states the assumption of
Scripture into terms of his philosophy. It could
then be expressed as follows: The piously disposed
prophet, when his imagination becomes excited and
he prophesies, will declare things in harmony with
"justice and charity." And the doctrine of justice
and charity, which is the only essential element of
biblical theology, is also the teaching of reason. On
account of its practical utility and its suitableness to
the conditions of human life, i. e., on account of its
correspondence with reality, it may be called, in an
accommodated sense, the mind and thought of God,
though properly speaking, God has no mind and no
thoughts.1

The distinguishing characteristic of "revelation"
as applied to biblical writers, — we should not for
get that all ideas, true and false, good and bad must

1 Mr. Pollock ("Spinoza," 2d ed., p. 336) seems to
think Spinoza possibly ascribes a peculiar "insight" to
the Prophets. I can find no evidence that Spinoza has
been guilty of the inconsistency of attributing any in
sight to the "imagination."

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 293

in one sense be " revelations," — lies not in its sub
stance, but in its form and in the peculiar kind of
certainty with which it is accompanied. From the
Scriptures it appears that a prophet's certainty was
based on one or more of three things: (1) the vivid
ness with which he conceived his thoughts; (2) the
presence of a sign, i. e., sensuous manifestation of
some kind, which, however, may be shown even from
scripture data to have been in every case, except
that of Moses, a subjective creation of the imagina
tion, an hallucination;* and (3) the prophet's con
sciousness of disinterested devotion to what is right
and good.1 Accordingly prophecy always bears the
personal characteristics of the prophet. One en
dowed with a cheerful disposition prophesied " vic
tories, peace and events which make men glad;" if
melancholy, "war, massacres and calamities"; if
they were countrymen, they had visions of oxen,
cows and the like; if soldiers, they saw generals
and armies; if courtiers, a royal throne; if they be
lieved that man acted from free choice, they repre
sented God as ignorant of future human actions.2

Spinoza's recognition of "the human factor" in
prophecy will not be mistaken, of course, for that
which goes by this name in traditional theology.
According to theology, there is, in addition to the hu
man factor, a divine, supernatural factor; for Spi
noza all is human. He admits nothing supernatural ;
and his explanation of "revelation" must not be
understood as inconsistent with his philosophy. A
revelation consists simply of the prophet's own

* Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, 359).
lTrac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. II (Opera I, p. 373).
"Opera I, p. 373 and ft.

294 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

thoughts, and is from ( i God ' ' only in the sense that
the prophet himself is God, i. e., a part of nature.1
The only thing that distinguishes a so-called revela
tion from any other undemonstrated opinion is the
circumstance that the prophet, because of the vivid
ness of his imagination, becomes subjectively sure
of his. But subjective assurance is not objec
tive certainty. In fact, to say that prophecy is a
function of the "imagination" is, for Spinoza, the
same as to say it is often positively erroneous.2 We
need not be surprised, therefore, to find that the
revelation to Solomon concerning the temple con
tained the mistaken assumption that the ratio be
tween the circumference and the diameter of a circle
is exactly as three to one.3 Moreover, there are, as
may be shown from scripture, false prophets as well
as true prophets; both alike may be accredited
with signs and miracles.4 The messages even of the
false prophet are in one sense "revelations" from
"God"; for God sometimes deceives men with false
revelations.5 As prophecy lacks the validity that
characterizes clear thinking, its value in any partic
ular case must be measured by its agreement with
rational knowledge (including sound moral prin
ciples) and with facts. For two of the grounds of
the prophet's own certainty constitute the grounds
upon which other men are justified in accepting his
"revelation," namely, (1) the presence of a sign.

1 This is the only meaning, when stated in terms of
his philosophy, of Spinoza's words, "Deum revelationes
captui et opinionibus prophetarum accommodavisse."
Opera I, 383.

3 Opera I, 376.

3Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. II (Opera I, 377).

4 Opus cit., Cap. II (Opera I, 373).
•Opus cit., Cap. II (Opera I, p. 372).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 295

and (2) the piety of the prophet, or rather, as he
now puts it, the soundness of his doctrine.1 But the
sign in this case must be understood as a "true"
sign, i. e., as the circumstance that the revelation
turns out to be true.2 Hence the "pious and elect"
will never be misled,3 at least as regards what is es
sential (practical morality) ; for rightmindedness,
we may suppose, will instinctively revolt against
whatever is morally unsound. ' ' Prophecy never ren
dered the prophets wiser, but left them in their
previous opinions."4 "They taught nothing special
about the divine attributes, and held quite vulgar
notions about God."5

On account of the conciliatory aim of the "Theo-
logico-Political Treatise" and Spinoza's oft-ex
pressed wish to interpret Scripture by Scripture, his
use of language in an accommodated sense in this
work is occasionally so extraordinary that he seems
expressly to contradict the views we have just de
fined. It is to be regretted 'that eminent writers on
philosophy, sacrificing the scientific spirit to caste
feeling, prejudice, mistaken "politeness," "good
taste," or what not, have arbitrarily minimized or
ignored Spinoza's accommodation, and have felt
obliged to take these contradictions seriously. One
of the passages which have been pronounced enig
matical is the following:

"If we go through the sacred books, we shall see that
all things which God revealed to the prophets were re-

1Opus cit., Cap. XV (Opera II, p. 118). — Signo et
Doctrina.

2 Opus cit., Cap. II (Opera I, p. 373).
8 Opus cit., Cap. II (Opera I, p. 372).
*Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. II (Opera I, p. 376).
6 Ibid.

296 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

vealed to them either by words, or by appearances
(flguris), or by words and appearances together. But
the words, and also the appearances, were either (1)
true and outside the imagination of the prophet who
heard or saw them, or (2) imaginary, because the imag
ination of the prophet was so disposed by watching that
he clearly seemed to hear words or to see something.
With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws which
he wished to be prescribed for the Hebrews, as appears
from Ex. XXV, 22, where God says, 'And there I will
meet with thee, and I will speak with thee from that part
of the mercy seat which is between the two cherubim.'
Which shows indeed that God employed some sort of
real voice; for Moses found God ready to speak to him
whenever he (Moses) desired."1

In close connection with this passage occurs an
other of similar tenor:

"In the opinion of some Jews the words of the Deca
logue were not pronounced by God, but the Israelites
heard only a noise, but no articulate words, and during
its continuance apprehended the laws of the Decalogue
with their minds only. And this I also once suspected;
for I saw that the words of the Decalogue in Exodus
vary from those in Deuteronomy; from which it seems
to follow (since God spoke but once) that the Decalogue
did not mean to teach the very words of God, but only
his meaning. But unless we would do violence to
Scripture, it must be granted without reservation that
the Israelites heard a real voice; for Scripture (Deut.
V, 4) says expressly, "God spake with you face to face,
etc."2

In these passages, contrary to the whole tenor of
his philosophy and to the emphatic repudiation
of miracles, Spinoza seems to recognize the reality of
miraculous revelations. But that the apparent con
tradiction is to be explained by his accommodation to

*Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 359).
3 Ibid. (Opera p. 360.)

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 297

a standpoint not his own is rendered unquestionable
in this case by Spinoza's express warning in the chap
ter on miracles:

"Before finishing this chapter, I wish to give notice
that in regard to miracles I have proceeded according
to a different method from that employed in speaking
of prophecy. Of prophecy I have affirmed nothing ex
cept what I have been able to conclude from grounds
revealed in the Holy Scriptures, but here I have deduced
the chief points from the principles known only by the
natural light of reason."1

This is tantamount to saying that, when treating of
prophecy, he endeavored to ascertain what the Bible
really teaches on this subject, and accommodated
himself to the theological point of view; but, when
treating of miracles, he spoke from the standpoint of
reason (his own standpoint), and stated what he him
self conceived to be the truth.

With reference to the means (other than the nat
ural light of reason) by which God reveals things to
men, Spinoza says: " Whatever can be said concern
ing these must be concluded from Scripture. For
what can we say about things exceeding the limita
tions of our mind, except that which is told to us by
the mouths or pens of the prophets themselves ? And
since today, so far as I know, we have no prophets,
there remains for us no alternative but to examine
the books left to us by the prophets of old. ' '2 What

irTrac. Theol.-Polit., Cap VI (Opera II, p. 35). In
view of this explicit warning that Spinoza's language
concerning prophecy does not always express his own
views, I am unable to understand the detail and caution
with which Mr. Pollock brings himself to concede that
"It is extremely difficult to believe that this [the real
voice] really commended itself to Spinoza." ("Spinoza,"
2d Ed., p. 335.)

2Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 358).

298 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

he meant by this is not clear. Probably it was only
his way of saying that, in order to determine what
prophecy assumes to be, we have no other way at the
present time than to study the Scriptures. But how
ever difficult it may be to understand what he did
mean, if anything, it is not difficult, in the light of
his total thought, to understand what he did not
mean. It is certain he did not mean to recognize a
supernatural revelation. In this connection, it is
well to remember the warning of Ludwig Meyer.
Spinoza's confidant, in the preface of the ''Meta
physical Thoughts," that when Spinoza says "This
or that is beyond the reach of the human mind,"
he is not speaking "according to his own way of
thinking."1

When Spinoza professes not to know by what
particular "laws of nature" the prophets perceived
through words and sensuous forms, "whether real
or imaginary," "the revelations of God,"2 he prob
ably means he will not undertake to determine what
special conditions existed among the Hebrews that
gave rise to the "prophetic" exercise of the imagina
tion there, but not elsewhere; or possibly, that he
will not undertake, by analysis of the imagination,
to show how it happened, in the case of the prophets,
generally to hit upon ethical truth.

As Spinoza does not concede to revelation as such
any certainty that may be depended on, it would seem
hard for him to justify obedience to it. He deals
with the difficulty in a passage that is worth quoting
at length:

1 Renati Des Cartes Prin. Phil., Praefatio. Opera III,
p. 112.

Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 369).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 299

"But since the fundamental assumption of theology,
that men may be saved by obedience alone, cannot be
demonstrated by reason, whether it be true or false,
the objection may be raised, Why, then, do we believe
it? If we accept it blindly without the warrant of reason,
we act foolishly, senselessly. But if, on the other hand,
we maintain that this basal assumption is demonstrable
by reason, theology will become a part of philosophy,
and will be inseparable therefrom. To this I reply that
I maintain without qualification that this fundamental
dogma of theology cannot be discovered by the natural
light of reason, or at least that no one has ever succeeded
in proving it, and therefore that revelation has been in
the highest degree necessary; but nevertheless we may
so use our judgment as to accept with moral certainty
at least the revelation when once it has appeared (id
jam revelatum). With moral certainty, I say; for we
may not expect to be more certain in regard to it than
were the prophets themselves to whom it was first re
vealed, whose certainty was nothing more than moral,
as we have shown. . . .

For this reason alone we are bound to believe in the
Scriptures, that is in the prophets themselves, namely,
because their doctrine is sound and is confirmed by
signs. For since we see that the prophets commend
above all things justice and charity, and aim at nothing
else, we conclude that they taught with no deceit, but
with conviction, the doctrine that men may become blessed
through obedience and faith; and since further they
confirmed their teachings with signs, we are persuaded
they did not speak at random and did not rave (delirare)
when they prophesied. In this belief we are still further
strengthened when we observe that they taught nothing
in morals which does not fully agree with reason; for it
is not by chance that the word of God in the Prophets
harmonizes completely with the word of God that speaks
within us. And these things, I say, we conclude from
the Scriptures as certainly as did the Jews formerly from
the living voice of the Prophets. For we have shown
above that Scripture, as regards doctrine and the princi
pal narratives, has come to our hands unfalsified. Where-

300 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

fore the above-mentioned fundamental assumption of
theology and Scripture, although it cannot be proved by
a mathematical demonstration, may nevertheless be ac
cepted with sound judgment. It would be folly to re
fuse merely for this reason to accept what is confirmed
by the testimony of so many Prophets, and brings great
consolation to those who are not very strong in under
standing, and is of much advantage to the state, and
which may be believed with absolutely no risk or
hurt. . . .

Now before passing on to speak of other things I
wish expressly to give notice (as indeed I have already
done) that I hold the utility and necessity of the Holy
Scriptures, or Revelation, to be very great. For since we
are not able to perceive by the natural light of reason
that simple obedience is a way of salvation, but are
taught by Revelation alone that, by the singular grace
of God, this happens; it follows that the Scriptures have
brought very great consolation to mortals. Absolutely
all men can obey, and there are only extremely few,
compared with the whole human race, who acquire the
habit of virtue by the guidance of reason: and so, if we
did not have this testimony of the Scriptures, we should
doubt of the salvation of nearly all men."1

This remarkable passage, apparently contradict
ing not only what Spinoza has been at great pains to
establish elsewhere in this same work, but also the
whole trend and spirit of his philosophy, has
been thought to present difficulties of sufficient
magnitude to raise the question whether after all
Spinoza did not accept, in some degree or in some
sense, a supernatural revelation. It has been treated
as representing "an unexplained gap between the
rationalizing criticism of the 'Theologico-Political
Treatise,' which goes a long way, but refuses to go
all lengths, and the thorough-going speculation of the

lTrac. Theol.-Polit, Cap. XV (Opera II, pp. 117-120).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 301

1 Ethics.' " At the same time it is admitted that " dif
ference of dates will not account for it, since we know
that Spinoza's philosophy was matured long before
the ' Theologico-Political Treatise' was published."1
And again it is said, "The words are express and
even emphatic; and we have no right to sacrifice
Spinoza's good faith to the dogma of his rigid consist
ency, which has arisen from attaching exaggerated
importance to the geometrical form used in the
1 Ethics.' "2

This position we can but regard as unscientific in
spirit and mistaken in fact. It is unscientific in
spirit, because the reference to Spinoza's good faith
shows a disposition to determine the meaning and
character of Spinoza 's writings by applying as a test
an arbitrary conception of Spinoza's personality, in
stead of examining without prepossessions the writ
ings themselves. Of Spinoza's personality we can, in
fact, have very little certain knowledge before we
have studied what and how he has written.

We would not seem to admit, however, that to
recognize Spinoza's frequent use of language in an
accommodated sense is to impeach his "good faith."
So seriously it need not be taken. Spinoza sincerely
believed that all that is of any value in religion, — its
ethical content, — could be established as necessary
truth by an atheistic philosophy; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that his atheistic philosophy
could be stated in terms of religion with sufficient
success to convince the philosophical mind that for
practical life they have the same value. At the same
time he hoped, by making this clear, to disarm belli-

1 Sir F. Pollock, "Spinoza," etc., 2d Ed., p. 339.

2 Sir F. Pollock, Opus cit., p. 338.

302 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

cose theologians, or at least to put them at a serious
disadvantage. In order effectually to attain this
secondary end, he sometimes (perhaps influenced by
the example of certain Jewish commentators) carried
his accommodation to a length that renders his
language difficult to translate completely into terms
of his philosophy. In so far as this is true, it is im
possible, of course, to acquit Spinoza of the charge of
sometimes saying what he does not mean.1 Every
fair-minded student of his writings must frankly
acknowledge as much. But a part of this extreme
accommodation is doubtless to be understood as a
sort of quiet irony, and the rest, in view of Spinoza's
environment, would better not be called by so harsh
a name as bad faith. It is rather excessive tact.

As to the ''dogma of rigid consistency," we would
observe that there are two senses in which consist
ency as applied to Spinoza may be understood; in
one sense it is true, and in another sense it is mis
taken. If it means that his argumentation is excep
tionally free from logical contradictions, it is a mere
prejudice given currency by superficial students of
his writings. Probably no other great philosopher
has committed so many serious mistakes of logic, or
has held so many conceptions that are mutually in
compatible. There is one sense, however, in which
Spinoza is an example of almost, perhaps quite, un
precedented consistency: his thinking moves on a
plane far above emotional interests, deference to

1 In the light of Spinoza's doctrine of the "imagina
tion," what else can be said of such language as this:
"Since the Prophets perceived revelations by the aid of
the imagination, they were doubtless able to perceive
many things lying beyond the boundaries of reason." —
Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 370).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 303

authority, and all other extra-logical considerations,
He is disposed to view all things in the dry light of
reason, and hence to follow his premises directly to
their ultimate consequences, however radical and
ruthless these consequences may appear. He has no
patience with half -measures. Now it is Spinoza's con
sistency in this sense, his thoroughness, that is ques
tioned in the case before us.

And not only this. In view of the fact that the
"Ethics" and the " Theologico-Political Treatise"
are contemporaneous products of his mind, it is
especially the consistency of his fundamental per
sonal attitude that is questioned; for it is assumed
that at the same stage in his development he was the
uncompromising champion of Naturalism and the de
fender of Supernaturalism, contending along with
the theologians for the necessity of "revelation" and
trying to prove its authority. Thus, to ignore
Spinoza's accommodation and to take at face value
his language in the passage quoted, would require
us to suppose that he could assume two fundamental
attitudes at the same time, that he could simultane
ously face both east and west. As this is impossible,
we are compelled to assume that one attitude was
real and the other assumed. That his real one is
represented by the "Ethics," we can not doubt. It
is therefore the duty of interpretation to bring this
passage, if possible, into harmony with Naturalism.
The problem before us is simply that of translating
his language into terms of his philosophy.

We notice first some single expressions. When
Spinoza mentions "signs" as one of the grounds
upon which our acceptance of "revelation" is justi
fied, he evidently means, not signs in general (for,

304 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

as he observes in this connection, false prophets con
firmed their messages with signs and wonders)
but "true" signs, i. e., verifiable signs. And the
only signs he mentions as not being the common pos
session of both false and true prophets are true pre
dictions.1 For Spinoza, therefore, the only signs pos
sessing any credential value are predictions of events
that come to pass. But these predictions may not
be regarded as based on either miraculous foresight
or on such rational insight as carries with it abso
lute certainty. Presumably they are based on a
knowledge of life gained through practical experi
ence, and hence, in so far as they turn out to be true,
they are proof, though only "moral," probable
proof, that the prophet is a trustworthy guide in
matters of practical life. It is consistent with this
that what the "signs" are said to prove is only that
the prophets did not speak "at random" and did not
"rave" when they prophesied. However liable the
uncritical reader may be to find in Spinoza's "signs"
a meaning harmonizing with traditional theology,
the meaning for Spinoza turns out, when sifted, to
be nothing more than what we have defined. The
signum et doctrina, therefore, which he designates as
the grounds upon which men of his generation may
accept the authority of Scripture writers are only
(1) evidence of practical wisdom, and (2) sound
ness of moral teachings.

The expression "word of God speaking in us," it
is hardly necessary to observe, should not be mis
taken for an innate moral or "spiritual" sense, nor
for the "witness of the Spirit," nor for anything of

1 Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. VI and XV (Opera, Vol. II,
pp. 28 and 118).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 305

this kind. For Spinoza it means the human reason
and the moral principles which reason can show to
be necessary truths.

Taking now the whole passage together, and trans
lating it into terms of Spinoza's philosophy, his
thought may be freely expressed as follows: That
' 'obedience" by faith to precepts promulgated on
authority brings salvation (happiness and well-
being), is the assumption of every prophet and of
" revealed religion" as a whole. But this assump
tion cannot be proved by reason, i.e., it is not neces
sarily true ; for it cannot be admitted as universally
valid. If followed unconditionally, it would bind us
blindly to obey the first man claiming authority;
and would therefore bring us to perdition, more
frequently than to salvation. The only universally
safe and valid principle is to commit ourselves to
the guidance of reason, i. e., to adopt those maxims
which are necessary truth. But when the assump
tion that faith and obedience lead to happiness and
well-being is made by the Scriptures, it is not as a
universal, but as a particular, proposition. What is
meant is obedience by faith to those particular
scriptures which the moral consciousness of the race
has selected from among others and has included
in the canon. In this case the assumption is one
which we may allow to pass, (1) because we see in
the Scriptures evidence that the writers were men of
practical wisdom, and (2) because their teaching,
"justice and charity," is in harmony with that of
reason. Although these arguments are not mathe
matical demonstrations, they are quite sufficient
(1) to justify in accepting and obeying the Scrip
tures those who cannot see moral principles as neces-

306 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

sary truths, and (2) to obligate philosophers to
support religion for the benefit of such persons;
especially as faith in the Bible affords great comfort
to many, and as obedience to its general moral
teaching does not involve risks and is even posi
tively advantageous to the state. It would indeed be
a great misfortune, if all men were required to dis
cover moral truths each for himself ; for, as compara
tively few possess the power of exact and independ
ent thinking, the majority of men would go astray.

This is the utmost that Spinoza's language could
have meant for him. That for many readers it
would probably mean more, he must have foreseen.

We are now in a position to estimate correctly
Spinoza's words in a letter to Blyenbergh, where he
professes to believe "all things which God has re
vealed to the Prophets," and that the Prophets were
"intimate confidents and trusted ambassadors of
God."1 The thought in his own mind which he
chose thus to clothe, (or to mask), in theological
phraseology, was simply this: "I believe the prac
tice of 'justice and charity' to be of the highest ad
vantage to men. ' '

Spinoza's "Theologico-Political Treatise," from
which we have had occasion to quote so copiously in
connection with this subject, contains many seed-
thoughts which have borne fruit in the field of theol
ogy. It is a remarkable case of an atheist's making
valuable contributions to divinity. But here is not
the place for a detailed account of his influence on
theology. It is proper only to point out more ex-
plicity how Spinoza's doctrine of "revelation" is re
lated to any religious doctrine of the same.

1 Epis. 21 (olim 34); Opera II, pp. 281-2.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 3Q7

With the traditional theological conception of rev
elation as a supernatural communication of truth
otherwise inaccessible to human knowledge, Spino
za 's teaching has of course nothing at all in common.
What he finds to be the essential part of "revela
tion," its ethical content, is better discovered by
reason, and was discovered by the sacred writers
only by a sort of happy conjecture.

Liberal religionists who do not recognize the
special authority of any one religion sometimes per
mit themselves to apply the term "revelation" to
the system of "truth" which the general religious
consciousness, through experience under the correct
ive influence of rational criticism, has wrought out
for itself in the course of human history. Such
writers are in a measure consistent, inasmuch as
the doctrines in question are assumed to have been
learned under Divine Providence as the teacher of
the race. But even this sort of revelation is sepa
rated toto coelo from Spinoza's by its metaphysical
setting.

It has both a different content and a different
source. Spinoza's contains no metaphysical ele
ments of recognized validity, its only valuable part
consisting of practical moral precepts; according to
liberal religionists the common metaphysical postu
lates of religion embodied in that which they call
revelation are valid. Spinoza traces his "revela
tion" back through the fallible operations of the in
ferior faculties of the human mind to a blind and in
sensible necessity; liberal religionists conceive their
revelation as the acquisition of the human soul
through its worthiest organs under the guidance of
a living, personal Spirit.

308 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

In one important particular Spinoza's biblical
criticism differs from all that of the present day,
whether conservative or radical ; it takes no account
of historical development in either religion or morals.
Nowadays it has become the universal mental habit
to view all particular facts as moments in a process
of development. On this account even conservative
biblical critics may unhesitatingly accept many of
Spinoza's conclusions in regard to particular points,
frankly recognizing the existence of biblical errors,
and still contend that the Bible as a whole contains
a bona fide divine revelation. For Spinoza who
never thought of historical development, this would
have been impossible, even if his metaphysics had
permitted.

3. Jesus Christ.

The doctrines held by orthodox Christianity con
cerning Jesus, Spinoza cannot of course accept. In
one place, to be sure, he says he neither affirms nor
denies them, since he is unable to understand them.1
But this statement, which occurs in the ( * Theologico-
Political Treatise," means only that he did not wish
in that place to express himself definitely on the
subject. His mind is revealed more fully in a letter
to Oldenburg, where he says the churches which
teach that in Jesus "God assumed human nature"
"seem to speak no less absurdly than he who should
say that a circle may put on the nature of a
square."1 As might be anticipated, therefore, he
regarded Jesus as a mere man. The supernatural
factors in Christ's life as related in the New Testa-

1Trac. Theol.-Polit., Cap. I (Opera I, p. 363).
sEpis. 73 (olim 21).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 309

ment are explained away or allegorized. What he
says of the resurrection is of special interest on ac
count of its substantial agreement with the explana
tions of certain more modern critics. He expresses
himself as follows:

"My opinion on miracles I have sufficiently explained
in the 'Theologico-Political Treatise.' Here I add only
this: if you note these circumstances, namely that Christ
appeared neither to the Elders, nor to Pilate, nor to any
of the unbelievers, but only to the saints; that God has
neither right hand nor left hand and is not in any one
place, but is in essence present everywhere, that matter
is everywhere the same, that God does not manifest
himself in a fancied space outside the world, and finally
that the human frame is restrained within due bounds
by the weight of the air alone, you will easily see that
this appearance of Christ was not unlike that by which
God appeared to Abraham when the latter saw men whom
he invited to dine with him. But, you will say, all the
Apostles surely believed that Christ rose from the dead
and really ascended into heaven; which I do not deny.
For Abraham also believed that God had dined with him,
and all the Israelites believed that God, enveloped in
fire, descended from heaven to Mount Sinai and directly
spoke to them; whereas these apparitions or revelations,
and many others like them, were accommodated to the
understanding and opinions of those men to whom
God willed to reveal thereby his mind. I conclude there
fore that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was
in fact spiritual, revealed to the faithful alone, and to
them according to their understanding; amounting to
this, that Christ was endowed with eternity and rose
from the dead ('dead' I use in the sense in which Christ
used the word when he said, 'Let the dead bury their
dead'), in that he gave in his life and death an exam
ple of singular holiness; and he raises his disciples from
the dead in so far as they follow the example of his life
and death."1

»Epis. 75 (olim 23).

310 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

From this it is sufficiently clear that, in Spinoza's
opinion, Christ's resurrection was an illusion, but
that for the edification of believers it may with
propriety be treated allegorically. Observe that, ac
cording to Spinoza, Christ's real resurrection is
nothing else than his " singular holiness." When
encountering such language as "to whom God willed
to reveal His mind," unsuspecting readers, — they
will pardon our frequent repetition of the warning —
should beware lest they understand more than
Spinoza means. It is a case of accommodation to
the theological point of view. It must not be forgot
ten that for Spinoza himself there exists no divine
"will" and no divine "mind," and hence no "God"
either, the word signifying in his vocabulary nothing
more than impersonal thought and extension.

But if Spinoza could not accept any of the super-
naturalism with which the Christian church has al
ways colored its conception of Christ, he was able
nevertheless to speak of Him in words of high ap
preciation. Jesus was, in any view, so unique and
commanding a personality that all respectable
writers, of whatever school of thought, have unhesi
tatingly accorded him sincere and profound respect.
Spinoza was too sane and too fair-minded a man to
be able to do less. In fact his interest in ethical truth,
if nothing else, could not permit him to be indifferent
to a teacher whose moral influence has been an im
portant factor in human history. From the lan
guage he employs in speaking of him, it is apparent
that to Spinoza 's own mind there was always present
the distinction, so familiar nowadays, between the
ecclesiastical and the historic Christ. Just where.
in regard to Christ's moral eminence, he drew the

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 311

line that separates fact from idealization, it is im
possible to determine; for, in his references to him,
there is always an uncertain amount of accommoda
tion to Christian thought and feeling. As throw
ing some light on this question, we quote from
the "Theologico-Political Treatise" the following
tangled paragraphs, which contain Spinoza's fullest
account of Christ, italicizing the expressions that
require special scrutiny:

"In the Holy Scriptures I find no other means [than
words and appearances] by which God has communicated
with men; and hence, as we have shown above, no others
are to be invented or admitted. And although we clearly
understand that God can communicate with us immedi
ately, for without any physical means he communicates
his essence to our minds [i. e., reality's fundamental
characters, thought and extension, are contained in our
ordinary knowledge] ; yet that any man should simply
by his mind perceive things not contained in the first
principles of our knoicledge and not deducible therefrom, his
mind would necessarily have to be superior, far sur
passing human intelligence. Wherefore I do not believe
that any one else has attained to such perfection above
others except Christ, to whom God's ordinances which
lead men to salvation were revealed, not by words and
visions, but immediately: so that God manifested him
self to the Apostles by the mind of Christ, as he did
formerly to Moses by means of a voice in the air. So
the voice of Christ, like that which Moses heard, may
be called the voice of God. And in this sense we may
also say that the wisdom of God, i. e., superhuman wisdom,
assumed human nature in Christ; and that Christ was

the way of salvation But here I must give warning

that those things which certain churches assert concerning
Christ I neither affirm nor deny; for I freely confess
that I do not understand them. What I have just affirmed, I
gather from the Scriptures themselves. For I do not read
anywhere that God appeared to Christ or spoke to him,

812 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

but that by Christ God was revealed to the Apostles,
that Christ is the way of salvation, and finally that the
old law was delivered through angels, and not immedi
ately by God. Wherefore, if Moses spoke face to face
with God, as a man to his fellow (that is, by means of
two bodies), Christ communicated with God mind to
mind."1

To this ought to be added a passage taken from
another chapter of the same work:

"Therefore he [Moses] perceived all these things,
not as eternal truths, but, as precepts and ordinances,
and prescribed them as laws of God; and hence it hap
pened that he imagined God as a ruler, as a legislator,
as a king, as merciful, as just, etc., notwithstanding that
all these are only predicates of human nature, and are
absolutely foreign to the divine nature. But this, I
say, is to be affirmed only in regard to the Prophets, who
laid down laws in the name of God, and not in regard
to Christ; for in regard to Christ, although he too seems
to have laid down laws in the name of God, it is to
be supposed that he perceived tilings truly and adequately:
for Christ was not so much a prophet as the very mouth
of God; since, as we showed in chapter I., God revealed
certain things to mankind through the mind of Christ,
as he did previously through angels, i. e., through a
created voice, visions, etc. Wherefore to hold that God
accommodated his revelations to the opinions of Christ
would be just as unreasonable as to say that formerly,
in order to communicate to the Prophets the things to
be revealed, God accommodated his revelations to the
opinions of angels, i. e., of a created voice and of visions.
It would be impossible to say anything more absurd than
this; especially as Christ was sent to teach, not the Jews
only, but the whole human race; and so it was not suf
ficient that he should possess a mind accommodated to
the opinions of the Jews only, but it was necessary that
he should have one accommodated to the universal
opinions and norms of mankind, i. e., to the notions

*Trac. Theol.-Polit. Cap. I (Opera I, pp. 362-3).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 313

that are common to all and are true.1 And indeed from
the circumstance, that God revealed himself immediately
to Christ, or to Christ's mind, and not, as he did to the
Prophets, through words and appearances, we can infer
nothing else than that Christ truly perceived or under
stood the things revealed; for it is when a thing is per
ceived by the mind alone, without outward words and
images, that it is understood. Christ, then, perceived
truly and adequately the matters revealed, and if he ever
prescribed them as laws, he did so on account of the
ignorance and pertinacity of the people. He thus acted the
part of God, inasmuch as he accommodated himself to the
understanding of the people, and hence, although speaking
somewhat more clearly than the Prophets, he very often
taught obscurely and in parables the matters revealed;
especially when addressing those to whom it was not
yet given to understand the Kingdom of Heaven. But
to those to whom it was given to know the mysteries of
heaven, he doubtless taught his doctrines as eternal
truths, and did not prescribe them as laws."2

That both these passages contain a considerable
element of accommodation is apparent at a glance,
but that this element is so large as to render them of
little value for determining Spinoza's real estimate
of Christ, will perhaps not be recognized at once.
In order to interpret them correctly it must be re
membered that, although the second passage occurs
in the chapter on miracles, in both passages the gen
eral subject under consideration is revelation. But
we have seen that Spinoza repeatedly warns us that,
when treating this subject, he occupies the stand
point of the Scripture writers themselves. If there
were any doubt about his having followed the general
rule in this particular case, it would be removed by
his express avowal in the first paragraph quoted:

1 "Notionibus communibus et veris." See page 80 seq.
2Trac. Theol.-Polit. Cap. 4 (Opera II, p. 7).

314 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

"What I have just affirmed, I gather from the Scrip
tures themselves" etc. When he speaks of a mind
that can "perceive things not contained in the first
principles of our knowledge, and not deducible there
from," he supposes a case which does not exist for
him, as anyone even superficially acquainted with
Spinoza's philosophy must recognize. "God's ordi
nances that lead men to salvation", which are said
to be "immediately" apprehended by Christ, are
for Spinoza nothing else than Christ's ethical doc
trines (justice and charity) ; but these, according to
Spinoza, can be deduced with mathematical certainty
by ordinary human reason from "the first principles
of our knowledge." It is clear therefore that he
himself does not credit Christ with any supernatural
wisdom. The extraordinary mind of Christ, it will
be observed, stands 011 precisely the same footing
with the "real voice" that spoke to Moses. For
Spinoza both are fictions. Hence the remark that no
one except Christ has attained to intelligence sur
passing man's, is equivalent to : No one has been en
dowed with the exceptional kind of cognition which
the Scriptures attribute to Christ.

What Spinoza really says is that the biblical writ
ers attribute to Christ (1) a pre-eminence over the
Prophets which could consistently be ascribed only
to one who possesses "adequate knowledge," and
(2) "superhuman" faculties as the organs of his
knowledge. What Spinoza's own view is, he does
not say. But, for the reasons already stated, we
know, what would be sufficiently clear on other
grounds that he himself did not suppose Christ to
be endowed with "superhuman" faculties, or to
know matters inaccessible to common human intelli-

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 315

gence. As to "adequate" knowledge, it is impos
sible to determine with certainty whether Spinoza
supposed Christ to possess it, or not. But from his
apparent readiness to assert (what no one else, I
imagine, would concede) that Christ's accommoda
tion to the "ignorance and pertinacity" of the peo
ple is illustrated not only by his use of parables but
by his adoption of a theistic frame-work for his doc
trines, it seems probable that Spinoza did regard the
historic Jesus as a man of adequate knowledge and
of .speculative genius. But if he supposed that
Christ, although perceiving moral principles as nec
essary truths, was nevertheless a bona fide theist.
Spinoza must have been unable to regard him as a
fully emancipated mind. In that case Spinoza's hu
man ideal would have forbidden his awarding to
Christ the highest place among mortals. That place
could belong only to those elect children of light who
reject all purely religious conceptions as crude an
thropomorphisms differing from one another only in
degree of crudeness.1

Certain expressions in the passages quoted above
might at first reading suggest that Spinoza credited
Christ with that gift of insight, which he calls
scientia intuitiva. But it will be observed that even
what the Scriptures attribute to Christ is not what
Spinoza can call intuition; for this he expressly
describes as proceeding from "the first principles of
our knowledge." And when Christ's knowledge
is called "immediate," Spinoza means only that it
was not mediated by signs and visions; he does not
mean that it was knowledge above process.

1 The men whom Spinoza admired were such as Epi
curus, Democritus, etc. Vide Opera II, 378.

316 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

The fact is, Spinoza has nowhere given a frank ac
count of his opinion of Jesus. It may be that
he chose not to reveal it. Possibly it was not very
clearly defined in his own mind except as regards its
negative determinations; that is to say, he was sure
that Christ was nothing more than a man, and, while
recognizing him as an eminent moral teacher, he
may not have been interested to determine affirm
atively just what type of mind he represented,
perhaps considering the historical data insufficient
for a satisfactory answer to this question.

4. Sin.

In its proper signification 'sin' is a religious term
and a religious term only. It means the transgres
sion of the assumed will of a postulated divine
person. As sometimes employed, however, it de
notes any unrighteousness, without implying an im
mediate reference to Deity. Spinoza uses the word
in both ways. In the chapter on "Church and
State" we had occasion to note that according to
him no unrighteousness can exist outside of civil
society, i. e., there can be no wrong conduct other
than the transgression of the laws of society; al
though of course there may be, outside of society.
conduct that is unwise, for the agent and harmful to
others. To what was said in that place we may here
add his express assertion that "in a state of nature
sin [unrighteousness in general] is inconceivable."1
But if unrighteousness in general has no meaning ex
cept in relation to the laws of society, there can be
no such thing as sin in the sense of a transgression of

1 Eth. IV, 37, schol. 2. — Atque adeo in statu natural!
peccatum concipi nequit.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 317

divine will. And this is of course only the plain and
inevitable consequence of Spinoza's philosophy.
When man 's being and activity are absolutely deter
mined by the immutable laws of the ' ' divine ' ' nature,
he possesses no ability to transgress; and when
"God" is deprived of will and of all ethical qualities,
there is moreover nothing to "sin" against.

Already in the "Short Treatise" sin is regarded
as only an ens rationis which corresponds to no
reality, the conception arising from the comparison
of a Peter or Paul with an abstract idea of man in
general. In truth the individual is not obliged,
since he is not able, to conform to anything but his
own particular nature.* What he can be, he is ; and
what he is not, he cannot be. This thought is re
peated later in his correspondence with Blyenbergh :
"For my part, I cannot concede that sins and evil
are anything positive, much less that anything is
or happens contrary to the will of God. On the con
trary, I not only say that sins are nothing positive,
but even assert that, except improperly and humanly,
we cannot speak of sinning against God."1 Ac
cepting the obvious consequences of these premises,
he adds : " It is indeed true that the wicked express
in their own way the will of God."2 When consid
ered in themselves, i. e., rightly considered, they are
also equally perfect with the good ; for each fills out
his full measure of being. But if by perfection you
mean well-being or "blessedness," they are of course
incomparably less perfect than the good.3 It is

* Opera III, 31. — "Wy besluyten dan te zezzen," etc.

1Epis. 19 (olim 32) Opera II, p. 253.

3 Ibid., p. 255.

3Epis. 23 (olim 34) Opera II, p. 290.

318 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

absurd however to ask whether good works are more
acceptable to God than crime. Neither are * accept
able' to him, the word itself being inapplicable to
God* (for the reason, no doubt, that it implies ethical
distinctions and self -consciousness).

The conception of sin as privation or negation he
illustrates at length, and employs it to evade Blyen-
bergh's objection that his doctrines make God the
cause of sin. He asserts that sin is simply the name
we give to the short-coming of an individual when
compared with what we expect from abstract 'man';
and when we say some one sins, we assume that his
nature possesses potentially the same content as our
abstract idea and that we have a right to require him
to act in harmony with that idea j1 whereas he in fact
possesses no attributes or powers beyond those inher
ing in his individual nature at any given point of
time. Sin therefore is not a real thing. Hence it
requires no cause and in fact has none. It is ab
surd then to speak of God as its cause.2 Nero's
matricide, for instance, was not sin in so far as it
included anything positive, i. e., in so far as it con
sisted of intention and act ; but only in so far as it
exhibited ingratitude, mercilessness, and disobedi
ence. But these words denote wickedness in Nero
only because we judge him by a standard that lies

* Ibid., p. 289.

1 Nominalism of course constitutes the basis of Spino
za's argument here. But that he is not, as is generally
assumed, a consistent nominalist, we have pointed out in
another place. See page 150. In other connections of his
thought, as Martineau has observed, he "unconsciously
retains the realism he professes to renounce." Cf. also
Prof. Fullerton ("The Philos. of Spinoza") who rightly
I think, makes "Spinoza's realism the key to his reason
ings in the 'Ethics.' '

2Epis. 19 (oliin 32) and 21 (olim 34).

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 319

outside his own nature and imagine he could have
been something else than himself and have done
otherwise than he did. The sin is simply our way of
thinking, an ens rationis. Being nothing real, it did
not have God or anything else for its cause. The
real elements in the fact are the intention and the
act, and of these God was indeed the cause.1

Blyenbergh had here, as in general, spoken from
the standpoint of indeterminism and religion, and
from that standpoint his objections were quite
valid. Even his contention that Spinoza's doctrine
makes men resemble stocks and stones is not, in the
sense in which it is meant, absurd ; for Spinoza him
self has compared man 's activity to that of a moving
stone.2 While retaining a good deal of religious
phraseology, Spinoza argues really from the stand
point of atheism ; and it is not surprising that Blyen
bergh, who had not seen the " Ethics,'' was some
what puzzled.

5. Repentance.

Twinges of conscience (knaging), says he in the
"Short Treatise," arise from our doing something
about the Tightness of which we afterward fall into
doubt ; and penitence results from having done some
thing which we recognize to be wrong, that is, ac
cording to Spinoza's thought, to be disadvantageous
or injurious to us. Both are hurtful and bad, since
they are kinds of pain, (droefheid), and all pain is a
sign of diminishing power and well-being. Instead
of penitence, therefore, he would substitute a pas
sionless change of conduct determined by the

1 Epis. 23 (olim 36), Opera IT, p. 288.
3Epis. 58 (olim 62), Opera II, p. 382.

320 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

knowledge of our previous folly.1 With this, what
he has to say on the same subject in the "Ethics"
does not disagree, although he there defines peni
tence as "sadness attended by the idea of oneself as
cause,"2 remarking incidentally, that both penitence
and self-complacency are very vehement affects be
cause men believe themselves to be free.

Rational religion must agree with Spinoza in rec
ognizing change of conduct as the only element of
repentance that is of absolute importance; but it is
to be noted that Spinoza's account of the matter in
volves no reference to "God" in any sense. Hence,
while it may properly be called an ethical doctrine,
there is no justification for calling it a religious doc
trine.

6. Salvation.

It has already appeared with sufficient clearness
that, from the standpoint of Spinoza's philosophy,
salvation is "the intellectual love of God"; or, as an
eminent writer3 has paraphrased it, "acquiescence in
the order of nature, with the delight in knowledge
thereby engendered, and living a righteous life at
the bidding of reason." This is the kind of salva
tion to which, according to Spinoza, the consistent
thinker, the philosopher, must necessarily attain.
But when he says that through obedience salvation
is possible also for unreflective people, it is evident
that the term is not to be understood in quite the
same sense as before. The cognitive factor must be
eliminated. Neither the delight in knowledge nor

1 Korte Verhandeling II, Cap. 10.

2Bth. Ill, 51, schol. Cf. III. 30, schol., where "causae
externae" evidently should be "causae internae."
3 Mr. Pollock Op. cit. 2nd ed., p. 344.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 321

the guidance of reason can be elements in the sal
vation attainable by the unenlightened. Their
peculiar salvation Spinoza has nowhere expressly de
fined, but we may easily discern what it is. This
too, is the ''love of God," although the phrase stands
no longer for a mere cognitive interest in nature,
but for obedience to the righteous personal ruler
postulated by Christianity, who has made a "revela
tion" consisting of the moral law. In other words,
salvation for the masses consists in living, as a con
sequence of theistic assumptions, a life of "justice
and charity," and in enjoying its natural fruits of
peace and security. So far as conduct is concerned,
therefore, the practical results of a life according to
reason and of a life according to religion are about
the same. Both kinds of life are determined by
ethical truths, but in one case these are deduced from
correct, in the other from entirely false notions of
ultimate reality.

7. Providence.

This is another term belonging to the vocabulary
of religion which Spinoza does not hesitate to retain
in his non-religious system. In its real meaning it
cannot be brought into any kind of relation to his
philosophy. It is the word and not the meaning that
he adopts, applying it to that in his system which
takes the place of providence in religion, namely to
necessary, blind causation. Already in the "Short
Treatise" he makes causation and providence equiv
alent, referring to 'God' as in the same sense "the
cause and providence"1 of things. With reference
to the scholastic distinction between a general and
a special providence, he accordingly speaks as fol-

1 Korte Verhandeling, I, Cap. 6.

322 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

lows: "General providence is that by which every
thing, in so far as it is a part of the whole nature,
is produced and sustained. Special providence is
the effort (poginye) ichlch everything makes to pre
serve its peculiar being, in so far as it is conceived, not
as a part of nature, but as a whole in itself."1

For a benevolent divine person without whose
knowledge and will nothing takes place, Spi
noza's doctrine substitutes an impersonal necessity
whose fast embrace extends to the last details of real
ity. His "providence," therefore, shows only a
formal resemblance to the religious doctrine, — it pre
cludes all accidents. A formal resemblance, we say ;
for in Spinoza's thought the impossibility of acci
dents does not, as in a religious system, imply security
through the oversight of a benevolent person, but
only the uniformity of unethical nature. According
to him, as we have seen, cosmic activity does not pro
ceed "from the standpoint of the good."2 His
doctrine supplies changeless data for science, it is
true ; and on this account it is calculated to minister
intellectual satisfaction; but, inasmuch as it fails to
mitigate the merciless aspects of nature and of life
by postulating a transcendent world in the light of
which they are assumed to be justified, it has no real
resemblance to the Christian doctrine of providence.
Religiously it possesses the same value as materialis
tic fatalism ; no more and no less.

8. Prayer.

If Spinoza had not employed this word in theo
logical controversy in such a way as to enable one

1 Op. cit. I., Cap. 5. The italics are ours.
2Bth. I, 33, schol. 2, at the end.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 323

to quote him as a believer in prayer, it would be
superfluous to mention the subject in this connection ;
for prayer can have no justification where all events
result from an impersonal necessity. Even in the
modified sense of mere articulate resignation or of
spiritual communion, it can find no place in Spi
noza's system. Hence he takes no notice of it until
the question of its legitimacy and value is forced
upon him in controversy. Then he says, "I do not
deny that prayers are very useful to us; for my in
tellect is too small to find out all the means which
God possesses for leading men to the love of himself,
i. e., to salvation."1 In the light of his philosophy
and of what we have learned concerning his treat
ment of religion in general, this can only mean, of
course, (if it means anything) that, as far as he can
see, prayer may be a beneficial exercise for the child
ren of the imagination, although for the children of
reason it is not only useless but inconsistent.

The value of such language, employed in con
troversy, may be correctly estimated by comparing
it with the attitude Spinoza assumed toward prayer
when speaking with trusted friends. What that at
titude was is revealed by expressions quoted from
Spinoza in a letter addressed to him by his friend
Hugo Boxel in 1674 — expressions that are indeed
so significant that they ought to be sufficient in them
selves to settle the question of Spinoza's at
titude toward religion. They were not generally
known to exist until 1899, when Prof. Freudenthal
of Breslau, who had found the original Dutch letter
in an old library at Amsterdam, gave it to the public.
Previously the letter had been known only in the

1Epis. 21 (olim 34). Opera II, p. 279.

324 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Latin translation published with the rest of Spi
noza's correspondence; but in this translation the
editors had omitted, for reasons that will be intel
ligible, the particular passage in question. The gen
eral subject of correspondence was the reality of
spirits and the genuineness of alleged supernatural
phenomena. At the conclusion of a letter in which
he had ridiculed Boxel's inclination to believe in
such things, Spinoza had employed language which
Boxel incidentally reproduces in his reply. "At the
end of your letter," he writes, "you say that to com
mend me to God is something you cannot do without
laughing."1

Philippus van Limborch asserts2 that he once found
himself at a dinner where Spinoza was present, and
he observed that, while some were saying grace, Spi
noza made certain signs by which he apparently
wished to indicate the stupidity of the performance.
Spinoza's well-known prudence and considerateness
would forbid our believing, even on the word of so
trustworthy a witness as Limborch, that he was
guilty of any intentional rudeness to those who be
gan the meal with a prayer; but there is nothing dis
creditable in the supposition that he made signs to

1 Freudenthal's Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's, p. 198,
lines 20-23. The passage appears cancelled in the Dutch
original, and, as remarked above, is entirely wanting in
the Latin translation. Spinoza's letter from the end of
which the sentence quoted by Boxel is taken appears
truncated in Spinoza's published correspondence, so that
the connection in which the words occurred is unknown.
I suppose he refers to the use of a conventional phrase
sometimes employed in conclusion committing the friend
addressed to the care of Providence.

2 Cf. a letter of Limborch's published in the appendix
to Meinsma's "Spinoza en zijn Kring," p. 14. An extract
is given in Freudenthal's "Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's,"
p. 211.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 325

intimate friends indicating his estimate of it,
and that these signs may incidentally have caught
the eye of Limborch. Whether the incident was real,
or, as has generally been supposed hitherto, imagi
nary, we are unable to determine with certainty;
but, in the light of Boxel's letter, it will scarcely be
considered any longer as improbable.

CHAPTER V.

SUPPOSED PROFESSIONS OF RELIGIOUS
INTEREST.

The question whether Spinoza's philosophy con
stitutes a religious system is not identical with the
question whether he possessed a religious interest.
It is conceivable that a thinker might have a genuine
religious interest, and nevertheless feel com
pelled, as a consequence of metaphysical pre
suppositions, to accept a non-religious or an anti-
religious view of the world. That Spinoza's philos
ophy is not a religious system, but a typical ex
pression of the antithetical world-view, has become
sufficiently clear. It remains only to consider the
question whether there are adequate grounds for
the common assumption that, whatever be the char
acter of his system, he was personally a man of
strong religious interest. The final answer to this
question, which might have been expected in connec
tion with the "Biographical Sketch," was purposely
deferred until after we should become acquainted
with the characteristics of Spinoza's thinking; for,
although anti-religious tenets may not be conclusive
proof of the absence of all religious interest, the
mental characteristics revealed in a philosopher's
thinking constitute an essential part of the total
manifestation of his personality, and must be known
in order to determine accurately his relation to re
ligion. That attitude, as it has come to light in
the foregoing investigations, has led us to assert that
Spinoza's dominant interest was cognitive and that

RELIGIOUS INTEREST 327

this was unmixed with anything which may be called
the religious interest. We propose here to justify
that conclusion more completely.

In any intelligent discussion of this question, the
first thing to settle is the meaning of 'religious in
terest/ We have already shown that there is no
warrant for applying the term religion to any atti
tude toward reality which does not postulate, ex
plicitly or implicitly, a higher personal power, or
higher personal powers, behind the sensuous world;
and that religion consists in a personal attitude to
the assumed power or powers. Religious interest,
therefore, is an interest in the reality of a world
so constituted; or, in other words, it is a psychical
condition that requires for its satisfaction the peace,
the sense of security, the optimism, the idealism, the
filial consciousness, etc., that are involved in such a
world-view, and in just the way they are involved in
such a world-view. And since interest necessarily
issues in a volitional experience, we may describe it
in ultimate terms as a preference for a world peopled
with superhuman intelligences or controlled by one
supreme intelligence, these intelligences or this in
telligence being conceived as not indifferent to hu
man life. Observe that we do not say it is the ac
ceptance of, but a preference for, such a world-view.
When we dispel the haze that generally envelops
the several expressions, ' religious sentiment,' 're
ligious feeling,' 'religious spirit,' 'religious interest,'
etc., and attempt to put into them some intelligible
content, they are seen to have no other construable
meaning.

The religious interest in this sense is a child of
our complex experience of reality, or of particular

328 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

elements in that experience. The consciousness of
dependence on objective reality, of which so much
has been made by different writers, is perhaps the
most important of these elements, although it does
not of itself constitute the religious interest. The
consciousness of dependence gives rise to the reli
gious interest only when the individual is disposed,
often on account of a sense of orphanage, to conceive
as a person the power on which he ultimately de
pends; when, in other words, he revolts at the
thought of being ruled by unfeeling, inexorable
things. Without undertaking to describe all the
other elements of experience which may condition
the religious interest, it is sufficient for our present
purpose to note that conceivably the determining
factor may be a perception of the vanity of the
ordinary goods of life. But neither is this dissatis
faction, in itself, the religious interest; it is only a
favorable condition for its birth when it does not
exist, and for its maintenance where it is already
found as a result of early education or of unreflec-
tive impulse. With the felt inadequacy of the com
mon objects of pursuit a religious interest may, or
may not, be associated. Such dissatisfaction might
favor a purely ethical, a purely aesthetic, or a purely
cognitive interest. Indeed it could co-exist with
passive pessimism, or even with a positive antipathy
to religion. Here we are concerned only with the cir
cumstance that, in the case supposed, the religious
interest is not present unless the dissatisfied spirit
craves, among other things, a world controlled by a
personal power.

We wish to emphasize the fact that the religious
interest has its roots in the emotional nature and is

RELIGIOUS INTEREST 329

the expression of personal needs. In how far the
personal needs thus expressed are facts which, in a
scientific account of the world, would appear as a ra
tional justification of the religious postulates, is a
question with which we are not here concerned.
Whether religion is based on truth or untruth, it
cannot be questioned that the distinctively religious
interest is concerned with values, and, can become
strong only in a richly emotional nature. In this
respect, it is the antithesis of the scientific interest,
which is concerned only with facts. The latter may
make religion, as well as anything else, an ob
ject of reflection, but it does not thereby become the
religious interest. Investigations in theology and
in the philosophy of religion do not necessarily im
ply a religious interest, but only a scientific in
terest in religion. But when the religious interest
is strong, it tends, of course, like any other, to sub
ordinate the cognitive activity to its own ends; and
its influence is distinctly traceable in the movements
and results of a man's thinking. Whether, in a
particular case, reflection on religion has been oc
casioned by a religious interest or by a scientific in
terest in religion, can be learned only from the way
in which the subject is treated.

In Spinoza we have, as all agree, a person in whom
the emotional life found little place. Whether we
consider it a virtue or a fault, we must recognize the
fact that, in his case, feeling was sacrificed to knowl
edge, heart to intellect. The claims of the emotional
nature were allowed neither in his life nor in his
system. On this point we would add nothing to
what has recently been said by one of his warmest
admirers : ' ' He is not a man of feeling So

330 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

great in him is the power of the intellect, that in his
character there appears at times a certain matter-
of-fact-ness and coldness, which represses important
aesthetic interests and undeniable needs of the
heart (Gemtit). This accounts for his one-sided

judgments on art and religion The most

beautiful creations of poetry, such as Ariosto's 'Ro
land,' are for him mere trumpery (nugae)."1 It is
evident, therefore, that to expect to find in Spinoza
a strong religious interest would be as unwarrant
able as to look for lilies at the North Pole.

The fact that Spinoza wrote much on religion has
been interpreted as an evidence of religious interest ;
but one could as well argue that, for the same rea
son, Lucretius was a man of strong religious interest.
To justify the assumption in Spinoza's case, it
would be necessary to point out in the peculiarities
of his thinking a subjective preference for a world
controlled by a personal power. But we have seen
that on almost every page he betrays the strongest
antipathy to such a world. In all his writings there
cannot be found the slightest evidence that, even
in his early years, the loss of faith in the religious
instruction of his youth, caused him any pain. In
the case of men of strong religious interest, such a
crisis is always attended with grief. The assump
tion of some2 that, when Spinoza wrote his first
works, his thinking was inspired by the desire of
harmonizing religion with reason, and that, in his
later works only, did he come to reject religion en
tirely, cannot be justified. The period in which his
thinking had a religious aim, if there ever was such

1 Freudenthal, "Sp. : Sein Lebeii u. seine Lehre," I, 197.

2 Avenarius for example.

RELIGIOUS INTEREST 331

a period, was already passed before the composition
of any of his works.

The fact that Spinoza thought and wrote much on
religious matters is adequately explained by the
circumstance that these subjects were the ones with
which he was occupied at the time when his scientific
interest awoke. They lay immediately in his way,
and it would have been very strange, in any case,
if he had not dealt with them.

The supposed expressions of religious interest,
when sifted, turn out to be what we have already
found Spinoza's religious doctrines to be, either
empty phraseology or expressions of the cognitive
interest. The introduction to his "Improvement of
the Understanding" may be taken as the most
characteristic example. It reads as follows :

"After experience had taught me that all the things
which frequently obtain in ordinary life were vain and fu
tile; when I saw that all things which I was wont to fear
were neither good nor bad, except in so far as the mind is
affected by them; I finally decided to inquire whether
there were something that is an attainable real good,
by which alone, all other things having been rejected,
the mind would be affected; whether, indeed, there were
something which, when found and possessed, would en
able me to enjoy continual and supreme happiness for
ever. I say 'finally decided,' for at first thought it seemed
unwise to be willing to drop a certain thing for one as
yet uncertain. I saw in fact the advantages of honor
and riches, and that I should be forced to renounce the
pursuit of them, if I wished to give serious attention to
something different and new; and, if perchance the
highest happiness really resided in those things, I saw
that I should be deprived of it; but, if it did not reside in
them and I should give attention to them, I should also
be deprived of the highest happiness.

332 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

I considered the question, therefore, whether it were
not perhaps possible to arrive at a new mode of life, or
at least at a certainty concerning its existence, without
changing the usual conduct of my life; but I often at
tempted it in vain. For those things in life which, as is
evident from men's actions, are esteemed to be the highest
good may be reduced to these three: riches, honor, and
sensual pleasure. By these three things the mind is so
distracted that it is able to think very little about any
other good. For as regards sensual pleasure, the mind
is thereby rendered so inactive that it rests in it as if in
some real good; so that it is in the highest degree hin
dered from thinking about any other; and such enjoy
ment is followed by the greatest depression of spirits,
which, if it does not suspend the mind's activity, at least
disturbs and dulls it.

By the pursuit of honors and riches also the mind is
not a little distracted, especially when they are sought
for their own sake; for then they are assumed to be the
summum &OMWW. But by honor the mind is still more dis
tracted than by riches; for it is always supposed to be
good for its own sake, and as a final end, to the attain
ment of which all things are employed as means

When I saw, therefore, that all these things would hinder
me from applying myself to any new mode of life; that,
in fact, they were so opposed thereto, that either the one
or the other would have to be renounced, I was compelled
to inquire, which would be the more advantageous to
me. .... After earnest reflection, I came to see that

I should be leaving certain evils for a certain good

The evils were seen to have resulted from the fact, that
happiness or unhappiness depends on the quality of the
object loved. For unless a thing is loved, no quarrels
arise concerning it; and there will be no sadness, if it
perish; no envy if it is possessed by another, — no fear,
no hatred, in a word, no perturbations of the mind at all.
All these arise when we love those things which can
perish, such as the objects of which I have just spoken.
But love towards an eternal and infinite thing feeds the
mind with joy only and is free from all sadness."

RELIGIOUS INTEREST

The "Improvement of the Understanding" was
composed, as is well-known, while Spinoza was
studying Bacon V No vum Organum"and Descartes'
"Discours de la Methode." The influence of Descar
tes is easily discerned, especially in the form. We
subjoin, in opposite columns, the introductory words
of Spinoza's work and corresponding passages from
Descartes':

Improvement of the Under
standing.1

"After experience taught
me that all things which
frequently obtain in ordinary
life were vain and futile, . . .
I finally decided to inquire
whether there were something
that is an attainable real
good; .... whether in fact
there were something
which, when found and pos
sessed would enable me to
enjoy continual and supreme
happiness forever,"

Discours de la Methode.3
For I have already
reaped such fruits [from
my method] that, although
when viewed philosophic
ally, nearly all the divers
activities and undertakings of
men seem to me vain and
futile, I never cease to re
ceive extreme satisfaction
from the progress I think
I have made in the search
of truth, and to receive
such hopes for the future
that, if among the occupa
tions of men there is some
one that is really good and
important, I venture to be
lieve it is this one which I
have chosen." (I. 3).

"For those things in life
which, as is evident from
men's actions, are es
teemed to be the highest
good are reducible to these
three: riches, honor, and
sensual pleasure."

(See next page for Note 2.)

1 De Intellects, etc. "Postquam me experientia docuit,
omnia, qua? in communi vita occurrunt, vana et futiUa esse: . .

334 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

"When I saw that all the "My third maxim was to
sources of my fears are attempt always to conquer
neither good nor bad, ex- myself rather than fortune,
cept in so far as the mind and to change my desires
is affected by them," — rather than the order of

the world, and in general
to accustom myself to be
lieve that there is nothing
entirely within our power,
except our thoughts."
(III. 4 Cf. III. 5).

"For although I really "But I confess there is
saw these things clearly, I need of prolonged exercise
was nevertheless not able arid of oft-repeated medita-
on that account to lay aside tion, in order to accustom
all love of riches, sensual oneself to look at all things
pleasure and fame" (p. 5). in this way." (III. 4).

"Which I often at
tempted in vain." (p. 3).

constitui tandem inquirere, an aUquid daretur, quod rcruni
bonuni, et sui communicabile esset; ..... imo an aliquid
daretur, quo invent o et acquisito, continua ac suininii in
(sternum f merer laetitia."

"Quae plerumque in vita occurrunt, et apud homines,
ut ex eorum operibus colligere licet, tanquam summura
bonum aestimantur, ad haec tria rediguntur: divitias
scilicet, honorem, atque libidinem."

"Cum viderem omnia, a quibus et quae timebam, nihil
neque boni neque mali in se habere, nisi quatenus ab iis
animus movebatur."

"Nam quamvis haec mente adeo clare perciperem, non
poteram tamen ideo omnem avaritiam, libidinem, atque
gloriam deponere" (p. 5).

"Quod saepe frustra tentavi" (p. 1).

2 Dlscours, etc. "Car j'en ai [de ma methode]
recueilli de tels fruits, que .... encore que regardant
d'un wil de pliilosopJie les diverges actions et entre-
prises de tons les Jwmmes, il n'y en ait quasi aucune qui ne
me seml)le uaine et inutile, je ne laisse pas de recevoir une
extreme satisfaction du progres que je pense avoir deja
fait en la recherche de la verite, et de recevoir de telles
esperances pour 1'avenir, que si, cntre les occupations des

RELIGIOUS INTEREST 335

As regards the way in which they introduce
their common subject only two noteworthy differ
ences appear: (1) Spinoza, consistently with his
general habit, employs, when he can, language that
has more or less of religious associations, as in
ceternum for permanent, while Descartes does noth
ing of the kind; and (2) les diver ses actions et enter-
prises des hommes, which both pronounce vain, are
specifically named by Spinoza as the pursuit of
riches, honor, and sensual pleasure, each of which he
treats in some detail.

Many other striking points of resemblance be
tween the two writings will be discovered by anyone
who will take the pains to compare them carefully.
The likeness which Spinoza's introduction bears to
the way Descartes approaches the same subject,
would justify the supposition that Spinoza borrowed
from Descartes at least the idea of writing it in the
form of personal experience, — that, in short, this
form was not spontaneous, and represents a hypo
thetical rather than a real experience. It may be a
mere pedagogical device. One may doubt whether he
actually aimed to describe anything more than the
typical experience of a rational man.

But if the experience related was literally his
own. we should still be making a mistake to regard

hommes . . . il y en a quelqu'itne- qui soit solidement bonne et im-
portante, fuse croire que c'est celle que fai choisie." (I. 3).

"Ma troisieme maxime 6tait de tacher toujours plutot
a me vaincre que la fortune, et a changer mes desirs que
1'ordre du monde, et generalement de m'accoutumer a
croire qu'il n'y a rien qui soit entierement en notre
pouvoir que nos pensges." (III. 4. Cf. III. 5).

"Mais j'avoue qu'il est besoin d'un long exercice et
d'une meditation souvent reiteree pour s'accoutumer a
regarder de ce biais toutes les choses" (p. 36).

336 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

it as evidence of a religious interest. A religious
interest, as we have shown, resolves itself into a sub
jective preference for a world-view that contains
a genuine God. What he was seeking was not God,
nor any grounds for positing the existence of God,
but the summum bonum ; and this he was quite satis
fied to find, not in the belief that the world is con
trolled by a personal power, but in what he rather
enigmatically called "the knowledge of the mind's
union with the whole of nature"1 — of nature un-
idealized, the system of mechanical forces. This
"union," or "knowledge" of it, (the two expres
sions seem to designate the same thing) is mentioned
in other works; but its nature is so unclearly de
scribed that we should have to abandon all hope of
understanding it, if we did not know its equivalents.
It is the same as the Amor Dei Intellectualis, which
we have already considered, and as "the love toward
an eternal and infinite thing,"2 mentioned in this
connection. But these formulae are so vague to
Spinoza's thought that they represent several differ
ent things at will: (1) the satisfaction the intellect
finds in a system of fixed laws, (2) the mere joy of
cognition, and (3) such a recognition of the neces
sity and invariable order of nature as quenches all
desire for anything else than the actual ; the
"love" of an eternal and infinite thing (changeless
and resistless nature) thus saving us from the dis
appointments of those who set their hearts on riches,
honor, pleasure, or any other perishable and

1 De Int. Emend., Opera I, p. 6. — "cognitionem unionls,
quam mens cum tota Natura habet."

2 De Int., Opera I, Emend., p. 5. "Amor erga rem
aoternam et infinitam."

RELIGIOUS INTEREST 337

variable objects of desire; In this aspect it is not
essentially different from the happiness which, ac
cording to Descartes, those possess who ''cease not
to recognize the limitations prescribed for them by
nature, and are so fully persuaded nothing is in their
power except their own thoughts, that this alone is
sufficient to prevent them from having any affection
for other things; and who thus dispose of them so
absolutely that they have in this fact some reason
for esteeming themselves richer, more powerful,
freer, arid happier than those, who, for want of this
philosophy, are unable, however much favored by
nature and fortune, to have in their power all they
desire."1 If Spinoza's language is that of a reli
gious spirit, so is Descartes'.

It should be observed that this supposed mystical
"union" has for its auxiliaries: (1) Moral Phi
losophy; (2) Pedagogy; (3) Medicine; and (4) Me
chanics.2

With the value of these thoughts of Spinoza's,
considered as ethical doctrines, we are in no way
concerned. It is sufficient for our purpose to note
that neither in the result at which he arrives, nor in
the way in which he reaches it, can be found the
slightest influence of a religious interest.3

In Spinoza 's different writings, especially where
he has occasion to vindicate his views against the

1 Discours de la Methode, p. 36. Cf. Sp. De Int. Emend.,
p. 5.
. J De Int. Emend., p. 6.

8 We regard as misleading, therefore, Professor Royce's
treatment of this passage in his "Spirit of Modern Philos
ophy," and also Freudenthal's in the work just pub
lished, "Spinoza," etc., I, p. 109.

338 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

charge of irrcligion, we sometimes meet language
that sounds like the profession of a profound re
ligious experience. In his correspondence with
Blyenbergh, for example, occurs this characteristic
passage: "In the meantime I know (that which
supplies me with the highest satisfaction and peace
of mind) that all things come to pass by the power
and immutable decree of a Being supremely per
fect."1 How nai've it would be to mistake this for
a bona fide expression of that religious peace which
the Christian saint sometimes professes in adversity
as a result of the assurance of divine care, the reader
who has followed us thus far need not be told.
Our analysis of Spinoza's "supremely perfect
Being" has shown that it is nothing more than the
mechanical cause of impersonal, unethical nature,
whose perfection consists only in its size and im
mutability.

In so far therefore as this language is anything
more than a gloss employed to vindicate his system
from the charge of impiety, it can be understood
only as an expression of the satisfaction which the
scientific mind finds in the uniformity of nature. As
Spinoza was the very impersonation of the cognitive
interest, the satisfaction he describes may have been
real ; but it was in no sense a religious experience.

'Opera II, Epist. 21 (olim 34), p. 276. — Agnosco In
terim (id quod summam mihl praebct satisfactloncm et
mentis tranquillitatem) cuncta potentia Entis summe per
fect! ac ejus immutabili ita fieri decreto.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we may briefly summarize the re
sults, already stated at different places in the fore
going chapters, to which our investigations have
brought us.

An accurate description of Spinoza's system is
not given when it is called Pantheism. This word
is so vague in its meaning that it may be applied to
every sort of Monism — even to Materialism on the
one hand and to certain forms of Theism on the
other. Etymologically the term ought to denote
only such systems as transfigure the world by ele
vating it into God, i. e., by spiritualizing it. In
systems of this type the world is swallowed up in
God, God being the only reality. But it is possible
to read the term in the opposite direction also, and
to apply it to systems which bring God down to the
level of the mechanical world, i. e., substitute the
de-spiritualized world for God. In systems of this
type God is swallowed up in the world, or rather is
abolished that the mechanical world may be the sole
reality. If, from the standpoint of religion, we are
to give Spinoza's system an unambiguous name, it
is evident that we must employ some other term than
Pantheism. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to
call it by a name that has often been used as an
opprobrious epithet; but, it scarcely need be added,
the present writer employs the term in its strictly
etymological signification, as applying to a system of
thought, and in no way as dishonoring the blameless
man who created that system. The right name for

340 SPINOZA AND RELIGION

Spinoza's philosophy is Atheistic Monism. It repre
sents a world-view which, in its essential features, is
the very antithesis of that required by the religious
consciousness.

Particular utterances of Spinoza's which, taken
by themselves, seem obviously to express religious
conceptions and religious feeling, evaporate under
critical examination into mere phraseology; a part
of which may be made intelligible by translating it
into terms of his atheistic philosophy, while a re
siduum remains unintelligible, although it is ac
counted for by his demonstrable purpose of some
times accommodating his language to the religious
views of the time.

Personally Spinoza had no religious interest prop
erly so-called, but only a scientific interest in reli
gion ; which is something quite different. In fact, it
is hardly too much to say that the only interest he
had in anything was scientific, philosophical. He
made religion the object of reflection, not because it
lay near his heart, but because the peculiar circum
stances of his life thrust the subject in the way of his
active intellect.

FINIS.

INDEX

Absoluta cogitatio 190 ff.

Accommodation, Spino
za's 55-65

Anathema pronounced

against Spinoza 15

Aristotle 12-97

Arnold, Matthew 50, 54 n.

Atheist, Spinoza is called

27, 45, 48, 241
Attribute, Spinoza's defi
nition 112

Attribute of extension.. 161
Attribute of thought . .190 ft*.
Attributes, The formal . 101
Attributes, The real . . . 112
Attributes, The unknown 125

Bacon, Francis 12

Bayle, Pierre 45

Blyenbergh, Willem van

30-31

Bodies, Spinoza's doc
trine of 67-68

Boxel, Hugo 40, 323

Brinton, Daniel G 226

Burgh, Albert, tries to
convert Spinoza 40

Cabala, The 8

Caird, Edward 233

Camerer 47, 276, 278

Cartesians oppose Spi-

nozisrn 36-37

Casearius, Spinoza's pu
pil 24

Causality, The "indirect"

135 ff.

Cause, Immanent 131-134, 159
Cause, Spinoza's concep
tion of ..92, 131-134, 213-16
Christ, Spinoza's esti
mate of 308 ff.

Church and State 281

Cogitatio absoluta 190 ff.

Coleridge 50

Colerus (Kohler) 39

Collegiants 18-1*

Conde ; 38

Costa, Uriel da, perse
cuted 13

Descartes 12, 99, 112

Deterrainatio est nega-

tio 192

De Vries 20, 29, 21&

Ens Indetermlnatum 128, 193

Ens realissimum l&a

Erdmann, Johann Ed.

47, 11T, 279>
"Essence" as used by

Spinoza 136, 213-16

Essences (eternal).
Their relation to indi
vidual existences ...141ff.

"Ethics" begun 25

"Ethics" completed 34

Excommunication of Spi
noza 15-17

Extension, Absolute 161

Ezra, Ibn ben 10

342

INDEX

Fades Totlus Naturae.. 175
Ferdinand, King of

Spain 2

Finite, How connected

with the infinite 134 ff.

Fischer, Kuno,

47, 120, 175 n., 193 n.
Frankness, Want of in

treating Spinoza .... 53
Freudenthal,

1 n., 20, 48, 53, 183 n., 330
Fullerton 150 n., 318 n.

God as cause ...110, 131-134
"God" employed by Spi
noza in two different

senses 158

"God-intoxicated P h i -

losopher," The... 49, 50, 56
God, Spinoza's concep
tion of 97 ff.

God, The intellectual

love of 249 ff.

God's immutability 107

God's infinity 103

God's perfection 109

God's self-existence and

eternity 102

God's solitariness 107

Goethe 51, 257

Hague, The 33

Hardenberg, Friedrich

von, (Novalis) 49

Hegel 46

Heidelberg, Spinoza's

call to 37

Heine, Heinrich 51

Herder 49, 243

Hobbes, Thomas 12

Holland in Seventh Cen
tury 3-5

Huygens, Christiaan ... 30

Idea Dei 182

Idea Ideae, 74, 192, 194, 220 n.
Idea, Use of the word

by Spinoza 68-71

Ideas, adequate... 80, 84, 85

Ideas, inadequate 78

Imagination 75-80

Immortality 173, 266 ff.

"Improvement of the

Understanding" 23

Inquisition in Spain .... 1-3
Intellectus Inflnitus . . .163 ff.
Interpretation, Rule of

for Spinoza 65

Intuition 83

Isabella, Queen of Spain 2

Jakobi 45, 243

James, William, 221, 232, 235

Jastrow 237

Jews, Persecution of .... 1-3
Jewish Colony in Am
sterdam 6, 10

Jewish Synagogue
School at Amsterdam. 7

Joachim 195 n.

John of Damascus 98

Kant 45, 230, 238

Koerbagh, John and
Adrian . 32-33

Leibnitz 39, 45

Limborch Philippus van 324

Loewe, J. H 47, 195

Love of God, The intel
lectual 249 ff.

Love, Spinoza's definition

of 252

Lullman 249 n.

Maimonides 10

Martineau 1, 18 n., 21. 47

Martini, J 98

Mathematics 86

Meinsma 1, 324 n.

Memory 77

Menasseh ben Isreal,

Spinoza's teacher 8

Mennonites 19

"Metaphysical Thought"

published 25

INDEX

343

Method, Spinoza's 86-93

Meyer, Lodewijk ...20, 41, 58

Mind, The human 68-74

Minds, An infinite num
ber of in each body, 178 ff.

Miracles 289

Mishnah, The 9

Modes, Infinite 134-136

Morteira, Saul Levi, Spi
noza's teacher . 8

Natura Naturans 155

Natura Naturata 155

Necessity 153

Neo-Platonism ..12, 134, 146

"New Christians" 3

Notiones communes .... 82

Novalis (Hardenberg) . . 49

Oldenburg, Henry 26

Pensions for Spinoza ... 29

Pfleiderer 48

Phenomenalism, Spino
za's relation to,

115-120, 124
Pollock, Sir Frederick,

47, 90 n., 278 n., 292 n., 301
"Posthumous Works" of

Spinoza 42

Prayer 322

"Principles of Descartes'
Philos." published ... 25

Problem, Spinoza's 97 ff.

Providence 321

Quakers

27

Realism (as distin
guished from Phe
nomenalism), Spinoza's

91, 113-120, 122

Realism, Spinoza's log
ical . j...90n., 150 n.

Reason 80-86

Religious consciousness,
Analysis of 221 ff.

Religious interest, Ex
pressions of 326 ff.

Remonstrants 19

Renan, Ernest 50

Repentance 319

Revelation 289 ff.

Rieuwertsz, Jan 40

Rijnsburg' 23

Romanes 239

Royce 337

Salvation 320

Schleiermacher 46, 234

School, Jewish at Am
sterdam , 7, 9

Schopenhauer 47

Schuller, Herman 40

Scientia intuitiva 83

Self-consciousness 74-75

"Short Treatise" 22

Sidgwick, H 233 n.

Sigwart, Christoph ...47, 204

Sigwart, S. G. W 47

Sin 316

Socinians 27

Space is filled 162

Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict):

Birth 1

Parentage and family 6-7

His teachers 7-9, 11

Refuses his share in

the inheritance 14

Excommunication ...15-16
Alleged banishment

from Amsterdam ... 18
Composes the "Short

Treatise" 22

Goes to Rijnsburg .... 23
Works upon his "Im
provement of the
Understanding" .... 23
Gives private instruc
tion in Descartes'

philosophy 24

Publishes his exposi
tion of the "Prin
ciples of Descartes'
Philosophy" with
"M etaphysical
Thoughts" appended

24-25, 58-59
Begins his "Ethics" . . 25

344

INDEX

Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict) —

continued:

Finishes the ".Ethics" 36
Goes to Voorburg .... 26
Begins his "Theolog-

ico-Polit. Treatise" . 27
Publishes the "Theo-

logico-Polit. Tr." ... 34
Pensioned by De Vries

and De Witt 29-30

Correspondence with

Blyenbergh 30-31

Moves to The Hague. . 33
Decides not to publish

the "Ethics" 36-37

Receives call to Hei
delberg Univer 37

Goes to Utrecht to

meet Cond£ 38

Meets Leibnitz 39

Is exhorted by Albert
Burgh to be con
verted to Roman

Church 40

Last illness and death 41 f.

His personality 42-44

Manifests no religious
interest in his youth

12, 20

Spyck, Van der 34

Suarez 98

Substance and modes . . . 130
Substance, Definitions of

97-99

Taylor, A. E 278 n.

Tennyson, Alfred 50

Terminology, Spinoza's

religious 55-65

"Theologico-Polit. Trea
tise" 27-29, 34

Thomas Aquinas 98, 183

Thought attribute 190 ff.

Trendelenburg 47, 195

Tschirnhaus, Walter 40

Van der Ende 11

Van Vloten 48

Velthuysen 35, 242

Voigtlander 205

Von Dalberg 49

Voorburg 26

William III. of House of

Orange 35

Witt, Jan de 30, 38

Zeller, Ed 147, 279 n.

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